Harmon v Oceania Football Confederation Incorporated
[2021] NZHC 1210
•27 May 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2020-404-760
[2021] NZHC 1210
BETWEEN LEE HARMON
Applicant
AND
OCEANIA FOOTBALL
CONFEDERATION INCORPORATED
Respondent
CIV-2020-404-837 UNDER
Parts 19 and 26 of the High Court Rules and Rule 36, Schedule 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996
BETWEEN
OCEANIA FOOTBALL
CONFEDERATION INCORPORATED
ApplicantAND
LEE HARMON
Respondent
Hearing: 24 August 2020 Appearances:
P W David QC and C D Boswell for Applicant/Respondent N R Williams and W R Potter for Respondent/Applicant
Judgment:
27 May 2021
JUDGMENT OF PETERS J
This judgment was delivered by Justice Peters on 27 May 2021 at 3 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date: ...................................
HARMON v OCEANIA FOOTBALL CONFEDERATION INCORPORATED [2021] NZHC 1210 [27 May 2021]
Introduction
[1] I issued a results judgment in this matter on 30 April 2021, granting the application by Mr Harmon and dismissing that by Oceania Football Confederation Inc (“OFC”), both of which applications are referred to below.1 These are my reasons.
Applications
[2] Mr Harmon applies for enforcement of an award by entry as a judgment, the award being that of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”) dated 10 March 2020 (“award”). This application is made pursuant art 35, sch 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (“sch 1” and “Act”).
[3] OFC opposes Mr Harmon’s application and seeks an order for refusal of recognition or enforcement of the award, pursuant to art 36, sch 1. OFC submits there is a dispute as to the effect of the award and there can be no recognition or enforcement until the Court has determined its effect. Failing that, OFC submits the award deals with a dispute outside the terms of the submission to arbitration; alternatively, that a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred, whether in connection with the making of the award or so as to render OFC otherwise unable to present its case.
Parties
[4] OFC is an incorporated society registered in New Zealand, and one of six regional confederations recognised by the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (“FIFA”), the international organisation for football.
[5] Mr Harmon is the President of the Cook Islands Football Association (“CIFA”). CIFA is a “member organisation” of OFC. As President, in usual circumstances, Mr Harmon would represent CIFA on OFC’s Executive Committee (“Executive Committee”).
[6] The dispute between OFC and Mr Harmon arose from the Executive Committee’s advice to Mr Harmon that, as a result of matters between him and FIFA,
1 Harmon v Oceania Football Confederation Incorporated [2021] NZHC 955.
he had become, and would remain for life, ineligible to be a member of the Executive Committee. The background to the dispute may be summarised as follows.
Background
[7] In December 2018, FIFA alleged Mr Harmon had breached various of its regulations by selling tickets allocated to him personally for games or events in the 2018 FIFA World Cup.2 Mr Harmon defended the allegations. Following mediation, the parties agreed that Mr Harmon would pay a fine of CHF 20,000 and that he would be suspended for three months from participating in any football-related activity, whether at national or international level. Mr Harmon paid the fine, and his suspension took effect on 8 March 2019.
[8] Following the settlement between FIFA and Mr Harmon, OFC reviewed Mr Harmon’s status as a member of the Executive Committee.
[9] OFC’s internal procedures are governed by its statutes or rules (“statutes”). The articles in the statues to which I refer below are set out in the annexure to this judgment.
[10] The Executive Committee has many important functions in the OFC, including setting OFC’s strategic direction, determining its policies and regulations, and approving its annual budget. Membership of the committee is provided for in art 27 and includes, amongst others, the “presidents of each Full Member Association”. Thus Mr Harmon was a member of the Executive Committee by virtue of being the President of CIFA.
[11] In or about 2018, OFC had established an “Eligibility Committee”, whose functions included reporting to the Executive Committee if a current office holder, such as a member of the Executive Committee, did not meet, or no longer met, the eligibility or independence criteria in arts 59 and 60 respectively, art 59 being the important one for present purposes.
2 Mr Harmon did sell the tickets but paid the proceeds of their sale into CIFA’s operating account. Mr Harmon did not retain the proceeds for personal gain.
[12] On 20 March 2019, the Eligibility Committee advised the Executive Committee that, having been “sanctioned” by FIFA, Mr Harmon had become ineligible to be a member of the Executive Committee, and that he would remain ineligible for life on the grounds in art 59(g) of the statutes.
[13] Article 28(k) of the statutes provides that the Executive Committee may give notice to a member, terminating his or her appointment immediately, if the Eligibility Committee advises he or she has become ineligible. OFC gave this notice by letter to Mr Harmon of 17 April 2019, in which Ms Lloyd, OFC’s in-house solicitor, said:
The OFC Eligibility Committee has reported to the Executive Committee ... that you no longer meet the criteria in Article 59, as you have been subject to sanctions by the FIFA Ethics Committee.
As the FIFA Ethics Committee has sanctioned you in a Decision of the Chairperson of the Adjudicatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee notified on 7 March 2019, you are no longer eligible to be OFC President, an OFC elected FIFA Council Member, a member of the OFC Executive Committee, a member of an OFC Committee, a member of [an] OFC Judicial Body or as OFC General Secretary for life.
You are hereby given notice of termination from (sic) your membership of the OFC Executive Committee under Article 28(k).
[14] Mr Harmon disputed this outcome, which led to further correspondence between the parties. The only point to note regarding the later correspondence is that, in its letter of 29 May 2019, OFC advised Mr Harmon that the members of the Executive Committee had determined in mid-April 2019 to give notice to Mr Harmon under art 28(k) and had ratified their decision at a meeting on 9 and 10 May 2019.
[15] As it turned out, OFC had already communicated with CIFA about what it contended resulted from the settlement between FIFA and Mr Harmon. On 12 March 2019, OFC advised CIFA that Mr Harmon was ineligible to hold office as a member of the Executive Committee as a result of art 59(g), and that CIFA would have no representative on the committee if it did not elect another president.
CAS
[16]Article 41 of the statutes provides for recourse to CAS to resolve any dispute.
[17] Mr Harmon lodged an appeal to CAS on 17 June 2019, and an “appeals brief” on 3 July 2019. In both documents, Mr Harmon identified his appeal as being against the “decision of [OFC’s] Executive Committee on 9-10 May 2019 to impose a life ban on [him] based on their interpretation of art. 59 of the OFC Statutes”. The appeal document and the appeals brief were both comprehensive, raising several issues about the procedure the Executive Committee had adopted, whether there had been a failure by OFC to give Mr Harmon an opportunity to be heard before reaching a decision, as well as taking issue with the Committee’s construction of art 59. Mr Harmon’s position on the merits was that any ineligibility continued only until he had paid his fine and served his suspension, following which he would become eligible to resume his position.
[18]In so far as concerns relief, Mr Harmon sought that the arbitrator:
13.1.1Cancel the respective decisions of the Eligibility Committee on 20 March 2019 and the Executive Committee on 9-10 May 2019.
13.1.2Make a declaration that Lee Harmon is eligible to return to the OFC Executive Committee on 8 September 2019 in accordance with Art. 27(1)(b) of the OFC Statutes when he has satisfied art. 59(h) of the OFC Statutes on 7 September 2019.
[19] OFC raised a number of defences in its statement of defence, including that the appeal was out of time and that CAS had no jurisdiction to hear the dispute. OFC also contended that, if it came to the merits, Mr Harmon was within art 59(g), that the effect of the provision was clear, and that it rendered Mr Harmon ineligible for life for appointment to, or to be a member of, the Executive Committee.
[20] OFC sought that Mr Harmon’s appeal be dismissed and a declaration that, having been sanctioned by FIFA, Mr Harmon was ineligible for appointment to, or to hold office as a member of, the Executive Committee.
[21] Subsequently, the parties agreed an “order of procedure” which provided CAS had:
... jurisdiction to determine, by arbitration, the dispute which is the subject of that Application brought by Mr Lee Harmon ... dated 17 June 2019 against [OFC] and agree to refer the dispute to CAS for determination by arbitration.
Arbitration
[22] A sole arbitrator, the Hon. Dr Tricia Kavanagh, heard the appeal on 16 and 17 September 2019. Mr Harmon and OFC were each represented at the hearing by counsel and each filed written submissions. After the hearing counsel confirmed their rights to be heard “had been fully respected” by the arbitrator and that they had “no issue with respect to the way the CAS procedure or hearing was conducted”.3
[23] In her lengthy award, the arbitrator dismissed OFC’s procedural arguments, and allowed Mr Harmon’s appeal. The main, but far from the only, point to emerge from her award was that any ineligibility brought about by any of the sub-articles in art 59 continued only until the particular event was cured. In this case, that meant Mr Harmon was eligible to resume his position as a member of the Executive Committee once he had paid his fine — which he had already done — and served the three month period of suspension imposed by FIFA and a further three months as provided for in art 59(h). (Nothing turns on that extension.)
[24]The relief ordered was:
The Court of Arbitration for Sport rules that:
...
2.The Decision of the OFC Eligibility Committee as endorsed by the Executive Committee of the OFC and notified to Lee Harmon by the Executive Committee on 17 April 2019 stating Mr Harmon is ineligible to be a member of the OFC Executive Committee “for life” and the Executive Committee’s associated decision to terminate Lee Harmon’s Membership of the OFC Executive Committee are set aside.
3.Lee Harmon is declared eligible under Article 59(h) as President of the Cook Islands Football Association to resume his role as a member of the OFC Executive Committee from 9 September 2019.
...
[25]I refer to the declaration in [3] above as “declaration three”.
3 Harmon v Oceania Football Confederation, above n 2, at [39].
Article 11(1)(f) of the statutes
[26] OFC acknowledges that on one view of it — the only view of it on Mr Harmon’s case — declaration 3 allows his immediate return to the Executive Committee as CIFA’s president in accordance with art 27. OFC does not wish Mr Harmon to return and relies on art 11(1)(f) as precluding his doing so. In my view, the most that can be said for art 11(1)(f) is that every member of OFC is obliged to ensure that none of its officials or members who have been suspended for six months or more and/or fined $500 or more in the previous five years can represent it at, broadly, OFC or FIFA events or meetings. It is fair to say art 11(1)(f) is not well drafted and no doubt there would be argument about its effect but, in any event, OFC contends it precludes Mr Harmon’s return to the Executive Committee as CIFA’s President.
[27]I turn now to the parties’ applications.
Arbitration Act 1996, Schedule 1, Articles 35 and 36
[28] Mr Harmon’s application is made pursuant to art 35(1)(b), sch 1, which provides:
35Recognition and enforcement
(1)An arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was made,—
(a)must be recognised as binding; and
(b)on application in writing to a court, must be enforced by entry as a judgment in terms of the award, or by action, subject to the provisions of this article and of article 36.
[29] As Mr David QC, for Mr Harmon submits, art 35(1) is mandatory. Subject to compliance with several procedural steps in art 35(2), which are not in issue in this case, the only basis on which to decline Mr Harmon’s application is if a ground in art 36 is made out.4 I should record that a CAS award is final and binding on the parties. There is scope for an application to CAS for interpretation of the award or an appeal to another tribunal in the CAS regime but OFC has pursued neither.
4 Hi-Gene Ltd v Swisher Hygiene Franchise Corporation [2010] NZCA 359.
[30]The parts of art 36 on which OFC relies provide:
36Grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement
(1)Recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was made, may be refused only—
(a)at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, if that party furnishes to the court where recognition or enforcement is sought proof that—
...
(ii)the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present that party’s case; or
(iii)the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration…; or
...
(b)if the court finds that—
...
(ii)the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of New Zealand.
(2) …
(3) For the avoidance of doubt, and without limiting the generality of paragraph (1)(b)(ii), it is hereby declared that an award is contrary to the public policy of New Zealand if—
...
(b)a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred—
(i)during the arbitral proceedings; or
(ii)in connection with the making of the award.
Grounds of opposition
[31] Mr Potter, for OFC, first submits that, in granting or refusing Mr Harmon’s application under art 35, sch 1, this Court must first consider the effect of declaration 3 in light of art 11. Mr Potter submits that Mr Harmon cannot enforce declaration 3 without that first step, as Mr Harmon seeks immediate restoration to the Executive
Committee whereas OFC contends that declaration 3 does not require that, as OFC and CIFA are required to continue to apply art 11.
[32]Alternatively, OFC submits that:
(a)enforcement of the Award would be contrary to the public policy of New Zealand, on the basis that a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of the award, alternatively that OFC was unable to present its case; and
(b)the Award was delivered in excess of jurisdiction, in that it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration.
Construction of declaration 3
[33] I am not persuaded that I am required to construe declaration 3 before granting Mr Harmon’s application.
[34] Mr Potter’s (sole) authority for this proposition is the oral judgment Rodney Hansen J gave in McDonald v Barfoote.5 In that case, after a longstanding dispute, the defendants sought (amongst other matters), the Judge’s view on a particular interest calculation ordered by an arbitrator. Having sought the parties’ submissions, the Judge gave his view of how the calculation was to be carried out.
[35] Whilst it may well have been open to the Judge to offer that view, the case could not be considered authority for the proposition that the same is necessary or even permitted prior to granting an application under art 35(1)(b), sch 1. There is nothing on the face of the award to suggest it cannot be enforced in its terms. As Mr David submits, art 35(1)(b) is a procedural provision and its mandatory terms count against Mr Potter’s submission on this particular point.
5 McDonald v Barfoote HC Whangarei CIV-2003-488-580, 22 April 2004.
Breach of natural justice/inability to present case
[36] Mr Potter submits that if Mr Harmon’s interpretation of the award is accepted, there has been a breach of the rules of natural justice, both during the arbitral proceedings and in connection with the making of the award, so that recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of New Zealand. Alternatively Mr Potter submits that OFC was unable to present its case in the sense of art 36(1)(a)(ii), sch 1.
[37] The breach of natural justice is said to have occurred because the hearing before the arbitrator focused on the interpretation of art 59 of the OFC statues, and not art 11 or CIFA’s obligations under that provision. Mr Potter also submits OFC needed to be heard on declaration 3 if that were intended to override CIFA’s obligations under art 11 but that OFC was given no such opportunity. Mr Potter also submits that declaration 3 has ramifications for all of OFC’s member associations, and that they might also wish to be heard, as they have a “clear interest in the proper constitution of OFC’s Executive Committee and other bodies, and in the probity of the governance of OFC”.
[38] I do not accept there was any breach of the rules of natural justice or that OFC was unable to present its case in the sense of art 36(1)(a)(ii), sch 1.
[39] First, if, as Mr Potter submits, the hearing focused on art 59 and not art 11, and for present purposes I shall assume it did, that was a reflection of how OFC saw and ran its case on the merits. In that part of its statement of defence which dealt with the merits of the dispute (as opposed to the procedural issues the arbitrator was required to determine), OFC said the dispute related solely to the interpretation of art 59, and that the appeal could and ought to be disposed of by construing that provision. As it appeared in the statement of defence, OFC’s case was that the FIFA sanction had created a permanent effect on Mr Harmon’s ability to serve on the Executive Committee, and that the effect at CIFA level was “not pertinent”. Although OFC may have rested its case on art 59, it was open to it to refer to art 11 if it thought it relevant to the construction of art 59, or separately as a reason for denying Mr Harmon the relief he sought.
[40] Secondly, however, OFC did in fact refer to art 11 in its final submissions. In those submissions, OFC said that if, contrary to its position, the arbitrator was entertaining making a declaration that Mr Harmon was eligible to return to the Executive Committee, other provisions in the statutes would govern and that Mr Harmon had not addressed these. OFC cited art 11 as “likely to come into play”, with the effect that Mr Harmon would otherwise be ineligible to serve on the Executive Committee for five years.
[41] Accordingly, art 11 was before the arbitrator before she rendered her award. Indeed the arbitrator discussed art 11 but determined that art 59 prevailed.
[42] Thirdly, this was not a situation in which the arbitrator was required to revert to OFC to permit it to make yet a further submission on art 11. Mr Potter referred me to Trustees of Rotoaira Forest Trust v Attorney-General as the leading authority on natural justice in the arbitration context.6 In that case, Fisher J summarised the principles to be applied. One of those is that an arbitrator is not bound to “slavishly adopt the position advocated by one party or the other” and another is that an arbitrator is not under any general obligation to disclose what he or she is minded to decide “so that the parties may have a further opportunity of criticising his [or her] mental processes”.7
[43] Mr Potter’s submission that other interested parties might have had an interest in the matter also does not assist OFC. First, it was open to OFC to seek the joinder of any party if it wished, but it did not. Secondly, the “natural justice” provisions of art 36 seem to me to be concerned with the principles of natural justice vis-à-vis the parties to arbitral proceedings, not third parties. That a third party may have an interest in the outcome of a dispute is not a basis on which to decline an application under art 35(1)(b), sch 1 of the Act.
[44] It follows that I am not persuaded OFC was unable to present its case or that there was any breach of the rules of natural justice, let alone one constituting such an
6 Trustees of Rotoaira Forest Trust v Attorney-General [1999] 2 NZLR 452 (HC).
7 At 463.
affront to the public policy of New Zealand that I am required to decline Mr Harmon’s application.
Scope of the submission to arbitration
[45] Mr Potter also submits that the award, if construed as overriding art 11 of the statutes, contains a decision on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, and thus recognition or enforcement may be refused pursuant to art 36(1)(iii), sch 1.
[46] Mr Potter submits the parties did not agree to arbitrate the effect of art 11 on the obligations of CIFA, and nor was such implicit in the orders Mr Harmon sought, as art 11 binds CIFA, not Mr Harmon. Mr Potter also submits, again, that the purpose of the arbitration was to determine the scope of art 59(g) and the arbitrator has acted in excess of her jurisdiction if the award is construed so as to permit Mr Harmon’s immediate restoration to the Executive Committee. As before, Mr Potter submits such would conflict with art 11 and the obligations it imposes on CIFA.
[47] Before I address the substance of this argument, I note the arbitrator expressed reservations regarding OFC’s contentions as to the relevance of art 11, its effect, and on whom it may be binding. However, putting that to one side, I do not accept the submission to arbitration was purely to determine the meaning of art 59(g). I am satisfied Mr David is correct in submitting that the issue the arbitrator was required to determine was whether, and if so when, Mr Harmon might return to the Executive Committee in accordance with art 27(1)(b). I think this is clear from Mr Harmon’s application for appeal, his appeals brief, OFC’s statement of defence (relying on procedural and “merits” grounds to oppose him), the parties’ submissions to the arbitrator and the relief sought and ordered. It may be observed that declaration 3 is largely indistinguishable from the relief Mr Harmon sought from the outset.
Result
[48]I grant Mr Harmon’s application and dismiss OFC’s.
[49] Pursuant to art 35(1)(b), sch 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996, I make an order enforcing by entry as a judgment the award identified in [2] above.
[50] OFC having failed, it must pay Mr Harmon’s costs and disbursements. The parties may make brief submissions in the unlikely event they are unable to agree on quantum.
Peters J
Solicitors: Wilson Harle, Auckland
Meredith Connell, Auckland
Counsel: P W David QC, Auckland
ANNEXURE
OCEANIA FOOTBALL CONFEDERATION INCORPORATION STATUTES
...
I.GENERAL PROVISIONS
...
Article 11: MEMBERS’ OBLIGATIONS
1.Every Member of the Confederation has the following obligations:
...
f) To ensure that none of its Officials and/or members who have been found guilty of breaching the FIFA and/or OFC Code of Ethics and as a result have been suspended for a period of six (6) months or more and/or fined for a sum of at least $500 or more in the previous five (5) years from the relevant date can:
i.Be entitled to represent any Member Association or its Members at any OFC Meeting, Congress, Seminar, Course or any OFC or any FIFA event organized under the auspices of OFC its members, sponsors or related parties; and
ii.Be entitled to be appointed to any ad hoc and/or standing committee of OFC or OFC representative on any ad hoc and/or standing committee of FIFA ...
IV.ORGANISATION
B.EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Article 27: COMPOSITION AND TERM OF OFFICE
Composition
1.The Executive Committee shall consist of:
a) The President who is elected at the Congress;
b) The other presidents of each Full Member Association; and
c) The two FIFA Council members who are elected in accordance with Article 22 (as a non-voting member unless they are the president of a Full Member Association) ...
Article28: ROLE AND POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
1.The role and powers of the Executive Committee are to:
...
k) Give notice to any member of the Executive Committee, Committee member or Judicial Body member terminating their appointment immediately if the Executive Committee is advised by the Eligibility Committee that any such member does not meet the Eligibility Criteria set out in Article 59 or the Independence Criteria set out in Article 60 (as applicable) ...
VII.ARBITRATION
Article 40: DISPUTES
1.Unless specifically provided for in these Statutes or the FIFA regulations, Members, and Clubs, Players, Officials and Match and Player’s Agents affiliated to Members shall not take before any national court of law any dispute relating to the FIFA Statutes or the OFC Statutes or Regulations or the administration of football.
Article 41: COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT (CAS)
1.Members of the Confederation, their Clubs, members of their Club and any Players, Officials and licensed match agents and players’ agents may have recourse to the Court of Arbitration for Sport, an independent arbitration tribunal with headquarters in Lausanne (Switzerland), recognised by OFC, to resolve any disputes between FIFA, the Confederations, Members, Leagues, Clubs, Players, Officials and licensed match agents and players’ agents.
2.The CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration governs the arbitration proceedings. With regard to substance, CAS applies the various regulations of FIFA or, if applicable, of the Confederations, Members, Leagues and Clubs and, additionally, Swiss law.
3.The Members and Leagues shall agree to recognize CAS as an independent judicial authority and to ensure that their members, affiliated Players and Officials comply with the decisions passed by CAS. The same obligation shall apply to licensed match and players’ agents.
Article 42: JURISDICTION OF CAS
1.Only CAS is empowered to deal with appeals against decisions and disciplinary sanctions of the last instance, after all previous stages of appeal available at FIFA, OFC, Member or League level have been exhausted. The appeal shall be made to CAS within twenty one (21) days of notification of the decision.
2.Recourse may only be made to CAS after all other internal channels have been exhausted.
CAS shall not, however, hear appeals on:
a)violations of the Laws of the Game;
b) suspensions of up to four matches or up to three
(3) months (with the exception of doping decisions);
c) decisions passed by an independent and duly constituted arbitration tribunal of a member or Confederation;
d) decisions against which an appeal to an independent and duly constituted arbitration tribunal recognised under the rules of a member or Confederation may be made.
4.CAS is also empowered to deal with all disputes between a third party and any entities or persons mentioned in Article 42(1) if an arbitration agreement exists.
XIII.ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA Article 59: ELIGIBILITY
The following persons are ineligible from being appointed (or holding office) as President, a FIFA Council member, a member of the Executive Committee, a member of a Committee, a member of a Judicial Body or as General Secretary:
a)A person who is under 18 years of age;
b)A person who is an undischarged bankrupt;
c)A person who is prohibited from being a director or promoter of, or being concerned or taking part in the management of, an incorporated or unincorporated body under the Companies Act 1993, the Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013, or the Takeovers Act 1993 or any equivalent legislation overseas;
d)A person who is disqualified from being an officer of a charitable entity under section 31(4)(b) of the Charities Act 2005 or any equivalent legislation overseas;
e)A person who has been declared to lack legal capacity to manage their own affairs;
f)A person who has been convicted of a crime involving dishonesty (within the meaning of section 2 (1) of the Crimes Act 1961) within the last seven
(7) years, or any equivalent legislation overseas;
g)A person who has been subject to sanctions by the FIFA Ethics Committee or the OFC Ethics Committee; or
h)A person who has been suspended by OFC’s Ethics Committee or the FIFA Ethics Committee (provided that any such person will be eligible when the term of any such suspension is lifted and the equivalent amount of time of the suspension has passed since the lifting of the suspension) ...
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