Harder v Incor Holdings Limited
[2025] NZHC 2229
•8 August 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2025-404-001975
[2025] NZHC 2229
UNDER Section 172 of the Senior Courts Act 2016 IN THE MATTER
of a judgment of the Supreme Court of British Columbia
BETWEEN
LORNE HARDER
First Applicant
SPRINGHILL INVESTMENTS LIMITED
Second ApplicantHARDER INVESTMENTS LIMITED
Third ApplicantContinued over …
Hearing: 6 August 2025 Counsel:
W Fotherby and K Tubbs for Applicants
Judgment:
8 August 2025
JUDGMENT OF ANDERSON J
This judgment was delivered by me on 8 August 2025 at 3.00 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules 2016.
………………………………
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors:
Meredith Connell, Auckland
HARDER v INCOR HOLDINGS LTD [2025] NZHC 2229 [8 August 2025]
AND INCOR HOLDINGS LIMITED
First Respondent
INCOR ENERGY MATERIALS LP
Second Respondent
The applications
[1]There are two (consolidated) without notice applications before me:
(a)for orders registering a money judgment of the Supreme Court of British Columbia issued on 13 December 2024 (BC Judgment) against the first respondent, InCor Holdings Ltd (IHL);
(b)for freezing and ancillary orders against IHL and the purported second respondent, InCor Energy Materials LP (IEMLP).
[2] The applications are supported by two comprehensive memoranda and by voluminous affidavits and bundles of authorities. Much of this material relates to activity in court proceedings overseas that I discuss below. In addition to considering this material I have also heard from counsel and received further submissions on certain aspects.
Background
[3] Mr Harder (the first applicant) is a retired insurance broker. Through his companies, Springhill Investments Ltd and Harder Investments Ltd (who are the other applicants), Mr Harder invested approximately CAD 7 million in, and loaned CAD 11.35 million to, certain mining-associated entities controlled by Jocelyn Bennett and George Molyviatis, the directors of IHL, in multiple transactions.
[4] The applicants have obtained judgment against IHL and others following a summary trial (in the nature of summary judgment) in the Supreme Court of British Columbia for repayment of certain loans, and other orders (BC Judgment).
[5] The summary trial was an aspect of broader proceedings on foot in Canada (BC proceeding). Summary judgment was obtained by default, although there had been considerable involvement by the defendants (or at least Ms Bennett and Mr Molyviatis) in earlier chapters of the BC proceeding. IHL is controlled by Ms Bennett and Mr Molyviatis. The same appears to be true of IEMLP.
[6] Among other claims in the wider BC proceeding is a claim involving the applicants’ investment of CAD 3.5 million in IEMLP. IEMLP is purportedly a limited partnership, but it transpires IEMLP was never registered. I return to the consequences of this below. The purpose of the IEMLP partnership was to invest in shares in LeadFX Inc (LeadFX), a company involved in lead mining.
[7] The applicants say they were induced by fraudulent representations made by Ms Bennett and Mr Molyviatis to acquire partnership shares from IHL in the IEMLP partnership for CAD 3.5 million.1
[8] Springhill Investments Ltd holds a subscription certificate purportedly issued by IEMLP. The certificate records that it holds 3.5 million in partnership rights, corresponding to 3.5 million LeadFX shares held by the general partner, InCor Energy Materials Limited (IEML), on trust for IEMLP. This document, the limited partnership agreement and some statements by Ms Bennett suggest that the shares in LeadFX are held by IEML on trust for IEMLP. Other documents such as a presentation made to potential investors suggests IEMLP became the registered shareholder. Either way IEMLP purports to be either the legal or beneficial owner of the LeadFX shares.
[9]The BC Judgment entered against IHL and others was on the following basis:2
(a)IHL was ordered to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of CAD 6,308,050 (Cascadero Amount) plus pre-judgment interest in accordance with the Court Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 79 of CAD 687,286.95 accumulated between 17 May 2021 to 13 December 2024;
(b)IHL was ordered to pay post-judgment interest on the Cascadero Amount to be determined in accordance with the Court Order Interest Act;
1 The BC proceedings suggest that this was via two tranches with a CAD 2 million investment in partnership units in October 2019, followed by purchase of CAD 2 million units from IHL in March 2020: Harder v InCor Holdings Ltd 2023 BCSC 2021 (Canadian Judgment–Freezing Orders).
2 Harder v InCor Holdings Ltd 2024 BCSC 2285 (Canadian Judgment–Summary Judgment).
(c)judgment against IHL for the failure to deliver 500,000 ordinary shares in IHL, with damages to be assessed (InCor Holdings Shares Amount);
(d)IHL was ordered to pay pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on the IHL Shares Amount, the quantum to be determined in accordance with the Court Order Interest Act;
(e)IHL and another defendant, Pangaea Resources Ltd (Pangaea) were ordered to be jointly and severally liable to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of CAD 2,200,000 (Pangaea Amount), plus pre-judgment interest of CAD 238,749.36 in accordance with the Court Order Interest Act from 21 June 2021 to 13 December 2024;
(f)IHL is ordered to pay post-judgment interest on the Pangaea Amount to be determined in accordance with the Court Order Interest Act; and
(g)costs assessed as special costs.
[10] The BC Judgment has been registered in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The applicants now seek registration here. The applicants also seek freezing and ancillary orders. These follow the form of similar orders granted by the Supreme Court of British Columbia and by the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
Second respondent’s status
[11] As noted above, there is a complication with the named second respondent. It is described in the intituling as an entity “purporting to be” a limited partnership: IEMLP was never registered under the Limited Partnerships Act 2008.
[12] The applicants discovered this only recently when they were preparing for this proceeding. However, IEMLP has apparently been treated as registered from the outset. Additionally, the applicants learned that the party identified in the limited partnership agreement as the general partner, IEML, was struck off the companies register in the Cayman Islands in 2022. This company was controlled by IHL (in turn controlled by Mr Molyviatis and/or Ms Bennett).
[13] There is a written and executed limited partnership agreement that appears to have been acted upon. As evidenced by the subscription certificate, LeadFX shares have been acquired for or by IEMLP. The LeadFX shareholding is the investment the partnership was intended to manage and hold, and for which the partners have invested funds.
[14] The documents also show that the limited partnership was intended to have its place of business in New Zealand. That is the location of its purported registered office,3 and is also the business address of one of its limited partners, John Seton, an Auckland solicitor.4 The board of the limited partnership was to be four members, including Ms Bennett, Mr Molyviatis, and Mr Seton. Because it appears everyone has assumed this partnership was registered, it is likely it has (at least previously) operated through its “board”.
[15] The applicants say that IEMLP has been treated by all parties in the BC proceeding and in proceedings in Western Australia as registered and as an entity that has been operative. For example:
(a)As part of the BC proceeding, in November 2023 Ms Bennett deposed that the defendants held shares in LeadFX via the general partner, IEML at Computershare Canada and at Union Bancaire Privée in Geneva, Switzerland.
(b)In a document akin to a statement of defence, the party “InCor Energy Minerals Limited”5 is asserted to be a “New Zealand Limited Partnership which holds shares in LeadFX”. The defendants’ amended response crossed out the word “Minerals” to “Materials”.
(c)Ms Bennett also describes herself as one of the principal limited partners in the limited partnership together with Mr Harder, Mr Molyviatis, IHL and approximately 20 others.
3 The purported location is Fort Street, Auckland.
4 It is not suggested by the applicants that Mr Seton is involved in any wrongdoing.
5 In fact, this is the general partner, although the statement suggests the defendants regard the partnership as existing.
(d)There is a presentation exhibited to Mr Harder’s affidavit inviting investment in IEMLP and characterising this as an established entity. This states that prior to IEMLP being established, the shares in LeadFX were held for partners by IEML, suggesting that they are now held by IEMLP.
[16] Circling back, because IEMLP is not registered, it does not exist as a limited partnership.6 I raised with counsel at the outset that, axiomatically, the Court cannot make orders against an entity that does not exist. Mr Fotherby for the applicants responds that what exists is a general partnership under the Partnership Act 2008. This is the partnership that has been operating, albeit holding itself out as a purported limited partnership.7
[17] I accept that the relatively limited evidence available that I outlined above supports that characterisation. There is a general partnership comprising the partners who subscribed and have signed the partnership agreement. Accordingly, references in this decision to IEMLP are to this general partnership unless otherwise stated. The orders I make are against this general partnership, identified in the intituling as the “purported” limited partnership.
Application to register the memorial
[18] The applicants seek to enforce the BC Judgment as it relates to money sums now payable by the rarely used procedure under s 172 of the Senior Courts Act 2016 through the filing of “a memorial containing the specified particulars that is authenticated by the seal of that court”. A memorial has been filed attaching the orders of the Court in British Columbia. The court orders are authenticated by an original seal. The memorial to which they are attached is not.
6 Limited Partnerships Act 2008, s 7.
7 The applicants pointed me to extracts in Nick Wells and Philippa Wilkie Wells Limited Partnership Handbook (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2008) which highlight that there is no deeming provision to this effect in New Zealand statute. This is in contrast to the position overseas where limited partnerships that do not meet registration requirements are deemed general partnerships. While this suggested deeming is not intended in New Zealand, I do not think it precludes the finding that a general partnership is what exists on the facts.
[19] My reading of the section is that the memorial needs to be authenticated. I adjourn the application under s 172 with a view to this aspect being attended to.
Requirements for a freezing order
[20] The specific requirements of a freezing order are set out in r 32.5 of the High Court Rules 2016. In the present case, the Court must be satisfied that either:8
(a)judgment has been given in favour of an applicant by another court (here the Supreme Court of British Columbia) where there is a sufficient prospect that the judgment will be registered or enforced here; or
(b)the applicants have a good arguable case on an accrued or prospective cause of action in this court or in another court (here the Supreme Court of British Columbia); in the latter case, r 32.5(3) applies.
[21] Rule 32.5(3) applies to a cause of action if there is a sufficient prospect that the other court will give judgment in favour of the applicant; the judgment will be registered in or enforced here; there is a real connecting link between the subject matter of the order sought and the territorial jurisdiction of the New Zealand court; and the order sought would not be inconsistent with interim relief granted by the other court.
[22] If the above requirements are met, the Court may make a freezing order or ancillary order against the judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor if the Court is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances, that there is a danger that a judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied because the assets of the judgment debtor (or prospective judgment debtor) might be:9
(a)removed from New Zealand or from a place inside or outside New Zealand; or
8 High Court Rules 2016, rr 32.2 and 32.5.
9 Rule 32.5(4).
(b)disposed of, dealt with, or diminished in value (whether the assets are in or outside New Zealand).
[23] By r 32.5(5), the Court may also make orders against a third party if satisfied, having regard to the circumstances, that there is a danger that the judgment against a judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor will be wholly or partly unsatisfied because:
(a)the third party holds or is using, or has exercised or is exercising, a power of disposition over assets of the judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor; or
(b)the third party is in possession of, or in a position of control or influence concerning assets of the judgment debtor; or
(c)a process in the court is or may ultimately be available to the applicant, as a result of a judgment or prospective judgment, under which the third party may be obliged to disgorge assets or contribute toward satisfying the judgment or prospective judgment.
[24] Ultimately, the Court must consider where the interests of justice lie by balancing the need to protect the applicant (to ensure any judgment is not rendered barren) against prejudice or hardship to the respondents and to third parties.10
[25] The requirements of s 32.5 reflect the acknowledged essential requirements for a freezing order:11
(a)a good arguable case on the substantive claim;
(b)assets to which the order can apply;
(c)a risk of dissipation of assets; and
10 Bank of New Zealand v Hawkins [1989] 1 PRNZ 451 (HC) at 452.
11 Jessica Gorman and others McGechan on Procedure (online looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at [HR32.2.03].
(d)that the balance of convenience favours the granting of the freezing order.
[26]I address the requirements in r 32.5 under the above heads.
Good arguable case
[27] Under r 32.5(1)(a)(ii) and (2), judgment has been given in favour of IHL under the BC Judgment. There is a sufficient prospect that this money judgment will be registered or enforced by the Court whether through the memorial registration in s 172 or at common law by summary judgment on the foreign judgment.12 IHL satisfies the first limb on this basis.
[28] IHL and IEMLP may also satisfy this first limb under r 32.5(1)(b) and (3) on the basis of a good arguable case on a present claim. This relates to the claims in the wider BC proceeding that did not go to summary trial. The applicants say Ms Bennett and Mr Molyviatis (as principals of the various entities) induced the applicants to invest in mining investments including into IHL and IEMLP based on fraudulent misrepresentations. Focusing specifically on the IEMLP aspect, this was the purchase by Springhill Investments Ltd of 3.5 million of IEMLP partnership interests from IHL, for CAD 3.5 million.
[29] The representations asserted are as to the level of risk of the investment and as to the personal integrity of Ms Bennett and Mr Molyviatis. The representations induced investment into, or transactions with IHL. Counsel says that the claim to be advanced against IEMLP involves return of funds invested and/or a constructive trust over LeadFX shares.
[30] In addition, by s 78 of the Partnership Law Act 2019, if a partnership agreement is rescinded on the ground of the fraud or misrepresentation of one of the parties to the agreement, the party who is entitled to rescind is entitled to a lien on, or right of retention of, the surplus of the partnership assets (after satisfying the partnership
12 See High Court Rules, rr 32.5(1)(a) and 32.5(2).
liabilities) for any sum of money paid by them for the purchase of a share in the partnership and the capital contributed.
[31] At the outset of the BC proceeding, an application for an injunction founded on the fraudulent misrepresentation claim failed because a strong prima facie case was not established.13 In substance, that was because:
(a)the court considered that Mr Harder, as an experienced businessman, could not fairly be said to be induced by representations about the investment given the high return and hence risk profile obviously involved and the nature of mining assets; and
(b)that an assertion that Ms Bennett and Mr Molyviatis had failed to disclose issues as to their credibility, such as that they were subject to investigation for fraud in Switzerland, were not made well-supported, and there was a question whether disclosure of the investigation would have made a difference to Mr Harder.
[32] The applicants say that since this early injunction stage of the BC proceeding, they have been able to gather significant further information in support of their claim. This includes the fact of non-registration of IEMLP and that IEML was struck off the Cayman Islands Companies Register in 2022. There has also been non-compliance with contempt orders made against Ms Bennett and Mr Molyviatis in the BC proceeding. These additional facts raise the threshold only marginally in that they suggest that representations were made about IEMLP, and the later conduct perhaps support Mr Harder’s assertions as to their integrity. I conclude that there is (just) sufficient to meet the threshold in r 32.5(a) of a good arguable case and a sufficient prospect of a judgment in favour of the applicants.14
13 Canadian Judgment–Freezing Orders, above n 1.
14 The applicants say that IMPLP (the purported partnership) has been recognised all the way through as a party to the BC proceeding. In fact, the general partner (IEML) is the named party to the BC proceeding. The confusion between IEML and IEMLP in the BC proceeding arises because in certain documents the defendants have asserted that IEML is a New Zealand limited partnership in which they are limited partners.
[33] The next requirement of r 32.5(3)(b) is that there is sufficient prospect that this judgment will be registered in New Zealand or enforced here. I do not see a reason why an application for enforcement would not succeed.
[34] Turning to r 32.5(3)(c), there must be a real connecting link between the subject matter of the order sought and the territorial jurisdiction of the New Zealand Court. Although complicated by the fact that IEMLP was not registered, this link is established by reason of the IEMLP general partnership having a partner in New Zealand, and because it purported to have its “registered office” in and be managed from here.15 The purported partnership agreement is also subject to New Zealand law, and the partners (including IHL) submit to the jurisdiction of New Zealand courts. While the partnership is not registered, the agreement all partners signed may nonetheless have some operation as between the partners.
[35] Last, the order sought would not be inconsistent with any interim relief granted by the Canadian Court.
[36]In summary, I find the “good arguable case” test to be met.
[37] In respect to IEMLP, alternatively to a good arguable case as a prospective judgment debtor, IEMLP is also a third party against whom orders can be made under s 35.5(5). It is convenient to address that aspect below, under “risk of dissipation”.
Assets to which the order can apply
[38] IHL holds assets to which the order can apply, at the very least, in its rights and interests in the IEMLP partnership. The IEMLP partnership also holds LeadFX shares legally or beneficially.
15 An interest in a partnership has its situs where the partnership carries on business, on the basis that the partner has a share in the enterprise, not a direct interest in the underlying assets: Hook and Wass, The Conflict of Laws in New Zealand (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2020) at [7.37] citing Haque v Haque (No 2) (1965) 114 CLR 98 followed in Re Knowles (dec’d) [1995] 2 NZLR 377 (HC) at 379.
Risk of dissipation
[39] The evidence is that Ms Bennett and Mr Molyviatis have effective control of IHL and IEMLP. As noted earlier, in addition to giving judgment by summary trial, Kirchner J in the Supreme Court of British Columbia declared that Ms Bennett and Mr Molyviatis were in contempt of asset disclosure obligations and injunction orders made by that Court. He also inferred that they did not intend to comply with their asset disclosure obligations from the fact that they knew about the injunction orders and what was required to comply with them, as well as the contempt proceedings. Ms Bennett and Mr Molyviatis have not complied with the orders even in the face of the contempt proceedings.
[40] I have considered the evidence filed on behalf of the applicants as to the conduct of Ms Bennett and Mr Molyviatis in that proceeding. They were not forthcoming in examination on several aspects relating to their assets. The fact that there is a key discrepancy about the status of IEMLP and the general partner is also of concern.
[41] I conclude that there is the relevant danger contemplated by r 32.5(4).16 This is consistent with the same conclusion reached in the Supreme Court of British Columbia17 and the Supreme Court of Western Australia where equivalent orders were made.18
[42] In the previous section I said there was an alternate basis for orders against IEMLP. Under r 32.5(5), the court may make orders against a third party if satisfied, having regard to the circumstances, that there is a danger that the judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied if the conditions described above at [23] are met.
16 In this conclusion I have had regard to the relevant case law in particular Oaks Hotels & Resorts NZ Ltd v Body Corporate 358851 [2013] NZHC 2695; An Ying International Financial Ltd and An Ying (Wellington) Limited v Li & Ors HC Auckland CIV-2004-404-6952, 6 April 2005; and Raukura Moana Fisheries Ltd v The Ship Irina Zharkikh [2001] 2 NZLR 801 (HC). See also Hebei Huaneng Industrial Development Co Ltd v Shi [2020] NZHC 2470 for an example of failure to disclose resulting in an inference that the defendant was willing to obfuscate their assets and dealings.
17 Canadian Judgment–Freezing Orders, above n 1, at [73]; see also the conclusions of Kirchner J in Canadian Judgment–Summary Judgment, above n 1, at [20].
18 Harder v InCor Investments Holdings Limited [2025] WASC 72 (Australian Judgment) at [36].
[43] In my view r 32.5(5)(b) is engaged in respect to IEMLP. It is in possession, or in a position of control or influence concerning, assets of IHL (the judgment debtor), being IHL’s interest in the IEMLP partnership or the jointly owned partnership assets, including the LeadFX shares.
[44] Based on the evidence outlined earlier in this section, there is a danger the judgment against IHL will be wholly or partly unsatisfied due to the likely ability of Ms Bennett and Mr Molyviatis to control IEMLP and hence take steps to dispose of LeadFX shares and/or their proceeds.
[45] Alternatively, potentially there may be a process (through exercise by the applicants of partnership rights) by which the applicants could require IEMLP to contribute towards satisfying the BC Judgment using IHL’s share in the partnership on dissolution.
Potential defences
[46] The applicants have appropriately raised potential defences. I have considered these in my conclusion that the orders should be made.
Balance of convenience/overall justice
[47] Ultimately, the Court must consider where the interests of justice lie. I need to balance protection of the applicants (to ensure any judgment is not rendered barren) against prejudice or hardship to the respondents and to third parties.19
[48] I observe that the assets presently frozen by the foreign orders already include the assets sought to be subject to the freezing orders in this Court. Hence, the orders give support to orders made elsewhere. The fact that the Supreme Court of Western Australia has granted equivalent orders against IHL on substantially similar grounds in respect to the BC Judgment reinforces my conclusion that the orders should be made.
19 Bank of New Zealand v Hawkins, above n 10, at 452.
[49] The orders sought have the usual carve out for reasonable legal expenses relating to the freezing orders and ordinary course of business expenses. This mitigates hardship caused by the orders. There is no suggestion that there is any imperative to transact the LeadFX shares.
[50] The applicants have also provided the necessary undertaking as to damages. All the applicants are resident overseas. Commonly security would be provided to support the undertaking. The documents supporting the application indicate that when Mr Harder retired, he sold his business for many millions of dollars in excess of the sums he invested into InCor-related investments. In addition, there is a level of security to the extent of the applicants’ interest in the IEMLP partnership (which would appear to be subject to New Zealand law).
[51] In my view, in the above circumstances, the balance of convenience and overall interests of justice favour the granting of the orders sought.
Ancillary orders
[52] The ancillary orders sought require IHL and IEMLP to disclose financial information detailing the assets and liabilities as well as the registration status and business of IEMLP. The applicants also seek the appointment of a receiver and manager to the assets of IEMLP.
[53] I accept that it is appropriate to make ancillary orders at this stage for affidavits enabling assets to be identified. However, particularly given the unclear status of IEMLP, it is premature to make orders appointing a receiver and manager over IEMLP’s assets as sought. I grant leave for the applicants to renew their application for appointment. Hopefully, there will be more clarity following ancillary orders.
Service
[54] When I heard from counsel, I raised the issue of service on the IEMLP partnership. As counsel indicated, by r 6.15, a document may be served on a partnership or on a person carrying on business in the name of a firm by serving it on any partner. Mr Seton is a partner in this jurisdiction.
[55]The other respondent, IHL is incorporated in England. Under r 6.27(2)(d) and
(m) an overseas respondent can be served without leave with an application for interim relief in support of a foreign proceeding20 and an application to enforce a foreign judgment.21
[56] The applicants seek orders that IHL can be served via an email address now being used to serve IHL in the BC proceeding. Gething J in the Supreme Court of Western Australia made an order permitting service through that means.22
[57] This was on the basis of an affidavit by the applicants’ Canadian lawyer, who has given a similar affidavit in this proceeding. He deposes that on the last occasion on which a lawyer acting for IHL filed a notice of intention to withdraw in the BC proceeding, the address for service provided for IHL was: [REDACTED]. The email address [REDACTED] was also provided. He goes on to say that in accordance with this notice and information received from Ms Bennett, where ordinary service is required in the BC proceeding, his office has served IHL by email at [REDACTED].
[58] Substituted service orders can be made in respect to overseas parties. However, the requirements of r 6.8 need to be met.23 This requires reasonable efforts to have been made to effect service by a method permitted or required under the High Court Rules. In the case of an overseas defendant, as relevant, service outside New Zealand may be effected by a method specified in r 6.1 or one in accordance with the law of the country in which the documents are to be served.24 Presumably, service on IHL’s registered office would be a method available.
[59] The applicants say that they intend to serve documents on Pangaea as a matter of courtesy (which is a party under the BC Judgment who is jointly liable for one of the amounts). I make no formal order in that respect.
20 There is no jurisdictional barrier to interim relief being granted against an overseas respondent prior to service: Commerce Commission v Viagogo AG [2019] NZCA 472 at [7] .
21 Hubei Huaneng Industrial Development Co Ltd v Shi [2020 NZHC 2992 at [12].
22 See Australian Judgment, above n 18.
23 Exportrade Corp v Irie Blue New Zealand Ltd [2013] NZCA 675, [2014] NZAR 495.
24 Rule 6.32.
[60] In my view, at least at this stage, there is no sufficient reason shown why formal service of the documents filed to date cannot be effected in the ordinary way. However, I direct that the documents also be sent to the respondents via email to [REDACTED].
Result
[61]I make orders as follows:
(a)adjourning the application for registration of judgment to 10 September 2025;
(b)orders as sought by the applicants in their application for freezing orders as attached, excluding orders (c) and (d) (as to appointment of receivers), with the date in Order 7 (orders to have no effect unless continued or renewed) to be 10 September 2025. The orders to be sealed are to make clear that the second respondent is sued as a general partnership and that the second respondent in name does not exist;
(c)listing the application for registration of judgment and freezing order application in the Duty Judge list at 10 am on 10 September 2025;
(d)reserving leave for the applicants to apply to appoint receivers to the assets of the IEMLP partnership; and
(e)directing that in addition to service through usual means, the documents are to be sent to the respondents by the email address [REDACTED].
Anderson J
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