Hannigan v R

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

SC 20/2012
[2012] NZSC 43

SHANE DANIEL HANNIGAN

THE QUEEN

Court: Blanchard, William Young and Chambers JJ

Counsel: J M Ablett-Kerr QC for Applicant
L C Preston for Crown

Judgment: 30 May 2012

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A Leave to appeal is granted.

B The approved ground is whether the way in which Kirsty Hannigan was re-examined led to a substantial miscarriage of justice.

REASONS

We grant leave only with respect to the second ground of appeal, which concerns the way in which the prosecutor led evidence of a previous statement given by the witness, Kirsty Hannigan.
We decline leave on the first ground of appeal. We see nothing amiss in the Court of Appeal’s analysis of the trial court’s role on the admission of propensity evidence in circumstances where the defence does not object to its admission (as was the case here).[1] The evidence relating to the earlier fires was clearly admissible under s 43 of the Evidence Act 2006. There was no good reason for the Judge to give a “propensity evidence” direction in the context of this trial. The proposed arguments on the first ground have no chance of success.
[1] Hannigan v R [2012] NZCA 133 at [13].

Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Shane Daniel Hannigan has appealed against his conviction for the murder of his daughter, Kirsty Hannigan. The Supreme Court was required to determine whether the manner in which Kirsty Hannigan was re-examined during the trial led to a substantial miscarriage of justice. Additionally, the court considered whether the trial court properly admitted propensity evidence in the context of the case. The Crown argued that the evidence of earlier fires was admissible under the Evidence Act 2006, and there was no reason for the judge to give a propensity evidence direction.

The Supreme Court found that leave to appeal was granted only in respect of the second ground, which concerned the re-examination of Kirsty Hannigan. The court determined that there was nothing amiss in the Court of Appeal’s analysis of the trial court’s role in admitting propensity evidence. The evidence relating to earlier fires was deemed clearly admissible under section 43 of the Evidence Act 2006. The Supreme Court saw no reason for the judge to issue a propensity evidence direction in the context of this trial. Therefore, the proposed arguments on the first ground of appeal had no chance of success.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal with respect to the second ground concerning the re-examination of Kirsty Hannigan, while declining leave on the first ground. The court did not find any issues with the Court of Appeal’s analysis of the trial court’s handling of the propensity evidence. The court confirmed that the evidence of earlier fires was properly admitted under the Evidence Act 2006 and there was no reason for a propensity evidence direction. The Supreme Court did not find any merit in the proposed arguments on the first ground of appeal.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established