Hamer v Police

[2013] NZHC 1006

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND NAPIER REGISTRY

CRI 2013-441-000002 [2013] NZHC 1006

BETWEEN  JOYCE ALLYSON HAMER Appellant

ANDNEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent

Hearing:         7 May 2013

Counsel:         Appellant in Person

J D Lucas for the Respondent

Judgment:      7 May 2013

[ORAL] JUDGMENT OF WYLIE J

Counsel: J Hamer

J D Lucas: [email protected]

HAMER V POLICE HC NAP CRI 2013-441-000002 [7 May 2013]

Introduction

[1]      The appellant, Mrs Hamer, appeals against a conviction and fine imposed against her by Justices of the Peace on 31 January 2013.

[2]      The appeal arises out of relatively commonplace circumstances.  On 21 June

2012, Mrs Hamer was driving along Taradale Road in Napier.  A speed camera had

been set up on the side of the road.   It recorded Mrs Hamer’s speed  as being

56 kilometres per hour.  The speed camera unit was mounted on the tow bar of the vehicle, partially obscuring the vehicle’s number plate.

[3]      An  infringement  notice  was  issued  to  Mrs  Hamer  on  4  July  2012. Mrs Hamer did not accept liability, and the matter came before two Justices of the Peace, Messrs Compton and McNeil, on 31 January 2013.

[4]      Mrs Hamer, before the Justices, challenged the validity of the speeding ticket. She argued that the speed camera unit was operated in a manner which contravened the Land Transport (Road User) Rules 2004.   She also claimed that the unmarked vehicle was parked illegally.

The Justices’ Decision

[5]      The Justices carefully identified the elements of the offending.  One of those elements was that Mrs Hamer was driving at a speed over the applicable limit.

[6]      Before  the  Justices,  evidence  was  given  by  the  traffic  camera  operator employed by the New Zealand Police, a Mr Charlton-Jones.  He gave evidence that the speed limit for the road in question was 50 kilometres per hour.  He produced as an exhibit his deployment register for the speed camera.  It recorded that the area had a posted speed limit of 50 kilometres per hour and that speed limit signs were erected.

[7]      Mrs  Hamer  cross-examined  Mr  Charlton-Jones.    She  asked  him  which authority controlled Taradale Road, and was told it was the Napier City Council.

Mr Charlton-Jones agreed that the Napier City Council would set the speed limit on Taradale Road.  He was unable to say how far away the nearest sign was.  He did not consider that that was relevant for a “school deployment” as he was required to be within 250 metres of the boundary of the school.

[8]      Mrs Hamer, in giving evidence, suggested that it was the local territorial authority which was required to make bylaws establishing limits within its boundaries.    She  complained that  the police had  failed  to  produce the relevant Napier City Council speed limit bylaw authorising the installation of 50 kilometre signs on Taradale Road.  Consequently, she argued that no conclusive proof had been produced to show that the 50 kilometre speed limit on Taradale Road was authorised.

[9]      The Justices noted as follows:

There was discussion regarding the Napier City Council bylaw 50 k regulations and whether it was authorised in Taradale Road.  We are dealing with a city, which is Napier City Council, and Ms Hamer was driving in an urban area and there is certainly not a speed sign in every road in town.  If you drive in Napier it is your responsibility to find out the speed limits and drive accordingly.

[10]     The Justices also considered that the photographs which were presented to them showed that the vehicle was parked legally.  They noted that the flash unit in the speed camera operated and recorded that it showed the vehicle number plate and Mrs Hamer in the vehicle.

[11]     The Justices entered the conviction and fined Mrs Hamer $30, together with

Court costs of $132.89.

The Appeal

[12]     Mrs Hamer has appealed the Justices’ decision on the following grounds:

(a)       She  argues  that  she  was  forced  to  give  evidence  against  herself, contrary to the Evidence Act 2006;

(b)She argues that the unmarked vehicle with the speed camera erected on its tow bar was parked illegally;

(c)      She says that no regard was had to the Local Government Act 2002, and to the bylaws which authorise the placing of speed limits on roads under the control of territorial authorities;

(d)She says that she was not asked about her means to pay a fine.  She says that she is unemployed, that she is a widow, that she rents her property, and that the motor vehicle she was driving on the day is on hire purchase.  She tells me that she has recently received a welfare grant from the Returned Services’ Association.   She confirmed that her concern is with the Court costs imposed, rather than the fine itself.

[13]     Mrs Hamer accepted that the speed camera was operating correctly.  Further, she accepted that she was driving the vehicle on the day.

[14]     I deal with each of the matters raised by Mrs Hamer.

[15]     First, I note that there is no material before me as to the circumstances in which Mrs Hamer gave evidence.   There is no protest from her recorded in the transcript of evidence.   Nor is there any mention in the Justices’ decision that she was reluctant to give evidence.  I cannot conclude on the materials before me that Mrs Hamer was forced to give evidence.  Rather, it appears that she elected to give evidence and to set out her view of events and of the police’s obligations, when she did so.

[16]     Secondly, I cannot see that whether or not the unmarked police vehicle was parked illegally is relevant.  What was at issue was whether or not Mrs Hamer was exceeding the speed limit.  Further, and in any event, Officer Charlton-Jones said in evidence that he deployed the unit in accordance with the deployment standard.  He produced the deployment register which recorded that the vehicle was parked legally, at a distance of 2.5 metres from the nearest lane.   The Justices found that the

photographs presented to them showed the vehicle was correctly parked.  I am not persuaded that they were in error in that regard.

[17]     The matter which troubled me most was the third issue — whether or not Taradale Road was subject to a 50 kilometre speed restriction.   On balance, the evidence satisfies me that it was subject to that speed limit.  As I have noted above, Mr Charlton-Jones gave clear evidence in that regard.  There was no direct challenge to that evidence.  Rather, Mrs Hamer raised issues as to Napier City Council bylaws and  whether  or  not  the  police  had  established  that  the  50  kilometre  signs  on Taradale Road were authorised.  This seems to me to be beside the point.  There was evidence before the Justices on which they could properly conclude that the road was subject to a 50 kilometre per hour speed limit.   In the circumstances, I am not persuaded that the Justices’ decision in this regard was in error.

[18]     Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and the conviction is upheld.

[19]     I have heard from Mrs Hamer in relation to her ability to meet the fine and the Court costs which were imposed on her.   There was no evidence before the Justices in relation to this issue.   Having regard to her limited means, I direct as follows:

(a)       The fine imposed by the Justices of $30 is to stand.  As I understand it, that is the standard fine applicable to such offending;

(b)      The Court costs imposed by the Justices of $132.89 are reduced to

$50.

Wylie J