Hall v Geary Limited

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2024-404-002967

[2025] NZHC 1004

UNDER Part 19 of the High Court Rules 2016 and the Property Law Act 2007

IN THE MATTER OF

relief against cancellation of a lease

BETWEEN

ROBYN LEIGH HALL and

BRENDON JAMES SALISBURY MADDEN-SMITH

Plaintiffs

AND

GEARY LIMITED

First Defendant

GARY WILLIAM WHETTON
Second Defendant

JANE MARGARET WHETTON

Third Defendant

Hearing: 11 March 2025

Appearances:

E Armstrong and H Ewen for the Plaintiffs H Thompson for the Defendants

Judgment:

30 April 2025


JUDGMENT OF WALKER J


This judgment was delivered by me on 30 April 2025 at 3 pm Pursuant to Rule 11.5 High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:

Lee Salmon Long, Auckland

McMahon Butterworth Thompson, Auckland

HALL & Anor v GEARY LIMITED & Ors [2025] NZHC 1004 [30 April 2025]

[1]                This dispute between neighbours in a  prime  beachfront  property  on  Milford Beach comes before the Court in the form of an originating application seeking relief against cancellation of a lease.

[2]                The beachfront property is held in a composite freehold and leasehold title, commonly known as a “cross-lease” title. There are three apartments on the title.

[3]                The plaintiffs, Robyn Hall and Brendon Madden-Smith are the registered owners of the ground floor apartment (Flat 1) in their capacity as trustees of the Hall Family Trust (the Trust). They own a one-third share of the freehold estate and are the lessees under a lease in relation to the ground floor apartment. Ms Hall lives in the apartment.  She   spends   time   in   other   properties   and   travels   extensively.  Mr Madden-Smith is an independent trustee of the Trust.

[4]                The first defendant, Mr Geary, is a director of Geary Limited which is the registered owner of the second-floor apartment (Flat 3), owner of a one-third share of the freehold estate and lessee of the second-floor apartment. Mr Geary lives there. He was Chairman of the Owner’s Committee at the relevant time.

[5]                The Whettons are the registered owners of the first-floor apartment (Flat 2) but also spend time at another property out of Auckland. They own a one-third share of the freehold estate and are lessees of the first-floor apartment.

[6]                The genesis of the dispute is the placing of a “swim-spa” pool on an area in front of Ms Hall’s apartment by the plaintiffs. The area is designated as an exclusive use area for the ground floor apartment. Ms Hall deposes that she uses the swim-spa for approximately 40 minutes a day when she is at the property to do physical therapy to manage a health condition.

[7]                A swim-spa is a larger than typical spa pool. It incorporates various technology to facilitate exercise including hydro-jets to enable swimming in place and a tread-mill. This swim-spa has a mechanically or hydraulically operated cover which also functions as a roof. This sits snugly over the swim-spa for safety when the swim-spa is not in use and is raised to a…

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Details
Case
[2025] NZHC 1004
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involves an originating application for relief against cancellation of a lease in relation to a beachfront property in Milford Beach. The plaintiffs, Robyn Hall and Brendon Madden-Smith, are the registered owners of the ground floor apartment in their capacity as trustees of the Hall Family Trust. They own a one-third share of the freehold estate and are the lessees of the ground floor apartment. The Whettons are the registered owners of the first-floor apartment and are the lessors of the ground floor apartment. They own a one-third share of the freehold estate and are the lessees of the first-floor apartment. The dispute arose from the placement of a "swim-spa" pool on an area in front of Ms Hall's apartment by the plaintiffs. The Whettons objected to the placement of the swim-spa and issued a notice of intention to cancel the cross-lease unless the swim-spa was removed within 21 days. The plaintiffs filed this application for relief against cancellation.

The court was required to decide whether the swim-spa is a structure within the meaning of cl 10 of the cross-lease, whether the withholding of consent on the part of the lessors/defendants is unreasonable, and whether relief against cancellation should be granted. The court found that the swim-spa is such a structure and that the withholding of consent on the part of the lessors/defendants is not unreasonable. The court exercised its discretion to grant relief against cancellation on the condition that the plaintiffs remove the swim-spa from the property within two months of the date of this judgment.

The court's reasoning was based on the objective interpretation of the lease as a contract, the commercial purpose of the contract, and the context of the lease. The court found that the swim-spa is a structure within the meaning of cl 10 of the lease, as it is a substantial object made up of composite elements sitting on a concrete pad on compacted foundation with steel reinforcing. The court also found that the withholding of consent on the part of the lessors/defendants is not unreasonable, as there are objectively reasonable bases to withhold consent to the placement of the swim-spa within the exclusive use area. The court held that the intrusion is not merely minimal and that the benefits to Ms Hall's health do not outweigh the adverse impact on the amenity value of the Whettons' property. The court exercised its discretion to grant relief against cancellation on the condition that the plaintiffs remove the swim-spa from the property within two months of the date of this judgment. The court reserved the question of costs and invited the parties to agree on costs memoranda.