| NOTE: HIGH COURT ORDER IN [2019] NZHC 2664 PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF NAME, ADDRESS, OCCUPATION OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF APPLICANT PURSUANT TO S 200 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011 REMAINS IN FORCE. SEE |
| NOTE: DISTRICT COURT ORDER IN [2019] NZDC 16211 PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF NAME OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF APPLICANT’S WIFE AND CHILDREN REMAINS IN FORCE. |
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI MANA NUI |
| SC 43/2020 [2020] NZSC 82 |
| BETWEEN | H (SC 43/2020) |
| AND | NEW ZEALAND POLICE |
| Court: | Glazebrook, O’Regan and Ellen France JJ |
Counsel: | C Mitchell for Applicant |
Judgment: | 13 August 2020 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS
Introduction
The applicant pleaded guilty to one charge of knowingly distributing an objectionable publication,[1] six charges of possessing objectionable publications with knowledge,[2] and one charge of indecency with an animal.[3] For this offending he was sentenced by Judge Dawson to a term of 26 months’ imprisonment.[4] The applicant appealed unsuccessfully to the High Court against sentence.[5] He later sought the leave of the Court of Appeal to appeal against the High Court judgment. The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, albeit the Court also addressed the merits of the appeal.[6] The applicant now seeks leave to appeal to this Court.
Background
[1]Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993, s 124(1) (the maximum penalty is 14 years’ imprisonment).
[2]Section 131A(1) (the maximum penalty is 10 years’ imprisonment or a $50,000 fine). Three of these charges were representative.
[3]Crimes Act 1961, s 144 (the maximum penalty is three years’ imprisonment).
[4]New Zealand Police v [H] [2019] NZDC 16211 [Sentencing remarks].
[5]H v New Zealand Police [2019] NZHC 3349 (Gwyn J) [HC judgment].
[6]H (CA36/2020) v New Zealand Police [2020] NZCA 155 (Clifford, Mallon and Dobson JJ) [CA judgment].
By way of background, the first point to note is that the distribution charge related to an image of what the District Court Judge described as “child exploitation material” which was sent to another user through an instant messaging application.[7] Second, the other charges related to items found when, some time later, police executed a search warrant at the applicant’s home. They found an iPad and a cell phone with over 1,100 images depicting sexual conduct involving young people and children (some very young) and bestiality.
[7]Sentencing remarks, above n 4, at [2].
Finally, it is helpful to summarise briefly the approach to sentencing in the District Court. Relevantly, from a starting point of 33 months’ imprisonment, the District Court Judge gave a discount for the applicant’s guilty pleas of six months (20 per cent, as rounded up). There was a further one-month (approximately four per cent) discount for the applicant’s “relatively limited” remorse.[8] The Judge accepted the applicant may suffer from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and impulsive behaviour but did not consider that mitigated his actions.
The proposed appeal
[8]At [18].
The applicant submits…
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- Case
- [2020] NZSC 82
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Supreme Court of New Zealand dismissed the application for leave to appeal from H, who had been convicted of distributing an objectionable publication, possessing objectionable publications with knowledge, and indecency with an animal. The Court of Appeal had already dismissed H's application for leave to appeal, but H now sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The legal issues in the case centred around the appropriate discount for the applicant's guilty pleas and remorse. The Court found that the applicant's proposed appeal did not meet the threshold for a grant of leave as it did not raise any issue of general or public importance nor did it indicate a risk of a miscarriage of justice. The Court also found that the Court of Appeal's assessment of the issues was correct and that the criteria for leave to appeal were not met. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi