H v H no.3 HC Ak CIV 2007-404-007415
[2009] NZHC 2521
•23 December 2009
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2007-404-007415
UNDER Care of Children Act 2004
BETWEEN WAH
First Applicant
AND LFA
Second Applicant
AND WTW
Third Applicant
AND MMP
Fourth Applicant
ANDRDH Respondent
Hearing: 27-29 October 2009
Appearances: First Applicant in person
G A Cole for Second Applicant
P E Main for Third Applicant
A Hart for Fourth Applicant
C Ryan and H Retzlaff for Chief Executive
L J Kearns for Children
G M Cameron as Amicus
Judgment: 23 December 2009 at 3:00 pm
RESERVED JUDGMENT (3) OF COURTNEY J
This judgment was delivered by Justice Courtney
on 23 December 2009 at 3:00 pm pursuant to R 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar / Deputy Registrar
Date……………………….
H & ORS V H (NO 3) HC AK CIV-2007-404-007415 23 December 2009
Introduction
[1] The Chief Executive has applied for an order either varying the order made at
[30](b) of my judgment 6 November 2009 or recalling the judgment. The application relates to the order that the Ministry of Social Development meet Mr W’s expenses for transporting the children to and from school, the costs of their extra- curricular activities and any compulsory costs connected with schooling.
[2] The order was made in response to an oral application by Mr W for financial assistance during closing submissions. In support of the application, Ms Ryan, for the Ministry, has submitted that since my judgment was delivered she has become aware of the decision in LC v Ministry of Social Development,[1] the effect of which is to preclude an order such as that made at [30](b). Secondly, Ms Ryan submits that the Ministry is concerned that Mr W is receiving benefits totalling $1,234 per week, details of which were not placed before the Court previously and that information, together with further benefits to which Mr W could be entitled if he applied to WINZ, means that the orders made at [30](b) of my judgment are not required.
[1] [2008] NZFLR 828
[3] Mr W opposes the application. His counsel, Ms Main, has filed a memorandum together with an affidavit from Mr W. Ms Main has submitted (distinguishing LC v Ministry of Social Development) that this Court does have jurisdiction to make the orders at [30](b) and, further, that the affidavit evidence from Mr W makes it clear that the cost of transporting children makes a difference between him being able to manage within the amount of the benefits he is entitled to and not being able to manage.
Jurisdiction
[4] Ms Ryan, for the Ministry, relies on a statement at [69] and [70] of the Court
of Appeal’s decision in LC v Ministry of Social Development in which the Court said:
…neither can the Court expend the Chief Executive’s money for him…
…the rule of law governs Judges as much as the executive. Family Court Judges must understand that they cannot dictate what facilities are to be provided.
[5] Before I consider the effects of LC v Ministry of Social Development it is worth setting out in full paragraphs [68-70] of that decision and noting that the judgment concerned s 78 of the Children Young Persons & Their Families Act 1989 and turned on the question as to whether the Family Court had the power to impose a placement condition on a custody order in favour of the Chief Executive. The Court said:
[68] In our view, the more difficult question is not whether the Court can impose conditions, even as against the chief executive, but rather whether there are any limitations on the conditions which may be so imposed. Again, the practicalities must be firmly borne in mind. If, as in our view is required by the legislation, a s 78 application is placed on notice in front of the Family Court Judge, along with any competing proposals or concerns by other properly interested parties, the Judge will be enabled to properly assess matters.
[69] The chief executive can hardly legitimately expect a “blank cheque”
as to what is to be done That said, neither can the Court expend the chief executive’s money for him. In the vast majority of cases, there are not likely
to be any real difficulties. But where there are, as here, there may be good and sufficient reasons where it is appropriate for a Family Court Judge to say that it is in the best interests of a young person that he or she remain, for
instance, in a particular locality for a time. The Court then has to carry out
its statutory role to act in the best interests of the child, by the imposition of such a condition.
[70] By the same token, the rule of law governs judges as much as the Executive. Family Court Judges must understand that they cannot dictate what particular facilities are to be provided. If, for instance, the Court is told there are only ten beds available in a given specialist centre, it would be quite inappropriate for a Family Court Judge to say that one of them must be allocated to a particular child and if there are not enough that the centre would have to provide more. Here again, the line between judicial and executive action must be respected.
(emphasis added)
[6] It is apparent that the context of this decision was markedly different from that of the present case. The reference to the Court spending the Chief Executive’s money for him was not, it seems to me, intended to be read literally. The discussion
at this point of the judgment is directed towards whether there are any restrictions on the conditions that may be imposed under s 78. I do not consider that this decision has any effect on the jurisdiction to make orders intended to ensure the success of
orders made under the Care of Children Act 2004. I note also that orders similar to the order in this case have previously been made by Family Court Judges.[2]
[2] See e.g. CAS v JAS FAM-2003-041-370 12 February 2008 Judge Dadelszen; AB v CG [2008] NZFLR 561; McGirr v Ministry of Social Development FAM-2001-085-001727 23 September 2008 Judge Moss.
[7] Ms Ryan submits that it is Mr W who is the agent of the Court for the purposes of caring for the children, which is correct. However, the Ministry is also the agent of the Court for the purposes of facilitating the arrangements I have put in place. The Ministry has, as part of these arrangements, met other expenses associated with them such as transporting the two youngest children to and from contact visits. The current application does not refer to these costs.
[8] In these circumstances, I consider that I did have jurisdiction to make the orders.
New evidence?
[9] Mr W gave evidence that he was receiving a benefit and that he was unable to meet the transport costs. Ms Main points out that the Ministry’s counsel could have explored this aspect with him further at that stage. In any event, Mr W has now filed
an affidavit in which he details the shortfall between his expenses and benefits. He has deposed that he has sought all available funding through WINZ and that WINZ did pay for the children’s school uniforms. However, his total benefits from WINZ (unsupported child benefit and sickness benefit including accommodation special benefit) total $1,040.89 and his average weekly expenditure he calculates as $1,080. This figure does not take into account emergencies such as doctors visits and one off items such as school trips and car repairs.
[10] Ms Main also advises that the children’s parents are liable for child support but that this cannot make any difference to the level of Mr W’s benefit.
Conclusion
[11] I consider that I had jurisdiction to make the orders at [30](b). Consideration
of Mr W’s further evidence confirms that the orders were justified. The Ministry’s application is therefore dismissed.
P Courtney J
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