Grinder v New Zealand Parole Board

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE

CIV-2022-485-389

[2022] NZHC 3188

UNDER the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016

IN THE MATTER OF

an application for judicial review

BETWEEN

BRETT DAVID GRINDER

Applicant

AND

NEW ZEALAND PAROLE BOARD

First Respondent

ATTORNEY-GENERAL

Second Respondent

Hearing: 18 October 2022

Counsel:

D A Ewen for the Applicant First Respondent abides

C A Griffin for the Second Respondent

Judgment:

30 November 2022


JUDGMENT OF GWYN J


Solicitors:

Ord Legal, Wellington Ms Owen, Wellington Crown Law, Wellington

GRINDER v NEW ZEALAND PAROLE BOARD [2022] NZHC 3188 [30 November 2022]

Table of Contents

Background  [2]

Application to vary  [5]

The special conditions  [15]

Grounds of review  [16]

The respondents  [18]

First ground of review - wrong legal test  [19]

Submissions  [20]

Analysis  [35]

Second ground of review - unreasonable finding of fact/wrong weight on expert assessments  [58]

Submissions  [60]

Analysis  [66]

Third ground of review – unreasonable assessment of applicant’s risk based on hypothetical scenario  [87]

Submissions  [89]

Analysis  [103]

Fourth ground of review - Irrelevant consideration (public confidence)       [109]

Submissions  [111]

Analysis  [114]

Fifth ground of review – failure to consider relevant matter (increased risk by

maintenance of EM) [116]
Submissions [123]
Analysis [125]

Outcome

[127]

Relief

[128]

Costs

[131]

[1]                 This is an application for judicial review of a decision by the Parole Board (Board) to refuse to vary the applicant’s conditions of parole and confirmation of that decision by a Parole Board Panel Convenor (Convenor) on review.

Background

[2]                 Mr Grinder, the applicant, is on life parole, having been sentenced to preventive detention by the High Court at Auckland in 2003, for sexual offending against children and young people between 1976 and 2001.

[3]                 The applicant was released on parole by the Board on 1 April 2019, subject to a range of standard and special conditions of release. The special conditions will expire on 31 March 2024.

[4]                 Mr Grinder had previously been released from prison in 2011 and subsequently recalled to prison for non-compliance on 5 July 2012, for breaching a non-association order.

Application to vary

[5]                 On 9 February 2021 Mr Grinder applied under s 56 of the Parole Act 2002 (the Act) to vary his conditions of parole by deleting three of the special conditions (application to vary). Two are electronic monitoring (EM) conditions and the third is a “whereabouts” condition.

[6]                 Mr Grinder had previously sought to vary or discharge the whereabouts condition and the EM conditions, at monitoring hearings held at six and 12 months after his release in April 2019.  The Board’s  decision at  the six  months  hearing  (22 October 2019) was that there was good reason to retain the whereabouts condition, which the Board said remained both relevant and necessary “until we can be satisfied that Mr Grinder is both established in the community and demonstrates sustained compliance with release conditions that mitigate his risk.” The Board also concluded that electronic monitoring of the whereabouts…

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Details
Case
[2022] NZHC 3188
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Brett David Grinder applied for judicial review of a decision by the New Zealand Parole Board to refuse to vary his conditions of parole. Mr Grinder, who had been sentenced to preventive detention for sexual offending against children, was on life parole, released on 1 April 2019, subject to a range of standard and special conditions of release. He sought to vary his conditions of parole by deleting three of the special conditions: two electronic monitoring (EM) conditions and a “whereabouts” condition. The Board had before it written submissions from Mr Grinder’s counsel, an 11 May 2021 assessment from David Riley, a psychologist and former Director of the Department of Corrections Psychological Service, and a memorandum from Mr Grinder’s probation officer, who advised that Community Corrections did not oppose Mr Grinder’s application. The Board reconvened on 14 October 2021, having received a psychological report from Dr Sheree Crump, dated 6 September 2021, assessing Mr Grinder as at a low risk of offending. The Board heard and, in a decision dated 14 October 2021, refused the application to vary (the decision). Mr Grinder sought judicial review of the decision by the Board, and the Convenor’s confirmation of the decision on review. He pleaded five grounds of review: (a) the Board applied the wrong legal test when considering whether to discharge the EM conditions; (b) it inferentially made an unreasonable assessment of the applicant’s risk by placing weight on outdated psychometric assessments of risk, in preference to contemporaneous assessments, and gave no reasons for doing so; (c) it made an unreasonable assessment of the applicant’s risk by reference to a hypothetical offending scenario that had no evidential foundation; (d) it took into account irrelevant considerations, namely public confidence in the operation of parole in general; and (e) it failed to consider a mandatory consideration, namely whether the continuation of the conditions would increase the applicant’s risk profile. The first and second grounds of review were upheld. The Court found that the Board erred in applying the wrong legal test when considering whether to discharge the EM conditions. It should have applied an undue risk test. The Board also acted unreasonably in placing greater weight on the risk assessments from Ms Farmer and Ms Ellis, dated 2017 and 2018 respectively, than it did on the two contemporaneous reports from Dr Crump and Mr Riley. It did not have a reasoned basis for doing so. The third, fourth, and fifth grounds of review were dismissed. The Board did not erroneously assess Mr Grinder’s risk by reference to a hypothesised offending scenario which involved him going to places where children might congregate and developing a relationship with them independently of any adults and out of contact with any of those supervising him. The Board was entitled to bring to bear its general expertise and experience, as well as its familiarity with Mr Grinder’s history, and to conclude that there was a degree of risk of Mr Grinder offending against children only recently or briefly known to him. The Board’s decision did not engage in any impermissible quasi-political decision-making by referring to the need to “reassure the public” that Mr Grinder was deprived of the opportunity to offend. It was inelegantly phrased but did not amount to a proper basis on which to quash the Board’s conclusion. The Board did not fail to consider the evidence that the applicant’s risk was increased by the continued use of EM monitoring. It was open to the Board to conclude that the potential risk Mr Grinder posed to young children outweighed the impact of the EM conditions. The Board’s decision should be quashed and the application remitted back to the Board, with directions. The applicant was awarded costs on a 2B basis.