Greig v Hutchison

Case [2015] NZHC 3067


IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

CIV-2014-409-000301 [2015] NZHC 3067

BETWEEN

MS GREIG

Appellant

AND

MR HUTCHISON First Respondent

MRS HUTCHISON Second Respondent

MR HUTCHISON AND MS CHAPMAN AS TRUSTEES OF THE HUTCHISON TRUST

Third Respondent

CIV-2014-409-000302

BETWEEN  MR HUTCHISON First Appellant

MS GREIG Second Appellant

ANDMRS HUTCHISON First Respondent

MR HUTCHISON AND MS CHAPMAN AS TRUSTEES OF THE HUTCHISON TRUST

Second Respondent

Hearing: 12 October 2015

Appearances:

J Wren for Ms Greig
H Cull QC and S van Bohemen for Mr Hutchison
J V Ormsby and M K Prendergast for Mrs Hutchison
A Corry for Representatives of the Hutchison Trust

Judgment:

4 December 2015

GREIG v HUTCHISON [2015] NZHC 3067 [4 December 2015]

JUDGMENT OF GENDALL J

(Note: The names of the parties to this litigation have been anonymised.) Introduction

[1]      Mr Hutchison (the husband) and Ms Greig seek leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal and Mrs Hutchison (the wife) (but only on a conditional basis) also seeks leave to cross-appeal a decision I gave in this Court on 17 June 2015.  This decision related to an appeal to this Court against an earlier Family Court decision dividing relationship property following separation of the marriage between the husband and the wife.1   A major issue in this litigation was whether the husband was in a de facto relationship with Ms Greig, contemporaneous with his marriage to the wife of some

47 years.

[2]      In my decision on the appeal to this Court largely I upheld the carefully reasoned judgment of Judge Walsh in the Family Court on the principal issues at stake.2    The facts and background to this matter are set out in my 17 June 2015

appeal judgment and I do not propose to repeat them here.3

Leave to appeal and cross appeal is sought

[3]      Ms Greig and the husband now seek leave to appeal specific aspects of my

17 June 2015 appeal judgment to the Court of Appeal.  From submissions, it seems the grounds advanced for their appeal can be aggregated to the following questions:

(i)whether   the   High   Court   misdirected   itself   as   to   the interpretation and application of section 2D of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (the Act) when determining that Ms

Greig and the husband were not in a de facto relationship;

1 Greig v Hutchison [2015] NZHC 1309 [High Court Decision].

2      [… v …] [2014] NZFC 2895 [Family Court Decision].

3      High Court Decision, above n 1.

(b)whether the High Court failed to consider evidence that Ms Greig had an equitable claim over the shares in the company concerned;

(c)      whether the High Court failed to consider the implications of the husband’s  and Ms Greig’s relationship from 2007 to  2012 on the status,  value,  and  division  of  relationship  property  between  the husband and the wife; and

(d)whether  the  High  Court  accordingly  failed  to  consider  and  apply s 52A  of  the  Act  and,  on  the  basis  of  what  were  said  to  be contemporaneous or successive…

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Greig v Hutchison [2015] NZHC 3067
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[2015] NZHC 3067
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Greig v Hutchison, the High Court considered applications for leave to appeal and cross-appeal by Ms Greig, Mr Hutchison, and Mrs Hutchison. The appeal related to a decision on dividing relationship property following the separation of Mr Hutchison and Mrs Hutchison. The key issue was whether Mr Hutchison was in a de facto relationship with Ms Greig during his marriage to Mrs Hutchison. The court had to decide whether to grant leave for a second appeal to the Court of Appeal, considering the substantial property involved, the need for finality, and whether the proposed appeal raised a question of law or fact capable of serious argument.

The court held that the threshold for a second appeal was high, requiring the appeal to raise a question of law or fact capable of serious argument and involve an interest of sufficient importance to justify the cost and delay. The court found that the issues had already been adjudicated twice, and the proposed grounds for appeal did not meet the requirements. The application for leave to appeal was refused. The conditional application for leave to cross-appeal by Mrs Hutchison was not pursued as the appeal by Ms Greig and Mr Hutchison was refused. Costs on the applications were reserved for a later decision.

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