Gregory v Police

[2013] NZHC 2176

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CRI-2013-404-146 [2013] NZHC 2176

BETWEEN	REWI GREGORY Appellant
AND	NEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent

Hearing:	26 August 2013
Counsel:	Appellant in person (together with McKenzie Friend) M Hammer for Respondent
Judgment:	27 August 2013

JUDGMENT OF BREWER J

This judgment was delivered by me on 27 August 2013 at 10:00 am pursuant to Rule 11.5 High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:           Meredith Connell (Auckland) for Respondent

(Copy to Appellant in person)

GREGORY v POLICE [2013] NZHC 2176 [27 August 2013]

Introduction

[1]      Mr Gregory appeals against his conviction for driving a motor vehicle whilst his driver’s licence was suspended.  The conviction was entered by Judge P Sinclair in the District Court at Waitakere on 2 May 2013 following a defended hearing.

Background

[2]      The evidence called at his trial was that on 16 October 2012, Mr Gregory was stopped by Police while he was driving a van which had no rear registration plate.  It was ascertained by the police constable involved that Mr Gregory was wanted for service of a notice of suspension of his driver’s licence due to excessive demerit points.  The constable served Mr Gregory with a notice of driver licence suspension and  explained the  consequences of  driving during the  three  months  suspension period.

[3]      On 24 December 2012, Mr Gregory was again stopped by police.  He was again driving a van that was not displaying a registration plate.  The constable gave evidence that Mr Gregory admitted he had previously held a licence and that it was suspended.

[4]      Mr Gregory gave evidence in his own defence.  Relevantly, he said that he had believed that the three months period of suspension had passed.  He said that he had “lost contact” with the suspension document with which he had been issued when stopped by Police the previous October.  I pause to note that Judge Sinclair did not accept Mr Gregory’s explanation that he believed the period of suspension had expired.  The Judge based this conclusion on the evidence that Mr Gregory did not assert this belief to the Police when he was stopped on 24 December 2012.

[5]      The evidence heard by the District Court Judge was certainly sufficient to justify her finding that the charge was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Appeal

[6]      At his trial, Mr Gregory made in his defence various arguments founded on his understanding of Tikanga Maori and related matters.  It is these arguments that form the basis of his appeal.

[7]      In his notice of appeal against conviction, Mr Gregory gives his grounds as:

The Court fail to produce facts of law. (a) Fail to produce FACTS, of LAW. (b)         Fail to produce the Injured Party.

(c)       Fail to produce terms and conditions of a CONTRACT between the

Police and the Appellant.

(d)      Judge Sinclair denied that the Crown was a Registered Company on the New York Stock Exchange.

(e)       I “offered the burden of proof” for my appeal.

[8]      Mr Gregory filed careful written submissions dated 10 August 2013.  These speak to his grounds of appeal quoted above.  During the hearing of the appeal, I discussed with Mr Gregory the limitations on my ability to grant him relief given the consistent position of higher Courts on his grounds of appeal.  Mr Gregory, who was genuine in his arguments, and dignified in his making of them, understood this.  His position is that he is subject to Tikanga Maori and that he has an obligation to “recognise the document”.  He and the members of his society have undertaken to follow the law and to do harm to no-one, but by “law” he does not mean the law as enacted by Parliament.

Discussion

I address Mr Gregory’s arguments on appeal as follows.

(a)      Failed to produce facts of law

[9]      The core of this ground of appeal is:1

1      Grounds for appeal/appearance under protest to jurisdiction and memorandum of understand of authority and determination, dated 10 August 2013, at para 1(iv).

The New Zealand Constitution 1986 or the Land Transport Act 1998 is not binding on the appellant.  It may be binding on agents of the CROWN or those person that are involved with Commerce.  But not a traveller its in breach of the human right. And or a birth right.

[10]     As I explained to Mr Gregory, I am obliged to give effect to the supremacy of Parliament.  Laws made by the Parliament bind us all, regardless of history.  This ground of appeal must fail.

(b)      Failed to produce the injured party

[11]     Mr Gregory’s argument is that there cannot be a criminal charge if there has been no injured party.  When this argument was put to the District Court Judge, she ruled:2

Well there does not have to be an injured – one victim.  The injured party is effectively the community and the fact that you have allegedly breached an order of suspension and that is what I have got to determine.

[12]     The District Court Judge is correct.  The driving suspension laws stem from an Act of Parliament and apply regardless of whether there is a victim in the literal sense.  However, the District Court Judge is also correct that in the figurative sense the community is the victim when laws made for the purpose of protecting safety on the roads are broken. This ground of appeal must fail.

(c)      Failed to produce terms and conditions of contract between the Police and

Appellant

[13]     In Mr Gregory’s submission, the New Zealand Police Force is a commercial entity, a company.  On that logic, the Police cannot interfere with the activities of Mr Gregory unless he has by contract agreed to it.  Mr Gregory goes on to say:3

The criminal charge is driving without a piece of paper.  The truth of the matter  was  I  was  travelling  home  for  Christmas  Day.    “The  Law  of Necessity” and freedom of movement (Declaration of Human Rights 1948 article 10, 13).

The vehicle I was travelling on was not registered under the Land Transport Act 1998.  Also the licence I had was suspended therefore I was not a participant in the LTA (section 2 Land Transport Act 1998).

[14]     The law I have to apply is clear that the authority of the New Zealand Police to enforce the laws of New Zealand does not have its origin in the law of contract.  I also have to hold that necessity, freedom of movement and the state of registration of the  vehicle  do  not  provide  defences  to  the  charge  on  which  Mr Gregory  was convicted.   I will not go into detail and will observe only that necessity is rather stricter, freedom of movement is not a concept applicable to wanting to drive a motor vehicle, and whether or not the vehicle was registered is irrelevant to the enquiry as to him driving while his licence was suspended. This ground of appeal must fail.

(d)      Judge Sinclair denied that the Crown was  a  registered company  on  the

New York Stock Exchange

[15]     I have not found the record of the denial by Judge Sinclair that the Crown is a registered company on  the New York  Stock Exchange.    Mr Gregory relies, for support of the proposition that it is, on the Public Finance Act 1998.4   I must rule that the Crown is not a registered company on the New York Stock Exchange and that the Public Finance Act 1989 does not constitute it as such.   I realise that this is a peremptory ruling but it is sufficiently orthodox that I do not see a need to give

reasons.   It follows that Mr Gregory’s argument that the Crown is a commercial

entity which must bind its subjects through contracts must fail as a ground of appeal.

(e)      I offered the burden of proof for my appeal

[16]     The submissions to this ground of appeal go to the failure by the prosecution to prove that the legislation enacted by Parliament is binding on Mr Gregory.  In his submission,  the  Constitution Act  1986  does  not  bind  him.    A  number  of  the arguments made by him previously are repeated under this heading.  He submits additionally:5

Ask for their identification, their standing, identification of the law they are using, and the original accommodation agreement with me knowing, willing

and intentional wet ink signature that give them authority to act, present and represent on my behalf.

[17]     I  have  already  put  forward  the  position  of  Parliament  as  lawmaker  in New Zealand.  I have also ruled on whether the ability of the Police to enforce the law rests in contract.  For completeness, I rule also that the authority of Parliament does not rest on contracts with individuals. This ground of appeal must fail.

Decision

[18]     In light of the above, I dismiss the appeal.

Brewer J