GREGORY GLANVILLE AND POLICE
[2024] NZHC 2588
•6 September 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE
CRI-2024-409-190
[2024] NZHC 2588
BETWEEN GREGORY GLANVILLE
Appellant
AND
POLICE
Respondent
Hearing: 6 September 2024 Appearances:
C Gullidge for Appellant G Collett for Respondent
Judgment:
6 September 2024
ORAL JUDGMENT OF EATON J
This judgment was delivered by me on …….. at ……… pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:
GLANVILLE v POLICE [2024] NZHC 2588 [6 September 2024]
Introduction
[1] Gregory Glanville was sentenced to eight months’ home detention by Judge Couch1 having pleaded guilty to three charges of breaching a protection order,2 one of assault on a person in a family relationship3 and one of wilful damage.4 Mr Glanville appeals, he says the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Facts
[2] On 15 December 2023 a temporary protection order was issued naming the appellant as respondent and victim as the protected person.
[3] On 8 March 2024 the appellant was staying at the victim’s address. He had been permitted to do so as he was recovering from leg surgery. In the small hours the victim awoke to discover the appellant smashing her laptop, kitchen plates, a dining chair and shelving. The victim clipped the appellant in the head. He then followed her to her room and endeavoured to force his way in. There was a struggle, during which he struck the victim in the head with an open hand and struck her leg. She struck his injured leg. When she tried to get away, the appellant grabbed her by the neck, pulling her back. They fell to the floor, with the appellant on top of the victim. He then left the address on foot, but later text messaged the victim saying, “I hope you [F]ucken die cos I’m killing myself. Good bye you absolute c…”.
[4] The victim, as a result of that incident, suffered tenderness to her face and legs. Mr Glanville was arrested and released on bail on 13 March 2024 on strict conditions that included a prohibition on having contact with the victim by any means.
[5] On 8 April 2024, Mr Glanville texted the victim multiple times including a message that read, “I hope you fucking die [to]” and “I hate you”. The following afternoon he again sent the victim multiple messages including a message that read,
1 Police v Glanville [2024] NZDC 16731.
2 Family Violence Act 2018, ss 90(a), 9 and 112(1)(a) — maximum penalty three years’ imprisonment.
3 Crimes Act 1961, s 194A — maximum penalty two years’ imprisonment.
4 Summary Offences Act 1981, s 11(1)(a) — maximum penalty three months’ imprisonment.
“Better lock your doors tonight c…”, “Think I fucking care about cops” and “Fuck you [victim’s name]”.
[6] The March offending gave rise to charges of breaching a protection order, assault on a person in a family relationship, and wilful damage. The April offending gave rise to two charges of breaching a protection order.
Victim impact statement
[7] The victim prepared a victim impact statement. It is powerful. As a consequence of the offending, she describes herself as a shell of the person she once was. She feels demoralised, disrespected, humiliated and fearful for her own safety. Her home that she understandably describes as her sanctuary is now a reminder of the violence she endured. She has observed negative behavioural changes in her son she believes to be a consequence of him hearing the appellant physically and verbally assault her. She has ongoing physical pain, struggles to sleep, to eat and describes herself as living on the edge. The consequences of the offending have manifested negatively in her employment where she feels distracted and disconnected.
The decision under appeal
[8] The Judge considered each of the charges to be interconnected and approached sentencing on a totality basis. He described the gravity of the offending overall as serious. The aggravating factors were identified as the victim being assaulted in her own home, a gross breach of trust, and the profound and long-lasting impact on the victim. The Judge said it was further aggravating that having left the victim’s home in March, the appellant continued to psychologically abuse her a month later.
[9] A global starting point of two years’ imprisonment was adopted. An uplift of five per cent was applied because the April offending occurred whilst Mr Glanville was on bail and a further five per cent to reflect that all offending was committed while he was serving a sentence of supervision.
[10] A 15 per cent deduction was allowed for guilty pleas, the Judge observing those pleas were entered in relation to the March offending only after not guilty pleas had
been entered and then maintained through a number of subsequent appearances. The Judge considered the victim had been re-victimised having to wait “quite a long time” expecting that she would have to give evidence and relive the offences that gave rise to the offending. The Judge acknowledged the pleas to the April offending were entered promptly but understood those pleas to have been entered “only after an indication that deemed not guilty pleas would be entered” if Mr Glanville did not enter pleas. No discrete allowance was permitted for remorse.
[11] The adjusted sentence was 23 months’ imprisonment. The Judge resolved to commute that sentence to one of home detention. In quantifying the term of home detention, the Judge recognised that Mr Glanville had spent two and a half months in custody on remand and had been on electronically monitored bail for just under a month. An end sentence of eight months’ home detention was imposed together with a reparation order in the sum of $2,572.
Principles on appeal
[12] An appeal against sentence may be allowed by this Court only if it is satisfied that there has been an error in the imposition of the sentence and that a different sentence should be imposed.5 It is appropriate for this Court to intervene and substitute its own views only if the sentence being appealed is “manifestly excessive” and not justified by the relevant sentencing principles.6
Submissions
Appellant’s submissions
[13] Mr Gullidge for Mr Glanville submits the starting point of 24 months’ imprisonment was too high. With reference to Kumar v Police and Watene-Christie v Police,7 he submits that a starting point for both sets of offending in the range of 18 – 20 months’ imprisonment was appropriate. He submits Mr Glanville was entitled to a guilty plea credit nearer to 25 per cent. He says the 15 per cent deduction allowed failed to recognise the April pleas were entered at the
5 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, ss 250(2) and 250(3).
6 Ripia v R [2011] NZCA 101 at [15].
7 Kumar v Police [2015] NZHC 1575; and Watene-Christie v Police [2023] NZHC 2148.
very first reasonable opportunity and the guilty pleas to the March offending were entered immediately following amendments to the summary of facts. Overall, he submits that the least restrictive appropriate sentence was one of five months’ home detention.
Respondent’s submissions
[14] Ms Collett for the police submits the starting point of 24 months’ imprisonment was appropriate, having regard to other cases including Morris-Stewart v Police,
Watene v Police and Manuel v Police.8
[15] As to the guilty pleas, she submits the changes to the summary of facts in relation to the March offending were not significant but does accept the guilty pleas to the April offending were entered at the first reasonable opportunity. She acknowledges a deduction of 20 per cent overall might be seen as more appropriate to reflect pleas. Having regard to what is described to be a modest uplift of 10 per cent for offending on bail and while subject to sentence, and to a generous deduction of one month rather than two weeks for time spent on electronically monitored bail, Ms Collett submits the overall sentence was within range and not manifestly excessive.
Analysis
[16] There is no tariff for the offence of breaching a protection order. That reflects the boundless circumstances that might give rise to a breach, and the variation in both the culpability of the offender and the nature of the threat and consequential harm to a protected person. Both counsel have referred to a number of cases said to be useful comparators. I have read each of those cases.9 I mention three.
[17] In Watene-Christie, a starting of 26 months’ imprisonment was adopted on two charges of assault on a person in a family relationship, two charges of a breach of a protection order and a charge of breaching release conditions. The offending involved
8 Morris-Stewart v Police [2016] NZHC 1030; Watene v Police [2020] NZHC 3011; and Manuel v Police [2015] NZHC 66.
9 Morris-Stewart v Police, above n 8; Watene v Police, above n 8; and Manuel v Police, above n 8;
Watene-Christie v Police, above n 7; and Kumar v Police, above n 7.
three separate incidents, one in which it seems the victim was detained in a vehicle for a period of about four to five hours whilst the offender was under the influence of methamphetamine. During that period there were repeated punching to the arms causing bruises. There was a later incident two days after the initial episode when there was a punch to the right side of the jaw with a closed fist.
[18] I agree with Mr Gullidge that assault was significantly more serious than the offending of Mr Glanville.
[19] In Morris-Stewart the appellant was charged with breaching a protection order. He sent 11 messages to the victim telling her that he was coming to her house, threatening to kill himself and that he hated her. A starting point of 12 months’ imprisonment was considered to be appropriate. More recently, in Watene v Police the appellant was charged with breaching a protection order and assault on a person in a family relationship. Following a verbal argument, the appellant had pushed the victim onto their bed, placed one hand around her neck holding her down and raised a fist, threatening to punch her. A starting point of nine months’ imprisonment was considered appropriate.
[20] As I have observed, reference to cases involving broadly similar offending can provide a general guide but are otherwise of limited value because each case must be very much considered on its own merits.
[21] The aggravating features of Mr Glanville’s offending include the repeated breaching of a protection order; that his offending involved physical violence; the threatening and intimidatory nature of the offending text messages; the vulnerability of the victim who had been kind enough to allow Mr Glanville to stay at her address while he recovered from surgery; and the significant impact on the victim as evidenced in the victim impact statement.
[22] As has been acknowledged in other cases, it is critical the Courts uphold the integrity of protection orders and responds appropriately to those who repeatedly flout their force and effect. Offenders who engage in violent and threatening conduct in breach of a protection order and who engage in conduct which is clearly intended to
intimidate, will face starting points of imprisonment in the range adopted in Morris-Stewart. Physical violence against an intimate partner, inflicted while a protection order is in place will likewise be met with a starting point of imprisonment.
[23] In my view, the global starting point of 24 months’ imprisonment adopted by the sentencing Judge might be viewed as stern and at the upper end of the available range, but I am satisfied it was still within range.
Guilty plea credit
[24] Turning to the credits allowed for guilty pleas, I observe that the two sets of charges were laid on different dates. Mr Glanville’s first appearance for the 8 March offending was on 13 March 2024. The not guilty pleas were entered by notice on 9 April 2024. His first appearance for the 9 April offending was on 10 April 2024.
[25] Guilty pleas to all charges were entered on 29 May 2024. Those pleas were entered promptly after amendments to the summary of facts for the March offending to add reference to the victim’s acts of cuffing the appellant and then kicking him in an already injured leg.
[26] The Judge considered the delay in entering the guilty pleas to the March offending would have “re-victimised” the victim. That is not an issue raised within the lengthy victim impact statement. Absent any material from the victim on point, I doubt whether the six or so weeks during which a not guilty plea was maintained would have had the consequence suggested by the Judge, and not to a level that justified reducing the otherwise available guilty plea credit.
[27] Ms Collett does not seek to support the deduction allowed on the grounds advanced by the Judge. She acknowledges that pleas to the April offending were entered at the first reasonable opportunity.
[28] I agree with both counsel that Mr Glanville is entitled to a full 25 per cent credit in relation to the April offending and, on my assessment, a slightly reduced credit of around 20 per cent in relation to the March offending. That would equate to an overall deduction on the starting point adopted by the Judge, taking into account the uplifts,
of around five and a half months, the Judge having allowed around three and a half months.
Was the end sentence manifestly excessive?
[29] Having acknowledged that the global starting point adopted was stern and that an additional deduction of around two months was appropriate to reflect guilty pleas, I calculate that if I was to adjust the sentence it would be to reduce the term of home detention by about one month.
[30] I agree with Ms Collett that the fact Mr Glanville offended in a like manner against the same victim whilst on bail, on sentence and in breach of a protection order could have warranted a higher uplift than that applied by the Judge. I also agree that the Judge was ‘generous’ in allowing a one-month deduction to reflect that Mr Glanville had spent three and a half weeks on EM bail.
[31] Having regard to those factors and standing back, I am not satisfied that the end sentence of eight months’ home detention was manifestly excessive.
Result
[32]The appeal is therefore dismissed.
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Eaton J
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitors, Christchurch
Public Defence Service, Christchurch
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