Greer v Commissioner of Police

[2024] NZHC 1141

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE

CIV-2023-485-276

[2024] NZHC 1141

IN THE MATTER OF

Human Rights Review Tribunal Appeal

UNDER

Judicature Act 1908, High Court Rules 2016 and Human Rights Act 1993

BETWEEN

ALAN IVO GREER

Applicant

AND

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

Respondent

Hearing:

On the papers

Appearances:

Applicant in person

S B McCusker for Respondent

Judgment:

9 May 2024

JUDGMENT OF CHURCHMAN J

Introduction

[1]                 On 8 February 2024, I  delivered  a  judgment  in  this  matter,1  dismissing Mr Alan Ivo Greer’s challenge to a decision of the Human Rights Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) of 21 December 2022.2

[2]                 Mr Greer had 15 working days from 8 February 2024 to appeal the High Court decision.

1      Greer v Commissioner of Police [2024] NZHC 104.

2      Greer v Commissioner of Police [2022] NZHRRT 51.

GREER v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2024] NZHC 1141 [9 May 2024]

[3]                 On 10 April 2024, well beyond the time limit for filing an appeal, Mr Greer has filed an application described as an application for leave  to  appeal  to  the  Court of Appeal.

Submissions

Applicant’s submissions

[4]                 Mr Greer’s application is very prolix with a number of exhibits appended to it. Its format is more akin to a statement of claim or submissions than an application. It focuses almost entirely on the purported grounds of appeal, rather than the issue of leave to appeal out of time.

[5]                 The limited grounds advanced as to why the appeal should be heard out of time are that Mr Greer has “been forced over many decades to prepare and present his own case” and has been purportedly “denied legal assistance”. No particulars are provided.

[6]                 The grounds of appeal advanced in the substantive application include purported unwarranted bias, failure to consider relevant facts, considering “false” facts contrary to law, failing to apply appropriate laws, applying laws inappropriately, and failing to permit any lawful hearing. Almost all of the material filed by Mr Greer relates not to the decision to strike out Mr Greer’s claim, which is the subject of this appeal, but rather the substantive matter behind his original claim at the Tribunal, and other prior claims Mr Greer has made against Corrections and the judicial system.

Respondent’s submissions

[7]                 Mr McCusker for the respondent submits that no formal application for an extension of time has been advanced by Mr Greer. Mr McCusker refers to the principles governing extensions of time for appeals as set out in Almond v Read,3 and submits that:

(a)The delay of 27 working days was significant.

3      Almond v Read [2017] NZSC 80, [2017] 1 NZLR 801.

(b)There were no reasons advanced for the delay, other than an unsupported claim that he has been forced to prepare and present his own case and been denied legal assistance. Mr Greer is an experienced litigant who is clearly aware of the significance of timetable orders.

(c)Mr Greer had an extensive history of delay and non-compliance, as reflected in the fact his claim in the Tribunal was struck out for deliberate non-compliance with timetabling directions for 27 months.

(d)There is prejudice to the respondent in that the proceeding has been ongoing for nine years at this point.

(e)There are no matters of public interest raised in Mr Greer’s proposed appeal.

[8]                 Consequently, Mr McCusker submits that the interests of justice overwhelmingly favour the application for leave to appeal out of time being dismissed.

[9]                 It is further submitted that if an extension of time for leave to appeal is granted, there is no proper basis for granting leave to appeal. This is because of the proposed leave grounds, only two, namely “interpretations of law” and “laws ignored” relate to a question of law.

[10]             Mr McCusker contends that these questions are not capable of bona fide or serious argument, as Mr Greer does not particularise what laws he alleges have been misinterpreted or ignored. It is submitted that Mr Greer’s written submissions are primarily concerned with historical matters relating to the  processing  of  his  Privacy Act request and the conduct of his proceeding in the Tribunal. Mr McCusker also submits that the appeal does not involve any matter of public interest and there is ongoing prejudice to the respondent in being put to unnecessary cost and expense in having to defend this proceeding.

The law

[11]             Section 124(1) of the Human Rights Act 1993 (HRA) provides that any party to a HRA proceeding before the High Court may, with the leave of the High Court, appeal to the Court of Appeal against any determination of the High Court on a question of law arising in those proceedings.

[12]             The party desiring to bring such an appeal shall within 15 working days after the determination of the High Court, or within such further time allowed by the Court, give notice of their application for leave to appeal as directed by the High Court Rules.4 Under those rules, the Court may, on application, extend the period for bringing an application for leave to appeal.5

[13]             The principles governing extensions of time for substantive appeals are relevant to an assessment of whether to grant an extension of time to bring an application for leave to appeal.6 The relevant factors for granting such extensions are:7

(a)The length of the delay, including how quickly the applicant sought to rectify any mistake at the filing date.

(b)The reasons for the delay, particularly whether the delay resulted from a deliberate decision not to proceed followed by a change of mind, from indecision, or from error or inadvertence.

(c)The conduct of the parties, particularly of the applicant, such as a history of non-cooperation or delay.

(d)Any prejudice or hardship to the respondent, such that significant delay or prejudice may lead to an extension being refused even where the appeal is strongly arguable.

4      Human Rights Act 1993, s 124(2).

5      High Court Rules 2016, r 20.3(5).

6      Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley Family Trustee Ltd (in interim liq) [2023] NZHC 2407 at [32];

Jones v New Zealand Bloodstock Financing and Leasing Ltd [2021] NZCA 213 at [19].

7      Almond, above n 3, at [38].

(e)The significance of the issues raised by the proposed appeal, including whether it gives rise to matters of public interest.

[14]For leave to appeal to be granted there are three conditions to be satisfied:8

(a)That the appeal involves a question of law.

(b)That the question of law is of general or public importance, or the appeal involves some other feature.

(c)That this importance, or feature, means that a second appeal is warranted.

[15]             The question of law must be capable of bona fide and serious argument in a case involving some interest of sufficient importance to outweigh the costs and delay of a further appeal.9

[16]An application for leave to the Court of Appeal must state:10

(a)the specific grounds of the appeal;

(b)why the Court should give leave; and

(c)the judgment that the application seeks to appeal, if leave is granted.

Analysis

Extension of time

[17]             Mr Greer has informally made an application for leave to appeal out of time. The relevant application in this case would be for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal. There was a reasonably significant delay which Mr Greer was unable to properly justify, with no affidavit evidence to support his claims of being denied access

8      Hoban v Attorney-General [2023] NZHC 222.

9      Waller v Hider [1998] 1 NZLR 412 (CA); and Snee v Snee (1999) 13 PRNZ 609 (CA).

10     Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005, r 17.

to facilities or legal aid. This delay reflects a broader pattern of Mr Greer consistently failing to comply with directions regarding when he must file court documents. As an experienced self-represented litigant, Mr Greer should be well aware of their importance.

[18]             Although allowing an extension of time is unlikely to significantly add to the prejudice suffered by the respondent from the already extremely protracted proceedings,11 it is clear the overwhelming majority of relevant factors militate in favour of not granting an extension of time.

Leave to appeal

[19]             Although it is clear that an extension of time for seeking leave to appeal is not justified here, I will also address the merits of the proposed appeal.

[20]             Mr McCusker rightly submits that only two of the grounds of appeal advanced by Mr Greer concern questions of law, namely the purported failure to apply appropriate laws, and applying laws inappropriately. The other grounds are questions of fact.

[21]             Mr Greer fails to specify in his application what these laws are. As discussed, the contents of his application largely do not relate to the strike out of Mr Greer’s claim, but rather the substantive issues of his claim before the Tribunal. Vague reference is made to the Human Rights Review Tribunal Regulations12 and the powers of the Tribunal under the Privacy Act,13 which appear to relate to the Tribunal striking out his claim without Mr Greer attending the hearing. This is settled law, and in this case does not raise any issues of general or public importance. It cannot be said that Mr Greer’s grounds of appeal are capable of bona fide and serious argument, or are of such importance to outweigh the cost and delay of a further appeal. It is clear that if leave to appeal out of time is granted, the substantive appeal is completely lacking in merit.

11     Rogan v Kaipara District Council [2020] NZSC 8.

12     Human Rights Review Tribunal Regulations 2002, r 19.

13     Privacy Act 1993, s 85.

Conclusion

[22]Application for leave to appeal out of time is declined.

Churchman J

Solicitors:
Luke Cunningham and Clere, Wellington for Respondent