Greer v Attorney-General - [2023] NZHC 1627

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE

CIV-2023-485-327

[2023] NZHC 1627

UNDER the Habeas Corpus Act 2001

IN THE MATTER OF

an application for a writ of habeas corpus

BETWEEN

ALAN IVO GREER

Applicant

AND

ATTORNEY GENERAL

First Respondent

JEREMY LIGHTFOOT

Second Respondent

Judgment
(on the papers):
28 June 2023

JUDGMENT OF ROBINSON J

[Application for Habeas Corpus]

This judgment was delivered by me on 28 June 2023 at 1:00 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules

…………………………………………………………………… Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:
Luke Cunningham Clere, Wellington

Copy to:
Mr A I Greer

GREER v ATTORNEY GENERAL [2023] NZHC 1627 [28 June 2023]

Introduction

[1] Mr Greer is currently serving a sentence of preventative detention with a minimum period of imprisonment of 10 years for a range of offences, the most serious of which is a charge of sexual violation by rape.1 He was found guilty of these charges by a jury in May 2014 and is currently detained in custody pursuant to a warrant of commitment dated 26 September 2014.

[2] Nevertheless, on 18 June 2023, Mr Greer applied, as is his right, for a writ of habeas corpus.

Mr Greer’s application

[3] Mr Greer’s submissions in support of his application contain a number of allegations related to the conduct of his 2014 trial and his alleged inability to have properly prepared his own defence. The latter complaint seems to be based on the fact that he was denied access to computer facilities, which he says he needed given he was self-represented. However, the crux of his application for a writ of habeas corpus
– which is concerned with whether he is unlawfully detained – is essentially:

(a)that he has been “criminally detained” for over a decade following a “corrupt mock trial in 2014”;

(b)that he had previously been “criminally detained” in the lead up to his 2014 trial for around 20 weeks; and

(c)that he has been deprived of “necessary facilities”, including “proper secure computer resources” and “proper original investigation notes and record”.

[4] Mr Greer’s application also mentions a proposed transfer to Waikeria Prison ordered “as of 16 June 2023” which Mr Greer alleges to be a “criminal transfer” on “the suggested pretence” that computer access cannot be facilitated from where he is currently detained.

1 R v Greer [2014] NZHC 2364.

[5] Mr Greer has applied for a writ of habeas corpus at least three times before. The Court dismissed his most recent application2 (prior to this one) because it raised the same questions as those which he had raised in a previous application which was dismissed by Goddard J.3 Mr Greer made that earlier application (determined by Goddard J) shortly after he was sentenced to the term of imprisonment that he is now serving. The Judge dismissed it on the basis that he was lawfully detained and sentenced.

Legal principles

[6] An application for a writ of habeas corpus is an application…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Greer v Attorney-General

Details

AGLC: Greer v Attorney-General [2023] NZHC 1627
Case: [2023] NZHC 1627
Decision Date: 28 June 2023

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the High Court of New Zealand, Wellington Registry, Alan Ivo Greer, an individual currently serving a sentence of preventative detention, filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his detention. The application was opposed by the Attorney General and Jeremy Lightfoot. The central issue in this case was whether Mr Greer was being unlawfully detained. Mr Greer alleged that his detention was unlawful due to the supposed corruption of his 2014 trial, his lack of access to computer facilities, and his transfer to Waikeria Prison. The court examined the legal principles surrounding habeas corpus applications and found that the onus was on Mr Greer to prove his detention was unlawful, particularly since a warrant of detention typically defeats such an application. The court noted that it could not question a conviction or re-examine substantially the same questions previously decided.

The court reasoned that Mr Greer's application fell within the exceptions to the general rule that such applications must first have a hearing. Firstly, under section 14(1A)(a) of the Habeas Corpus Act 2001, the court could refuse the application without a hearing if it was an attempt to relitigate the same questions as were raised in a previous application. Mr Greer's current application was indeed an attempt to relitigate the same questions, and his detention remained lawful under the warrant of commitment. Secondly, under section 14(1A)(b), the application was not the appropriate procedure for considering the allegations made by Mr Greer, as his complaints about restricted computer access and his transfer to another prison facility were matters for judicial review and did not render his detention unlawful. Finally, even if the application did not fall within section 14(1A), the court found that the warrant of commitment was a lawful justification for Mr Greer's detention.

As a result, the court dismissed Mr Greer's application for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held that Mr Greer's detention remained lawful, and his application was an abuse of process. The court also noted that it did not consider it necessary to treat Mr Greer's application with the same precedence as usually required, given his history of making similar applications.

Orders