Green Land Investment Limited v Mao

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2020-404-606

[2020] NZHC 1677

IN THE MATTER of s 142 of the Land Transfer Act 2017

AND

IN THE MATTER

of an application for the removal of certain caveats

BETWEEN

GREEN LAND INVESTMENT LIMITED

Applicant

AND

JIAWEN MAO

Respondent

Hearing: On the papers

Appearances:

G M Illingworth QC for the applicant Ms Mao in person

Date of judgment:

14 July 2020


JUDGMENT OF JAGOSE J

[Leave to appeal]


This judgment was delivered by me on 14 July 2020 at 11.00am.

Pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

………………………… Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Counsel/Solicitors:

G M Illingworth QC, Auckland Heritage Lawyers, Auckland

GREEN LAND INVESTMENT LIMITED v MAO [2020] NZHC 1677 [14 July 2020]

[1]                 My 14 May 2020 judgment ordered Ms Mao’s caveat removed.1 Ms Mao now seeks leave to appeal against my decision.

Approach to applications for leave to appeal

[2]                 Section 56(3) of the Senior Courts Act 2016 prohibits appeals of orders or decisions on interlocutory applications in civil proceedings without this Court’s leave. The object of requiring such leave is:2

… to limit the cases which may go on appeal in the interests of finality of litigation and the workload of the [appellate] Court, while preserving the integrity of the law and the interests of justice.

[3]                 The Court of Appeal recently endorsed this Court’s approach to leave as a “filtering mechanism”,3 noting its own approach to be similar:4

… leave to appeal should only be granted where the significance or implications of an arguable error of fact or law, either for the particular case or for the applicant or as a matter of precedent, warrants the further delay which the appeal process would involve.

There is no reason for this Court’s approach to be seen any differently, and it is not.5 The question is if there is something justifying intermediate appeal.

Discussion

[4]  It is not clear leave to appeal was required. Green Land brought an originating application for an order removing a caveat, which I granted. In the circumstances of an urgent application brought against an unrepresented respondent, I reserved the balance of Green Land’s application for substantive determination.6 But Green Land’s claim for the caveat’s removal was finally determined;7 my order was


1      Green Land Investment Ltd v Mao [2020] NZHC 1000 at [16].

2      Sandle v Stewart [1982] 1 NZLR 708 (CA) at 715.

3      Greendrake v District Court of New Zealand [2020] NZCA 122 at [6], citing Finewood Upholstery Ltd v Vaughan [2017] NZHC 1679 at [13].

4      At [7], citing Ngai Te Hapu Inc v Bay of Plenty Regional Council [2018] NZCA 291 at [17]; and Meates v Taylor (1992) 5 PRNZ 524 (CA) at 526. Similarly, Fairway Holdings Ltd v McCullagh [2018] NZCA 605 at [11]–[14]; and McLaren v McLaren [2018] NZCA 570 at [3]–[5].

5      Li v Chief Executive of Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment [2018] NZHC 1171, [2018]…

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Details
Case
[2020] NZHC 1677
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Green Land Investment Limited v Mao, the applicant, Green Land Investment Limited, sought an order for the removal of certain caveats from a property registered in the name of the respondent, Jiawen Mao. The matter was heard by Jagose J in the High Court of New Zealand. The central issue before the court was whether leave to appeal the decision granting the order for the removal of the caveats should be granted to Mao. Jagose J began by examining the statutory and procedural framework governing appeals in civil proceedings, noting that leave to appeal interlocutory applications is generally not granted unless there are significant implications for the particular case, the applicant, or as a matter of precedent. The court considered whether the refusal of an application to remove a caveat, on the grounds that the respondent established an arguable case of a caveatable interest in the land, could be considered a procedural matter warranting leave to appeal.

Jagose J analysed Mao's written submissions, which focused on new evidence she claimed supported her caveat and criticisms of Green Land's financial position and motives. The court found that Mao had not identified any arguable errors of law or fact in the original judgment and had not demonstrated that the appeal would have significant implications for the case, herself, or as a matter of precedent. Jagose J concluded that Mao's application for leave to appeal did not meet the threshold for consideration and dismissed the application. The court also noted that any points raised in the application for leave could still be raised in a subsequent appeal against the substantive decision.

In the final orders, Jagose J dismissed Mao's application for leave to appeal and reserved costs for further determination if the parties could not agree on the issue. Green Land was preliminarily considered entitled to costs and disbursements for the steps taken in opposing the application, which were of a straightforward nature and occupied a normal amount of time.

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