Grant v Police - [2017] NZHC 953

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND ROTORUA REGISTRY

CRI-2017-470-13 [2017] NZHC 953

BETWEEN
DYLAN GRANT

Appellant

AND

NEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent

Hearing: 11 May 2017

Appearances:

K Davies for the Appellant
AZM Shore for the Respondnet

Judgment:

11 May 2017

ORAL JUDGMENT OF WOODHOUSE J

Solicitors:
Ms K Davies, Public Defence Service, Tauranga
Ms AZM Shore, Hollister-Jones Lellman, Office of the Crown Solicitor, Tauranga

GRANT v POLICE [2017] NZHC 953 [11 May 2017]

[1] Mr Grant appeals against disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver licence for 2 years. This was imposed by C J Harding in the District Court at Tauranga on 28 February this year.1 The disqualification was imposed for three driving offences. At the same time Mr Grant was sentenced for four other offences which I will mention in a moment.

[2] The three driving offences are as follows, although not in chronological order.

[3] There are two offences of driving when suspended from driving on a third or subsequent occasion. These are offences against s 32(4) of the Land Transport Act
1998. The two offences occurred on 27 December 2016 and 2 February 2017. The second offence also occurred after conviction on 2 February 2017 for the first offence and therefore while Mr Grant was awaiting sentence for that offence.

[4] The offences of driving when the licence was suspended occurred within a short period after the earliest and most serious of the driving offences. This is an offence of driving under the influence of a drug which occurred on 15 November
2016. A brief summary of the facts in relation to that offence is relevant and is conveniently taken from the helpful submissions of Ms Davies for Mr Grant:

[6] At about 11.02pm on Tuesday 15 November 2016 the appellant drove a motor vehicle in Tauranga. He was stopped by the police as a result of a driving complaint. A Compulsory impairment test was done and was not completed to the satisfaction of the testing officer. The subsequent evidential blood test returned a positive result for the use of controlled drugs namely cannabis and methamphetamine.

[7] At the time the appellant had been having some difficulty seeing out of his left eye however accepts that he had consumed drugs in the month preceding the offending.

[5] Mr Grant had indicated to the Court on 23 January 2017 that he was likely to enter a guilty plea to that charge and the plea was confirmed, following blood test
results, on 2 February 2017.

1 Police v Grant [2017] NZDC 4118.

[6] The two offences of driving while suspended or disqualified were the fifth and sixth. The previous suspension and disqualification orders were as follows:

(a) In 2007 Mr Grant was convicted for driving when his licence was suspended and was disqualified for six months from holding a licence.

(b)In 2013 there was an order suspending his licence for the second time with disqualification for six months.

(c) Six months later, in 2013, he was convicted…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Grant v Police

Details

AGLC: Grant v Police [2017] NZHC 953
Case: [2017] NZHC 953
Decision Date: 11 May 2017

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Dylan Grant appealed against the two-year disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence imposed by the District Court for three driving offences. The disqualification was imposed alongside a five-month imprisonment sentence for four other offences. The appeal focused on whether the disqualification was manifestly excessive, considering the primary purpose of disqualification is public safety, balanced against the consideration that long periods of disqualification typically leave little hope for the offender.

The District Court judge had noted Mr. Grant's pattern of repetitive offending, minimization of responsibility, and substance abuse issues, and had concluded that a sentence of imprisonment was necessary to address these issues. The judge imposed a two-year disqualification for the driving offences, alongside a one-month imprisonment for driving under the influence of drugs and a one-month imprisonment for the two theft charges, resulting in a total of five months imprisonment.

The court considered that the District Court judge had broad discretion in determining the length of disqualification, and the minimum period of disqualification is one year. The court also noted that the two-year disqualification was not solely for the fifth and sixth occasions of driving while suspended or disqualified, but also took into account the serious offence of driving under the influence of drugs, and Mr. Grant's large number of demerit points accumulated over an extended period for numerous offences of excessive speed. The court found that the disqualification was not manifestly excessive, and dismissed the appeal.

This case highlights the importance of considering both public safety and prospects of rehabilitation when determining the length of disqualification for driving offences. The court emphasized that the sentencing judge has a broad discretion in this regard, and that a comparison with other cases is a less reliable guide than in conventional sentencing. The court also noted that long periods of disqualification typically leave little hope for the offender, but that this consideration is balanced against the primary purpose of disqualification, which is public safety.

Orders