Grant v CP Asset Management Limited
[2013] NZHC 3341
•12 December 2013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2012-404-005014 [2013] NZHC 3341
UNDER sections 243(7) and 245A of the
Companies Act 1993 and Part 19 of the
High Court RulesIN THE MATTER OF
the liquidation of NZ Properties Holding
Limited (in Liquidation)BETWEEN
DAMIEN GRANT AND STEVEN KHOV AS LIQUIDATORS OF NZ
PROPERTIES HOLDING LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION)
Applicants
AND
CP ASSET MANAGEMENT LIMITED First Respondent
ASIA PACIFIC HOTEL INVESTMENTS LIMITED
Second Respondent
C P RETAIL HOLDINGS LIMITED Third Respondent
RAISONS PACIFIC INVESTMENTS LIMITED
Fourth Respondent
SOUTH ISLAND HOTEL INVESTMENTS LIMITED Fifth Respondent
YEIL C & M LIMITED Sixth Respondent
BRIAN AND BRIDGIT LAWRENCE Seventh Respondents
Hearing: (On the papers) Counsel:
B J Norling for Applicants
R B Hucker for First to Sixth RespondentsG A Keene for Seventh Respondents
GRANT & KHOV AS LIQUIDATORS OF NZ PROPERTIES HOLDING LTD (IN LIQ) v CP ASSET MANAGEMENT LTD [2013] NZHC 3341 [12 December 2013]
Judgment: 12 December 2013
COSTS JUDGMENT OF VENNING J
This judgment was delivered by me on 12 December 2013 at 3.45 pm, pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the
High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date……………
Solicitors: Waterstone Insolvency, Auckland Hucker & Associates, Auckland Pidgeon Law, Solicitors, Auckland
Copy to: G A Keene, Auckland
[1] Following delivery of the Court of Appeal decision the applicants and the seventh respondents seek to have the previous orders of the Court in relation to costs set aside and seek costs on the proceedings in this Court.
[2] Although the Court of Appeal did not directly address the issue, given the decision of that Court the costs order previously made cannot stand. It is set aside.
[3] The applicants seek costs on a 2B basis calculated at $11,343.00.
[4] For the seventh respondents Mr Keene acknowledges that the seventh respondents are in receipt of legal aid but submits, nevertheless, the Court may be justified in awarding the seventh respondents scale costs, notwithstanding they would be higher than the amount actually paid by the Legal Aid Unit. He seeks further time to make submissions.
[5] For the first to sixth respondents Mr Hucker submits that there should be no costs order made in favour of the seventh respondents but if there is to be an order then it should be limited to the costs paid by the Legal Services Agency.
[6] Mr Hucker submits the applicant liquidators should not be awarded costs at all, but if they are, then bearing in mind r 14.2(f) the Court should effectively require the applicants to satisfy the Court that the costs they seek do not exceed the actual costs incurred bearing in mind that Mr Norling is in-house counsel.
[7] I am not prepared to adjourn the matter for further submissions as sought by the seventh respondent. I have a clear view on the issue of costs. The matter has been before the Court for some time and there should be finality.
[8] In terms of the seventh respondents’ position, they played a very limited role at the hearing before this Court. Nevertheless, they are entitled to costs as their interests have led in part at least to the appeal being allowed. Their costs are more than adequately compensated for, however, by recognition of the Legal Aid contribution.
[9] The seventh respondents are to have costs against the first to sixth respondents but limited to the payments made by Legal Services together with the seventh respondents’ contribution (if any). When filing an order for costs for sealing Mr Keene is to certify as counsel the amounts received by the seventh respondents as costs from Legal Services Agency in relation to this application.
[10] The applicants are entitled to costs given the outcome in the Court of Appeal. Those costs should ordinarily be on a 2B basis as suggested by Mr Norling. I note Mr Hucker’s submission that bearing in mind r 14.2(f):
(f) an award of costs should not exceed the costs incurred by the party claiming costs
the applicants should provide evidence of actual costs.
[11] The submission Mr Hucker makes has recently been considered by Courtney J in the case of Grant & Khov v Pandey & Ors.1 I agree with Courtney J that there is no reason in principle that the statutory regime ought not to operate effectively for both in-house and external counsel. Mr Norling, as an officer of this Court, has an obligation to comply with r 14.2(f). Again, in seeking to seal an order for costs on a 2B basis, Mr Norling is effectively certifying to the Court that the costs as sealed are less than the actual costs incurred by his employer for his attendances on the file. That is a professional obligation resting on Mr Norling.
[12] In relation to quantum Mr Hucker raises the issue of the length of the hearing. He notes the hearing only took a half day as opposed to the one day sought and he also objects to the inclusion of costs for a conference which was initiated by the applicants and seventh respondents. They sought an alteration to the timetable directions previously made by an Associate Judge. In the event that application was rejected.
[13] I accept Mr Hucker’s submission. The hearing was a half day hearing. There
is no entitlement to claim for one full day. Further, the first to sixth respondents should not be responsible for payment of the costs associated with a conference
1 Grant & Khov v Pandey & Ors [2013] NZHC 3323.
which was only required because the applicants and the seventh respondents sought the conference and the applicants and seventh respondents’ submissions at that conference were rejected.
Result
[14] The seventh respondents are to have costs against the first to sixth respondents but limited to the payments made by Legal Services together with the seventh respondents’ contribution (if any).
[15] The applicants are to have costs against the first to sixth respondents on a 2B
basis, calculated at $9,950.
Venning J