[2] The plaintiff, Samantha Grant, has brought a wide-ranging set of claims against the defendant. The genesis of Ms Grant’s complaints is the belief that the New Zealand Police unlawfully disclosed inaccurate information to potential employers as part of a Police vetting process. Ms Grant perceives the disclosure of the information lead to a spiral of events that saw her lose her liberty, her employment, her home, and access to her children.

[3]The Attorney-General seeks to strike out Ms Grant’s claims on the basis they:

(a)are an abuse the Court’s process by seeking to relitigate matters already determined by another Court;

GRANT v THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2021] NZHC 1700

(b)disclose no reasonably arguable cause of action; or

(c)are so prolix and difficult to understand that the defendant would be significantly prejudiced if required to respond them.

[4] If any of the claims are not struck out, the Attorney-General seeks a security for costs order.

[5] For the reasons outlined below, I have reached the clear view that all but one of Ms Grant’s claims should be struck out.

Background

[6] The last decade has been difficult for Ms Grant. It has involved her losing work as a early childhood teacher, separation from two partners, loss of unsupervised access with her two children, criminal charges in relation to family violence and breaches of a trespass and protection order, a conviction for driving with excess breath alcohol, and incarceration as a remand prisoner.

Overview of Ms Grant’s litigation

[7] In 2017 Ms Grant complained to the Privacy Commissioner about the release of information to prospective employers in Police vetting reports. This information concerned eight alleged family violence incidents from 2009 to 2016. The incidents did not result in convictions, but in charges being withdrawn, a discharge without conviction, a warning and a dismissal (of one of the assault charges).

[8] In December 2017 the Privacy Commissioner wrote to Ms Grant informing her that there had been no interference with her privacy. Ms Grant asked the Commissioner to reconsider. The Commissioner reconsidered Ms Grant’s complaints and reached the same conclusion.

[9] Throughout 2018 Ms Grant (then using her former partner’s surname, Everett) filed three statements of claim in the District Court alleging the New Zealand Police

had improperly disclosed irrelevant and inaccurate personal information in Police vetting checks to potential employers and to Oranga Tamariki.1

[10] In March 2019, Judge Zorab struck out Ms Grant’s cause of action based on the Privacy Act 1993.2 Ms Grant filed another statement of claim, which resulted in an order for security for costs.3

[11] In March…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Grant v Attorney-General

Details

AGLC: Grant v Attorney-General [2021] NZHC 1700
Case: [2021] NZHC 1700
Decision Date: 8 July 2021

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The proceeding was brought by Samantha Grant against the Attorney-General. Ms Grant alleged that the New Zealand Police had unlawfully disclosed inaccurate information to potential employers as part of a vetting process. She claimed this disclosure led to a series of negative events including losing her liberty, employment, home, and access to her children. The Attorney-General sought to strike out Ms Grant's claims on the grounds that they were an abuse of the court's process, disclosed no reasonably arguable cause of action, or were so prolix and difficult to understand that the defendant would be significantly prejudiced. The Court found that most of Ms Grant's claims should be struck out as they were either an abuse of process, disclosed no reasonably arguable cause of action, or were otherwise an abuse of the court's process. However, one claim relating to Ms Grant's detention with sentenced prisoners while on remand was not struck out as it had not been previously determined and may have merit. Ms Grant was ordered to amend her pleading to focus on this claim and identify the cause of action and remedy sought. The Court adjourned the application for security for costs and suggested that the issue of a civil restraint order under s 166 of the Senior Courts Act 2016 should be advanced through a formal application.

Orders