Gottler v Police
[2020] NZHC 3191
•3 December 2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CRI-2020-404-356
[2020] NZHC 3191
BETWEEN JOHN GOTTLER
Appellant
AND
NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Respondent
Hearing: 30 November 2020 Appearances:
J Maddox for the Appellant
J M Xulue for the Respondent
Judgment:
3 December 2020
JUDGMENT OF GORDON J
This judgment was delivered by me on 3 December 2020 at 4 pm
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:
Solicitors: Crown Solicitor, Manukau
Liberty Law, Manukau
GOTTLER v POLICE [2020] NZHC 3191 [3 December 2020]
Introduction
[1] The appellant, John Gottler, was found guilty of one charge of careless driving causing injury1 following a judge-alone trial in the District Court at Manukau on 9 January 2020.2
[2] His application for discharge without conviction was declined on 23 July 2020. Mr Gottler was sentenced to pay compensation of $1,500 and was disqualified from holding or obtaining a New Zealand drivers’ licence for eight months.3
[3] Mr Gottler appeals against his conviction and the decision declining a discharge without conviction. His grounds of appeal against conviction are that the Judge erred by incorrectly applying the relevant test and that an adverse factual finding was not supported by the evidence. On the decision declining a discharge without conviction, he says the Judge erred in his assessment of the gravity of the offending and in his proportionality assessment.
[4] The respondent says that there was no error in the Judge’s analysis of the evidence and no miscarriage of justice occurred. Nor was there any error in the decision to decline a discharge without conviction.
Background
[5] On 7 December 2018, at about 5.00 am, Mr Gottler was driving his car down a residential street in Howick. Mr Gottler came to an intersection with another road. The intersection was T shaped. Mr Gottler was on the road approaching the top of the
T. He was on the part of the intersection controlled by a compulsory stop sign. The victim, Jeannie Smith, was on her bike and was approaching Mr Gottler in his car from his right. He pulled out, colliding with her and driving his car over her. She was lodged beneath the car and suffered significant injuries, including a fractured ankle, pelvis and ribs and a broken clavicle. She also suffered spinal related injuries.
1 Land Transport Act 1998, s 38. Maximum penalty: three months’ imprisonment or fine not exceeding $4,500.
2 Police v Gottler [2020] NZDC 23501.
3 Police v Gottler [2020] NZDC 14286.
[6] At trial, evidence was given by Ms Smith, two Police officers who attended the incident and Mr Gottler.
District Court conviction decision
[7] The Judge identified a single issue in dispute: had the prosecution proved Mr Gottler was careless in operating his car? That is, the prosecution was required to prove Mr Gottler’s actions fell below the standard of care of a “reasonably prudent4 driver” in the circumstances of this event.
[8] The Judge noted the weather conditions were good, although it was dark at the time. He referred to and accepted Ms Smith’s evidence was that she was wearing a rain jacket with fluorescent markings on the front around chest level. She was wearing gloves with fluorescent markings. Front and rear lights were fitted to her bike. The Judge was satisfied they were operating and the front light emitted a bright light; the Police officers who attended the accident did not see the collision but saw the lights on the bike and their evidence was that they were working. The Judge referred to some differences in the evidence as to whether the front light was pulsating or whether it was in a steady state. He said he did not know whether the extent of that mattered. The Judge noted that Mr Gottler was in a position where he was controlled by a compulsory stop sign. He was required to stop and ascertain the way was clear before proceeding into the intersection.
[9] The Judge said there was some dispute as to whether the bike’s pedals had reflectors. However, the official New Zealand road code was produced in evidence and established the requirement that, where a bike did not have reflective material on the pedals, the rider was required to wear reflective clothing. The Judge could not be certain about the pedals. He said he was inclined to regard that as not proven but had accepted the victim was wearing reflective clothing and so was satisfied as to the requirements of the road code.
4 The text of the ruling has the word “proven” rather than “prudent”. There was no suggestion that this was other than a typographical error.
[10] The evidence of Ms Smith was that, as she approached the intersection, she hesitated, she saw the car was stopped and she assumed the driver had seen her because the car was stopped. She then continued forward. She said she was right in front of Mr Gottler’s car and it smashed into her.
[11] The Judge noted Mr Gottler was a local resident who lived nearby. The Judge also acknowledged Mr Gottler’s professional qualifications and experience on matters of road safety, as a road safety auditor and crash reconstruction expert (but recorded he did not give expert evidence in the proceeding). The Judge referred to Mr Gottler’s evidence of leaving his home in normal road conditions, approaching the intersection, indicating his intention to turn right, coming to a complete stop, and looking to his right, to his left and to his right again. He said he thought nothing was coming on his right so started to take his right turn. Ms Smith suddenly appeared directly in front of him. The Judge noted Mr Gottler gave evidence that his car did not hit Ms Smith’s bicycle but rather she fell off her bike and his car then went over her. The Judge accepted Mr Gottler provided assistance to her following the accident.
[12] Mr Gottler’s defence was that he took every reasonable step in driving up to and into the intersection. He insisted that Ms Smith was not there so far as he was concerned. The Judge stated clearly she was there. The question for him to determine, he said, was whether Mr Gottler’s actions fell below the standard expected of a reasonable and prudent driver.
[13] The Judge referred to Mr Gottler’s evidence that the streetlights at this intersection had a particular effect which made it difficult to see cyclists, pedestrians and small objects on the road. There is no depth of field until something is directly in front of a driver. Mr Gottler said the streetlights had been improved since the accident.
[14] The Judge stated that Mr Gottler had this knowledge as he approached the intersection. The Judge considered additional care was required in negotiating the intersection in consequence. The Judge referred to Mr Gottler’s theory that Ms Smith may have skidded towards his car, which is why Mr Gottler said it did not hit her bike. He noted Mr Gottler’s insistence that he was a careful driver and also the absence of any prior convictions or engagement with traffic control authorities. Mr Gottler did
not think the front light on the bike was flashing but, given his evidence that he did not see Ms Smith, the Judge said little weight could be attributed to his evidence on this point.
[15] The Judge did not consider the issue of whether contact was with the bike or with Ms Smith was of any significance to the question to be determined. The Judge thought the impact may have occurred towards the middle of the road as Ms Smith moved to her right, away from Mr Gottler’s car, to avoid the imminent collision as he pulled into the intersection. The Judge stated she may have fallen off the bike in this manoeuvre or the bike may have been shunted by the car, causing her to come off the bike. However, the Judge said Police did not have to establish contact, only that Mr Gottler’s actions caused Ms Smith’s injuries.
[16]The Judge then concluded as follows:
[24] … I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Gottler knew and indeed needed to take more steps than he did to ascertain, to make certain that the way was clear. This may have meant edging out very cautiously and perhaps keeping a continuous eye on vehicles that may be approaching from his right, given the difficulties he would have had in spotting a cyclist on his evidence. Whatever the position, Ms Smith fell from her bicycle and was injured by Mr Gottler’s vehicle in merging from that intersection governed by the compulsory stop sign.
[25] The fact that it was governed by a compulsory stop sign does not mean that any accident following from that is his fault. This is not an offence of strike [sic] liability. There can be situations where in an intersection following a compulsory stop that the circumstances are such that it would not be reasonable to have ascertained the presence of another person. However, in this, I am sure that Mr Gottler knew of the dangers inherit [sic] in it. He says that so far as he was concerned that she was not there. I can understand his perspective and his evidence, but the fact remains that she was, and it seems to me, and I so find, that Mr Gottler should have proceeded with more caution than in fact he did.
[26]The charge is proven, and Mr Gottler will be convicted.
Appeal against conviction
Approach
[17] Section 229 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 provides that a person has a general right of appeal against conviction.
[18] Under s 232(2), the Court must allow the appeal if it is satisfied that, in the case of a Judge-alone trial, the Judge erred in his or her assessment of the evidence to such an extent that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, or if a miscarriage of justice has occurred for any other reason. A “miscarriage of justice” is defined in s 232(4) as an error, irregularity, or occurrence in or in relation to or affecting the trial that has created a real risk that the outcome of the trial was affected or resulted in an unfair trial.
[19] An appeal against conviction proceeds by way of rehearing.5 If the appellate court comes to a different view on the evidence, the trial judge necessarily will have erred and the appeal must be allowed.6 But the appellant must show that an error has been made; the appellate court is not to consider the evidence de novo.7 The appeal court must remember the advantages a trial judge has, especially where the challenge is to credibility findings based on contested oral evidence.8
Submissions
[20] In his written submissions, Mr Maddox, on behalf of Mr Gottler, identified two issues with the Judge’s decision:
(a)The Judge failed to properly consider the question of lighting; and
(b)The Judge held Mr Gottler to a higher standard of care than a reasonable and prudent driver, based on Mr Gottler’s professional qualifications.
[21]In his oral submissions Mr Maddox said the ground relied on was (b) above.
[22] Mr Xulue, on behalf of the Crown, says the Judge properly considered the lighting evidence and correctly found that greater care was required. The Judge correctly applied the reasonable and prudent driver test and did not hold Mr Gottler to a higher standard on the basis of his expertise in traffic safety.
5 Sena v Police [2019] NZSC 55, [2019] 1 NZLR 575 at [32].
6 At [38].
7 At [38].
8 At [38].
Discussion
[23] I am satisfied there was sufficient evidence to support the Judge’s conclusion that Mr Gottler’s conduct fell below the standard of care of the reasonable and prudent driver in the circumstances of the accident.9 He did not apply a higher standard because of Mr Gottler’s qualifications and experience in the field of road engineering and road safety.
[24] The Judge assessed the effect of the lighting on Mr Gottler’s ability to see Ms Smith. This included consideration of Mr Gottler’s evidence that he confused Ms Smith’s front bike light with a streetlight some 200 metres behind her. It follows from his finding that he did not accept this precluded Mr Gottler from seeing Ms Smith. As noted, he found that she had a front light on her bike emitting a bright light and that she was wearing fluorescent material on the front of her jacket and her gloves. The Judge was satisfied that Mr Gottler needed to take more steps to be sure the way was clear, such as edging out very cautiously and perhaps keeping a continuous eye for any vehicles approaching from his right. The Judge found that, because Mr Gottler was waiting at a compulsory stop sign, he was required to take more care to ensure his path was clear and that he needed to give way to on-coming vehicles.
[25] Mr Maddox submits the Judge failed to consider the difficulty in identifying the cyclist in the particular area. He refers to Mr Gottler’s unchallenged evidence that:
(a)the high-pressure lighting (HPL) then installed in the area, being monochromatic light, provides some reflectivity on fluorescent clothing, but it is not as good as white light from LED lights for this purpose;
(b)HPS lighting creates a flat picture so you do not get the depth of field as you do with LED lights;
(c)there were dark pools between the HPS lights; and
9 Simpson v Peat [1952] 2 QB 24; Baugh v Ministry of Transport HC Wellington AP147/90, 1 August 1990.
(d)Mr Gottler mistook the headlight on the bike for a streetlight some 200 metres behind Ms Smith.
[26] The difficulty with that submission is that, first Mr Gottler did not say HPS lights do not create any reflectivity at all. He said “you will get some reflectivity”. As noted, Ms Smith had a reflective fluorescent patch on the chest of her jacket and on the backs of her gloves. But more significantly, Mr Gottler accepted that he did see the light on her bike. He assumed it was a streetlight further down the road. He did not take care, as a reasonable and prudent driver would have, to check that assumption.
[27] The standard of care a reasonable and prudent driver must demonstrate always depends on the surrounding environment (or circumstances).10 An intersection which has no lights, or which is poorly lit, will always require a driver to take additional steps to ensure the road is clear before proceeding. Any driver approaching that intersection would recognise the lighting deficiencies and take appropriate action before proceeding. A reasonable and prudent driver does not need Mr Gottler’s expertise to recognise a situation where greater care is required.
[28] The Judge took Mr Gottler’s evidence into account in assessing Mr Gottler’s actions. He carefully reviewed the evidence as to the victim’s visibility – her bike was equipped with a functioning light at the front and she was wearing reflective clothing
– and concluded that she was there to be seen. A reasonable and prudent driver would have seen her by keeping a careful watch to the right given the lighting issues at the intersection.
[29] In short, there was no error by the Judge in his assessment of the evidence nor did he hold Mr Gottler to a standard higher than the reasonable and prudent driver standard.
District Court decision declining discharge without conviction
[30] The Judge assessed the gravity of the offending as moderate, taking into account several aggravating features. They were the vulnerability of the victim, the
10 Police v Vialle [1989] 1 NZLR 521 (CA) at 523.
serious injuries she had suffered and the ongoing effect of those injuries, the circumstances of the offending and the degree of carelessness. On the circumstances of the offending, the Judge observed the victim was there to be seen—she was wearing reflective clothing and the bike’s lights were functioning—and the degree of carelessness was not the lowest level despite evidence about lighting at the intersection. The Judge accepted Mr Gottler demonstrated genuine remorse for the significant harm his actions caused to the victim.
[31] As to consequences of the offending, the Judge acknowledged Mr Gottler’s age, good character, professional expertise and experience and his prominent roles in several industry organisations. However, he rejected submissions that Mr Gottler’s professional reputation and credibility, and his employment, were at serious risk of damage if convicted. The Judge did not consider those consequences flowed from conviction but from the fact of the offending. He characterised the offending as one of momentary inattention and doubted that Mr Gottler’s employment or position in other organisations would be affected by conviction.
[32] The Judge concluded that the consequences of conviction would not be out of all proportion to the gravity of the offending. Conviction may affect Mr Gottler’s position but those consequences did not meet the statutory test.
[33] Mr Gottler was convicted and sentenced to a period of disqualification and payment of compensation.
Appeal from decision refusing discharge
Approach
[34] Section 106 of the Sentencing Act 2002 gives the Court a discretion to discharge an offender without conviction. This discretion is subject to the test in s 107 being satisfied. Section 107 provides:
107 Guidance for discharge without conviction
The court must not discharge an offender without conviction unless the court is satisfied that the direct and indirect consequences of a conviction would be out of all proportion to the gravity of the offence.
[35] In assessing the gravity of the offence, the Court is not restricted to an assessment of the conduct that gives rise to the charge. In R v Hughes, the Court of Appeal approved the comments of Miller J in Delaney v Police where the Judge said:11
[29] … I consider that “the gravity of the offence” should be read as including not only the offence itself but also anything that may affect the Court’s subsequent assessment of overall culpability. That includes guilty pleas, expressions of remorse and the Court’s assessment of how likely it is that the offender will reoffend, the victim’s perspective, and any consequence already suffered by way of reparation, community work, or publicity.
[36] The law in relation to ss 106 and 107 is succinctly stated by the Court of Appeal in Taulapapa v R:12
[22] It is settled law that a court considering a discharge should: examine the gravity of the particular offence, taking into account all aggravating and mitigating factors of the offending and the offender; identify the direct and indirect consequences of conviction; and consider whether those consequences are “out of all proportion” to the gravity of the offence. Only then does it move to considering the residual discretion under s 106. There must be a “real and appreciable” risk that any given consequence will happen: this standard recognises that the court is assessing the likelihood of something that may happen in the future.
[23] The offender should ordinarily put information before the court to provide a factual basis for a decision that the test has been satisfied. There is no legal onus on the offender to do so however, and the standard of proof in s 107 is simply that the judge be satisfied that the requirements of the section are met.
(citations omitted)
[37]A three-step approach is thus required by the Court which must:
(a)determine the gravity of the offence, having regard to both the aggravating and mitigating factors of the offending and the offender;
(b)determine the direct and indirect consequences of conviction; and
(c)determine whether those consequences are out of all proportion to the gravity of the offence.
11 Delaney v Police HC Wellington CRI-2005-485-22, 22 April 2005, at [29] as cited in R v Hughes
[2008] NZCA 546, [2009] 3 NZLR 222 at [27].
12 Taulapapa v R [2018] NZCA 414.
[38] Only if the threshold in (c) above is met can the Court move to consider the residual discretion under s 106.13 There must be a “real and appreciable” risk that any given consequence will happen.14 This standard recognises that the Court is assessing the likelihood of something that may happen in the future.15 If the s 107 test is satisfied, a discharge will normally follow.
Submissions
[39] On gravity, Mr Maddox submits the Judge characterised the degree of carelessness as higher than the lowest level but also as the result of momentary inattention. I understand Mr Maddox’s submission to be that these two remarks contradict each other and go to the gravity assessment.
[40] Mr Maddox’s submission on consequences is that the Judge speculated any consequences for Mr Gottler would arise from the offending rather than conviction. Mr Maddox says there was no evidence to support this statement. Rather, a letter from Mr Gottler’s employer indicated tenders to government organisations may be compromised by any convictions.
[41] Mr Xulue submits the Judge made no error on gravity. As to consequences, Mr Xulue acknowledges Mr Gottler’s evidence that his membership of professional bodies and employment may be affected by conviction. However, there was no evidence before the Judge to support those assertions or establish a real and appreciable risk that conviction would lead to one of those consequences. Moreover, prospective employers ought to make fully informed decisions about a person, particularly where professional activities are connected with proven offending. Mr Gottler’s role in the transport industry raises the public interest in this regard. Finally, on proportionality, Mr Xulue says this is a case where Mr Gottler should be convicted so that employers can make appropriate inquiries to manage any future risk.
13 Z (CA 447/2012) v R [2012] NZCA 599, [2013] NZAR 142 at [27] and Taulapapa v R, above n 12,
at [22].
14 DC (CA47/2013) v R [2013] NZCA 255 at [43] and Taulapapa v R, above n 12, at [22].
15 Taulapapa v R, above n 12, at [22].
Gravity assessment
[42] I do not see any error in the Judge’s gravity assessment as moderate. The point Mr Maddox raises is a minor one which would have, at best, limited effect on a much broader exercise. The Judge took account of the nature of the carelessness in his assessment of gravity which he set at above the lowest level. But carelessness was only one factor to take account of and the Judge correctly incorporated others into his reasoning, including the circumstances of the accident, the injuries to the victim and Mr Gottler’s remorse.
[43] In any event, “momentary” inattention is a temporal consideration; it seems to me possible that the spectrum of carelessness can be covered in a short period of time. That Mr Gottler’s inattention was brief does not undermine the Judge’s assessment of carelessness.
Consequences of conviction
[44] I first refer to the evidence available to the Judge. His summary of Mr Gottler’s background accurately reflects the evidence and submissions. He said:
[7] In terms of the consequences of a conviction, they must be real and appreciable consequences, not necessarily certain, and they have been identified in the affidavit in [sic] submissions filed on Mr Gottler’s behalf. Mr Gottler is a man I think of 63 years or he may be older now but a man of previous good character. He has been driving I have no doubt for many years with no previous traffic convictions or convictions of any sort for that matter. He is a person who is well respected in the community, he has membership of a number of professional bodies and his qualifications and membership is outlined in the submissions. He is the vice-president of TRAFINZ, a chartered member of Engineering New Zealand, transport, planning, management and control in Sydney, post-graduation [sic] transportation certificate University of Auckland, a registered engineer associate, a holder of a New Zealand Diploma in Engineering, certified code of practice for temporary traffic management, member of the National Safety Working Group for current road safety auditor guidelines, he is an engineering expert and a safety-qualified supervisor, a certified level crossing auditor and tram safety specialist.
[45] There was further evidence from Mr Gottler in the District Court. He annexed to his affidavit relevant provisions of his employment contract which records that if criminal background checks are “not satisfactory” his employment may be summarily terminated. The contract also states that it is a condition of his employment that Mr Gottler hold appropriate qualifications and professional memberships for his
position. Mr Gottler deposed in his affidavit that while his qualifications are not affected by a conviction, his membership of the professional bodies he belongs to may well be affected due to the nature of the charge.
[46] In that regard, there was evidence before the Judge from the President of the New Zealand Traffic Institute (TRAFINZ) who deposed that he had known Mr Gottler for approximately 25 years; that Mr Gottler had worked in both the public and private sectors on road safety in New Zealand and many other countries around the world; and his contribution to saving lives on the roads had been immense. The witness deposed that Mr Gottler is the Vice-President of TRAFINZ and was made a life member of that organisation for his on-going contribution to traffic safety and to reflect the esteem in which he is held professionally and personally by his peers. He states that should Mr Gottler be convicted, he would lose his life membership and his position as Vice President. Finally, he says the loss of Mr Gottler’s professional status and reputation would adversely affect his ability to work in other countries in the road safety field.
[47] There was also a letter from Mr Gottler’s employer, dated 4 March 2020, which confirmed that Mr Gottler is an engineer employed in the role of National Traffic and Safety Engineering Director. The employer stated that in that role Mr Gottler works for government clients on high-profile major projects. Due to the nature of his work, there might be a potential for a traffic-related conviction to negatively affect Mr Gottler’s reputation and his employer’s reputation. The letter continued that the employer’s business involved competitive tendering for clients and that it was common practice for tender conditions to require disclosure of any convictions of key personnel. Tender assessment commonly relied on “point scoring” and the employer considered it very possible that convictions of key personnel such as Mr Gottler would result in marks against a tender. The letter concluded that no decisions had been made in relation to Mr Gottler’s employment at that stage.
[48] However, events have since moved on. The Court was provided with a letter dated 24 November 2020 from Mr Gottler’s employer terminating his employment, effective as at the date of the letter. There were said to be two bases for the dismissal
– the failure to provide information when requested about the prosecution and the
incongruity of Mr Gottler’s road traffic safety role with a conviction for careless driving. As to the first ground, the letter states this was a serious breach on Mr Gottler’s part. As to the second ground, the letter states that Mr Gottler’s conviction exposes the employer to risk in terms of its reputation and its business.
[49] As is obvious, there is now not simply a real and appreciable risk of loss of employment. The risk has eventuated. Mr Gottler has lost his job and the conviction was said to be one of the two reasons for ending his employment.
[50] Although the letter clearly states that it is the conviction (rather than the offending per se) which was operative in the employer’s decision, there are aspects of the letter which arguably refer to the offending itself, as opposed to the conviction. This raises the issue of the right of a future employer to know of the offending.
[51] As was noted by the Court of Appeal in R v Taulapapa,16 where the Court set out principles arising from a survey of cases relating to consequences for employment, a conviction may affect a person’s career, but that consequence must normally yield to the employer’s right to know. The Court noted that this principle extends to independent bodies charged with assessing the character or suitability of persons seeking registration to practise a particular profession or trade.17
[52] In this case the offending has a connection to Mr Gottler’s professional position. In saying that, I am not suggesting one way or the other whether the offending would affect Mr Gottler’s capacity to discharge his professional duties. However, there is a link between the offending and his role. That is to be contrasted with say a conviction for a minor assault. It seems to me that this is therefore a case where a future employer does have the right to know and it is not the function of the Court to pre-empt future employers’ decisions of the significance of the conviction.
[53] However, even if I am wrong on this point, there are indications in the employer’s letter of 24 November 2020 that the fact of the offending itself (as opposed to the conviction) was a relevant consideration. The letter refers to the “ethical
16 R v Taulapapa, above n 12.
17 At [42](a).
obligations around transparency and integrity” in relation to work for two Government agencies. Additionally, the letter refers to Mr Gottler’s position description. He is required to be a “role model”, with a focus on road safety, and in that role to work directly with road safety clients.
[54] The consequences of conviction for Mr Gottler’s future employment must therefore take account of four factors. First, in his current employment, there is no longer a risk; his employment has been terminated. Second, however, the conviction was one of two matters related to the offending for which Mr Gottler was disciplined. It was not the only consideration. Third, given the relationship between Mr Gottler’s offending and his professional roles, this is a situation where current and future employers’ right to know is given greater weight than the consequences to a defendant of conviction. Fourth, and finally, Mr Gottler’s employer expressly refers to the consequences of conviction in the letter sent to him, but the content of the letter as a whole suggests the offending rather than conviction was a significant concern in considering his continuing employment.
Proportionality
[55] Taking into account the circumstances referred to above, I do not consider the consequences of conviction are out of all proportion to the gravity of the offence:
(a)Mr Gottler works in the field of road safety and the offending has a connection to that field of work; and
(b)Any consequence must yield to a future employer’s right to know of the offending;
[56] No doubt any future employer will take into account the nature of the charge and the circumstances of the offending. The charge is one which sits at the lower level of driving offences. That is reflected in the relatively low level of the maximum penalty of three months’ imprisonment or a fine not exceeding $4,500. The Judge did not impose imprisonment or a fine. Rather, Mr Gottler was disqualified for eight months and directed to pay compensation of $1,500 to Ms Smith. There was no other sentencing consequence for Mr Gottler.
Result
[57]The appeal is dismissed.
Gordon J
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