Good v Police

[2025] NZHC 2672

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE

CRI-2025-409-157 [2025] NZHC 2672

BETWEEN

MICHAEL ROSS GOOD

Appellant

AND

NEW ZEALAND POLICE

Respondent

Hearing:	11 September 2025
Appearances:	H V Bennett for Appellant M W Fulton for Respondent
Judgment:	15 September 2025

JUDGMENT OF DUNNINGHAM J

This judgment was delivered by me on 15 September 2025 at 11.30 am, pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Date……………

GOOD v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2025] NZHC 2672 [15 September 2025]

Introduction

[1]    Mr Good was sentenced to 100 hours community work having pleaded guilty to charges of intentional damage1 and intimidation.2 A final protection order was made in favour of the victim.3 Mr Good appeals the community work order, which he contends was manifestly excessive, and the imposition of the final protection order, which he contends was unnecessary.

Facts

[2]    Mr Good had been in an “on-again off-again” relationship with the victim for approximately two years. Around midday on 20 January 2025, he was at her address and they had an argument. Mr Good stood in front of the victim, threatening to smash the house. He left before returning to the address three minutes later where the victim was inside with the door locked. Mr Good punched and kicked the front door. He then picked up a large rock and threw it at the victim’s vehicle, damaging the windscreen.

District Court decision

[3]    In sentencing Mr Good, the Judge noted that, beyond convictions for assault in 2002, Mr Good had no history of violent offending. However, he noted the family violence report which disclosed two incidents with the same complainant, in January and April 2023. Following those incidents, Mr Good was in custody for unrelated offending.

[4]    The Judge agreed with counsel that the appropriate penalty was a moderate period of community work given Mr Good’s willingness to make reparation for the windscreen, his guilty plea and the lack of “any real history” of family violence.4 The Judge convicted Mr Good, sentenced him to 100 hours community work and ordered him to pay $471.50 in reparation.

1      Summary Offences Act 1981, s 11(1)(a)—maximum sentence three months’ imprisonment or

$2,000 fine.

2      Summary Offences Act, s 21(1)(a)—maximum sentence three months’ imprisonment.

3      Police v Good [2025] NZDC 12355.

4 At [6].

[5]As to whether or not to grant a protection order, the Judge said this:

[7]    … I am advised … that not only is [the victim] not objecting to a protection order, which is one of the statutory grounds, she actively seeks one. I do note the defendant has been reporting in terms of his sentence as far as we can tell and there has been no suggestion of any bail breach but, as against that, there are previous matters.

[8]    This is family violence, and it is matter which gives rise to some concern. The complainant is in some ways best placed to know the extent to which such an order is necessary given the fact that there has been repeated behaviour, and the complainant is concerned at its repetition. I am satisfied that a protection order is necessary. …

Principles on appeal

[6]    An appeal against a protection order made at sentencing proceeds as an appeal against sentence under the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. Appeals against sentence are allowed as of right by s 244 Criminal Procedure Act and must be determined in accordance with s 250. An appeal against sentence may be allowed by this Court only if it is satisfied that there has been an error in the imposition of the sentence and that a different sentence should be imposed.5 As the Court of Appeal stated in Tutakangahau v R, quoting the lower court’s decision, a “court will not intervene where the sentence is within the range that can properly be justified by accepted sentencing principles”.6 It is appropriate for this Court to intervene and substitute its own views only if the sentence being appealed is “manifestly excessive” and not justified by the relevant sentencing principles.7

Community work

Submissions

[7]    Ms Bennett submits that the sentence of community work was manifestly excessive. She submits that the 100 hours was “wholly punitive” when the least restrictive outcome called for fewer hours. Ms Bennett says that no findings were made by the Judge as to why the community work sentence was appropriate and seems to suggest that it was not, in light of the offending and Mr Good’s background—the

5      Criminal Procedure Act 2011, ss 250(2) and 250(3).

6      Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [36].

7      Ripia v R [2011] NZCA 101 at [15].

offending was brief, spontaneous and not premeditated, Mr Good pleaded guilty and offered reparation. Furthermore, at the hearing, Ms Bennett pointed out that Mr Good had spent more than 20 days in custody before being granted bail and this should have been taken into account.8 She submits that an order for 50 hours should be substituted.

[8]    Ms Fulton, for the Crown, suggests that the reason no findings were made as to the appropriateness of the community work sentence was that his counsel sought such a sentence.9 Ms Fulton disagrees with the characterisation of the offending as “brief, spontaneous and not premediated”. She points out that Mr Good initially threatened the victim before leaving, returning to the address to kick and punch the door and then damage the victim’s vehicle. That the appellant left and then returned minutes later suggests the second incident and his accompanying behaviour were premeditated, rather than a momentary loss of control. As to the number of community work hours, Ms Fulton submits that 100 hours was within range.

Analysis

[9]    There is no guideline for setting the quantum of community work hours. However, examples can be found of offending of similar seriousness where a similar sentence was imposed. For example, on a charge of misusing a telephone which attracted a maximum sentence of three months’ imprisonment or a fine of $2,000 (being the same maximum sentence as applies to the current charges), Toogood J held a sentence of 100 hours’ community work and nine months’ supervision “could not be described, on any analysis of the circumstances, as manifestly excessive”.10

[10]   While I accept that Mr Good spent at least three weeks in custody, I am not persuaded that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive, particularly in light of the maximum penalty available on each charge. I also note the Judge permitted the hours to be met through attending training programmes, so the sentence could not be described as “wholly punitive”.

[11]The appeal against this aspect of the sentence is dismissed.

8      Mr Good was remanded in custody on 21 January and granted bail on 12 February 2025.

9      Mr Good was represented by different counsel in the District Court.

10     Steele v New Zealand Police [2014] NZHC 2626 at [19].

Protection order

Submissions

[12]   Ms Bennett submits that the sentencing judge did not undertake the necessary evaluative exercise in order to impose a protection order, noting the brevity of the reasons given. Ms Bennett submits that the requirement of necessity was not met, as the previous incidents relied upon did not result in prosecution, and occurred some time before this offending. She submits that there is not sufficient information to establish a pattern of conduct that suggests future risk.

[13]   Ms Fulton submits that the protection order was necessary. Mr Good and the victim share a child together, and are therefore likely to have an ongoing relationship. There are two previous family harm incidents in relation to the victim, as well as  four prior family harm incidents with other complainants.

[14]   Ms Fulton also seeks leave to adduce the relevant family violence reports as fresh evidence on appeal. However, it was accepted that the sentencing judge had that information before him in any event, so no application is required. It is relevant evidence on appeal.

Analysis

[15]   The sentencing judge may impose a protection order if the following statutory criteria is met:11

(a)The offender is convicted of a family violence offence;

(b)There is not currently a protection order in force;

(c)The victim of the offence does not object to the making of the order; and

(d)The court is satisfied that the making of the order is necessary for the protection of the victim of the offence.

11     Sentencing Act 2002, s 123B.

[16]   It is that final requirement that Mr Good contends is not present. The relevant test for the necessity of a protection order was carefully summarised by Mander J in Butler v R:12

[13] The evaluation of whether a protection order is necessary for the protection of a victim involves an evaluative enquiry that need not be overly refined.13 The enquiry is of a predictive nature, but past behaviour is to be viewed as the most reliable guide to future conduct.14 An order will likely be made where the offender's past conduct has led the victim to hold reasonable fears of future violence.15 Particular regard must be had to the nature and seriousness of the past inflicted violence.16 However, there is no specific standard of threat required before an order can be made,17 and it does not need to be shown that future violence is likely.18 If there has been past violence and there is a reasonable, subjective fear of future violence, the evidential burden passes to the offender to raise countervailing factors that would weigh against the need for a protection order.19 …

[17]   There are two  family  harm  investigation  reports.  The  first  is  from January 2023. Mr Good was made subject to a police safety order for three days to “calm down” following a family harm call-out following a physical altercation. The second and more serious incident was in April 2023. The relevant report records that the victim was in the shower when Mr Good kicked the door in after he was angry about some messages on her phone. He is said to have then threatened her with a baseball bat and pushed her belongings off the bench and cabinets before taking a suitcase with her personal belongings in. When police arrived, the victim stated that Mr Good had threatened to assault her multiple times over the past few days and in the past, including holding a knife to her throat. The report records that the victim refused to complete a statement. Mr Good was not present when police arrived.

[18]   Although Ms Bennett notes the time between this incident and the present offending, that submission is somewhat undermined by the fact that Mr Good was in custody for a significant portion of the intervening period. Mr Good was sentenced to six months imprisonment in November 2023, and one month imprisonment in

12     Butler v R [2023] NZHC 1846.

13     SN v MN [2017] NZCA 289, [2017] 3 NZLR 488 at [19] and [22].

14     At [24(a)].

15     Surrey v Surrey [2008] NZCA 565, [2010] 2 NZLR 581 at [37].

16 At [40].

17     Whitehead v Police [2021] NZHC 3421 at [13].

18     Surrey v Surrey, above n 15, at [36].

19     At [43]; and SN v MN, above n 13, at [24(e)].

May 2024. Mr Good and the victim were also said to be in an “on-again off-again” relationship during that period. As for the lack of prosecution, it is notable that the victim refused to complete a statement with police, which may have affected the ability of police to prosecute Mr Good.

[19]   There has clearly been past violence and the victim holds a reasonable, subjective fear of future violence. Mr Good’s past behaviour—the April 2023 incident and the present offending—is indicative of a tendency to resort to violent and threatening behaviour when upset with his partner. Mr Good raises no countervailing factors that would suggest that tendency has not persisted. While the Judge’s reasons in relation to the protection order were brief, I am satisfied there was no error in his approach. Notably, the Judge declined to grant a protection order in relation to the victim’s daughter, which, as the Crown points out, indicates that the Judge did not impose the protection order as a matter of routine.

Result

[20]The appeal against sentence is dismissed.

Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Christchurch

Copy to:
H V Bennett, Barrister, Christchurch