IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND TAURANGA REGISTRY
CIV-2010-470-281
BETWEEN EDWARD JAMES GOLDSMITH AND NOELINE TAURUA AS TRUSTEES OF THE G & T FAMILY TRUST
Appellants
AND IAN KENNETH CARTER, HTT 2003
LIMITED AND KPMG FINANCIAL SERVICES LIMITED AS TRUSTEES OF THE RIVERGLEN FAMILY TRUST
First Respondents
ANDIAN K CARTER LIMITED Second Respondent
ANDIAN KENNETH CARTER Third Respondent
Hearing: 17 June 2010
(Heard at Hamilton)
Appearances: P J Wright for Appellants
M S McKechnie for Respondents
Judgment: 21 December 2010
JUDGMENT OF COOPER J
This judgment was delivered by Justice Cooper on
21 December 2010 at 3.00 p.m., pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date:
Solicitors:
Burton & Co., PO Box 8889, Symonds Street, Auckland
McKechnie Quirke & Lewis, PO Box 242, Rotorua
Copy to:
P Wright, PO Box 4338, Shortland Street, AucklandM S McKechnie, PO Box 1227, Rotorua
GOLDSMITH AND ORS V CARTER AND ORS HC TAU CIV-2010-470-281 21 December 2010
Introduction
[1] On 30 August 2004 the first respondents (“Riverglen”) entered into an agreement to sell land situated on the beachfront at Pukehina to “Edward Goldsmith or Nominee”. The appellants (“G and T”) became the nominated purchasers.
[2] The agreement was in the standard form (seventh edition) approved for the sale and purchase of real estate by the Real Estate Institute of New Zealand and by the Auckland District Law Society. It stated the address of the property to be sold as
707 Pukehina Parade and gave as the legal description “an undivided half share in fee simple of Lot 573 DPS 11365 contained in Certificate of Title SA7B/1213”.
[3] A deposit of $10,000 was required to be paid on execution of the agreement, and the provisions for payment of the balance of the purchase price reflected the fact that the parties intended that two apartments would be constructed on the property. The sum of $90,000 was required to be paid on the issuing of a building consent for the apartments. The balance of $480,000 had to be paid on the date of settlement, said to be 22 November 2004, or such earlier date as might be agreed. The possession date was stated by reference to the date of practical completion of apartment A.
[4] There were a number of “special conditions of sale”. They dealt in particular with the provisions that were to apply to the construction of the apartments. Clause
14 stated that the vendor and purchaser had entered into the agreement on the basis that they would “join together in the construction of two apartments on the land”. Clause 15 provided that the purchaser would construct the apartment identified on plans annexed as apartment A and that the vendor would construct the apartment identified on the plans as apartment B. It was provided that the vendor and purchaser would construct their respective apartments by engaging Ian K Carter Ltd (“the second respondent”) “as their respective agent to undertake the management of the construction project”.
[5] Clause 16 contained…
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- Case
- [2010] NZHC 2307
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The District Court judge had concluded that the agreement constituted a joint venture and that mutual obligations of good faith applied. The judge ordered both parties to complete the building and the exterior of the building, with costs initially borne by the appellants. The appellants appealed, arguing that the judge erred in concluding there was a joint venture and in implying certain terms into the agreement.
The High Court found that while the relationship between the parties could be characterised as a joint venture, it was not fiduciary in nature. The court held that the agreement itself governed the obligations of the parties and that there was no room for an implied term that the appellants would pay a greater sum due to the failure of the builder contracted by the respondents. The court also found that the judge's conclusion regarding the variation of the agreement and the $70,000 payment was unclear and that the issue of specific performance was not determinable on the current record.
The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with the judgment. The appellants were awarded costs on a category 2 band B basis.
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Evidence Before The Court
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