Goggin v Police
[2013] NZHC 2710
•18 October 2013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
CRI-2013-485-000069 [2013] NZHC 2710
BETWEEN MATTHEW JAMES GOGGIN Appellant
ANDNEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent
Hearing: 15 October 2013
Counsel: A M P Ross for appellant
A J Ewing for respondent
Judgment: 18 October 2013
RESERVED JUDGMENT OF DOBSON J
[1] On 9 August 2013, Judge A P Walsh in the District Court at Wellington declined an application on behalf of Mr Goggin for discharge without conviction in relation to a charge of assault under s 196 of the Crimes Act 1961, to which Mr Goggin had pleaded guilty.1 Instead, Judge Walsh entered a conviction and then discharged Mr Goggin, subject to an order that he pay reparation to the victim in the sum of $1,000.2
[2] Mr Goggin has appealed from the Judge’s refusal to grant him a discharge
without conviction.
[3] The assault occurred in Mr Goggin’s flat in suburban Wellington on 14 April
2013. An argument developed between Mr Goggin and a friend as to who should go out to purchase alcohol for the evening. Without warning, Mr Goggin landed a single punch to the face of the victim with great force. The force caused the victim
to temporarily black out. Once he regained consciousness, the victim left the
1 New Zealand Police v Goggin DC Wellington CRI-2013-085-4238, 9 August 2013.
2 That was directed to be paid at the rate of $20 per week.
GOGGIN v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2013] NZHC 2710 [18 October 2013]
premises and called an ambulance. The Police became involved in the matter because they were contacted by the ambulance staff. The victim sustained a severely broken nose, which will require reconstructive surgery to be straightened.
[4] Mr Goggin has no previous convictions and his violent response was apparently out of character.
[5] Between October 2010 and October 2012, Mr Goggin had been subject to compulsory treatment under the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 (the Act). At the end of that period, he was discharged from supervision under the Act. It is acknowledged that, in light of subsequent events, that was a poor clinical decision.
[6] Mr Goggin was re-admitted to hospital on an involuntary basis the day after the assault, and his monitoring since then has led a psychiatrist to conclude that his offending behaviour was likely to have reflected a relapse of paranoid schizophrenia. Mr Goggin acknowledged that he had stopped taking his medication at the time, and that seems likely to have contributed to his mental deterioration.
[7] The Judge took into account Mr Goggin’s diminished responsibility on account of his mental health difficulties, which rendered the circumstances of the offending materially less serious than they would otherwise have been. The Judge was wary of granting a discharge without conviction when circumstances of offending of this type were likely to be relevant to enable potential employers to make fully informed decisions as to Mr Goggin’s capabilities as a prospective employee.
[8] The Judge recognised the prospect that the existence of a conviction would make it more difficult for Mr Goggin to pursue aspirations, both to travel and potentially study overseas, and in obtaining employment. However, he did not see the disproportionality of the adverse consequences for Mr Goggin as outweighing the gravity of the offending, which he classified as a serious assault.
[9] On the appeal, Mr Ross for Mr Goggin submitted that the Judge gave inadequate credit for the extent to which Mr Goggin had diminished responsibility for the assault. On such appeals, whether the test under s 107 of the Sentencing Act
2002 has been met is a matter of fact requiring judicial assessment, so that the appeal should be determined on normal appellate principles.3
[10] Mr Ross asked me to accept a letter from Mr Goggin’s grandmother, which was not available to the District Court Judge. Ms Ewing did not object to my considering the letter. It described the grandmother, together with her husband until he died in October 2012, as having been the main caregiver(s) for Mr Goggin during his upbringing. She reports that Mr Goggin’s mother (her daughter) was unable to care for him. She describes Mr Goggin as having been diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome at the age of six. His condition made social interaction difficult, leading to him being ostracised and sometimes bullied at school. The grandmother observed that Mr Goggin did not react violently to that, and has subsequently been able to succeed academically at university.
[11] I am satisfied that Mr Goggin was suffering a severely compromised mental state at the time of the offending. A psychiatrist has opined that his discharge in October 2012 “initiated a cascade of events which culminated in the recent admission to hospital” (that is, immediately after the assault). He had moved from supported accommodation to a student flat, imprudently decided to stop taking the prescribed medication, and no longer had oversight from mental health services when it seems tolerably clear that his mental health was deteriorating. It was reasonable for counsel to suggest that when the assault occurred, he was likely to have been responding to voices or delusional beliefs, which have been noted since his admission to hospital.
[12] It is not appropriate to determine the reduction in sentence that would otherwise reflect Mr Goggin’s diminished responsibility on any sort of arithmetic basis. Counsel were inclined to agree that, absent diminished responsibility, the appropriate sentence would likely have been an order for reparation, together with
community work for Mr Goggin as a first offender. Instead, he was convicted and discharged.
[13] The assessment of the relative gravity of the offending has to take into account the circumstances of the offending and the offender.4 Given the combination of circumstances in which this occurred, the severity of the harm inflicted on the victim should not prevent a full measure of recognition of Mr Goggin’s diminished responsibility for inflicting that harm. It does not belittle the victim’s interests in this case to acknowledge that the serious harm was imposed in circumstances where the
law recognises that the mental condition of an offender can reduce the responsibility that is attributed to the offender for his conduct. I am satisfied that substantially diminished responsibility should be attributed to Mr Goggin.
[14] The second aspect of the evaluation under s 107 of the Sentencing Act is the extent to which there are any disproportionately adverse consequences for this offender, resulting from the sentence imposed. I accept that a young man attempting to pursue a university career despite the challenges caused by an Asperger’s condition should be encouraged. Mr Goggin has had a measure of success thus far, and aspires to study further, either in New Zealand or overseas. He has also had periods of employment in situations where further employment is likely to be more difficult to secure if he has a conviction for assault.
[15] The extent of those adverse consequences is difficult to project accurately, but their adverse impact is a reality at a material level. That impact does qualify as out of all proportion to the gravity of the offending.
[16] I am therefore satisfied that the criteria for a discharge under s 107 of the Sentencing Act are present in this case. Having reached that point, there is no reason why the discretion under s 106 of the Sentencing Act ought not to be exercised in his favour.
[17] I accordingly allow the appeal and quash the conviction.
[18] In lieu of the conviction entered, I discharge Mr Goggin without conviction, upon the condition that he acknowledge his commitment to pay compensation in the sum of $1,000 at the rate of $20 per week. The order of the District Court Judge for Mr Goggin to pay costs of $132.89 remains.
Dobson J
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Wellington for respondent
Counsel:
A M P Ross, Porirua for appellant
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