Gifford v Marlborough District Council

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND BLENHEIM REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WAIHARAKEKE ROHE

CIV-2024-406-000014

[2024] NZHC 3896

UNDER the Resource Management 1991 (RMA)

IN THE MATTER OF

a decision of the Environment Court

BETWEEN

MICHAEL HOWARD GIFFORD

First Appellant

CRB TRANSPORT LIMITED
Second Appellant

AND

MARLBOROUGH DISTRICT COUNCIL

Respondent

Hearing: 27 November 2024

Appearances (via AVL):

D J Clark for Appellants

A C Besier for Respondent

Judgment:

19 December 2024


JUDGMENT OF GRAU J

[Environment Court appeal]


[1]    The appellants, Michael Gifford and CRB Transport Ltd (CRB), appeal the Environment Court’s order that they pay $130,000 to the Marlborough District Council (the Council), that sum being the Council’s (reduced) cost of complying with enforcement orders that had been made by consent in 2020 under s 314 of the Resource Management Act 1991 (the RMA).1

[2]    The orders were made for an investigation of an area of Mr Gifford’s property where Mr Gifford had buried organic waste. The Council considered Mr Gifford’s


1      Marlborough District Council v Gifford [2024] NZEnvC 148 [Decision on appeal].

GIFFORD v MARLBOROUGH DISTRICT COUNCIL [2024] NZHC 3896 [19 December 2024]

actions were generating, or were likely to have generated, adverse effects on his and adjoining property, as well as on downstream waterways. Mr Gifford had not complied with the enforcement orders and so the Council undertook the work on his behalf.   The work cost  much more than was expected; almost double the quote     Mr Gifford had earlier obtained but did not proceed with. Mr Gifford’s view is that the Council spent far too much money on an unnecessarily wide investigation that was ultimately inconclusive, and he should not have to shoulder the cost of it.

[3]Mr Gifford says that the Environment Court Judge made three errors of law:

(a)The Judge adopted a Wednesbury approach to assess the costs payable to the Council for the steps it took to comply with the enforcement orders.2

(b)The Judge was wrong to take a restrictive approach, being only a “broad review” of the costs the Council incurred.

(c)The Judge incorrectly stated that the appellants had opportunities to seek to refine, amend, or cancel the orders and they have not done so, when the appellants had in fact applied to cancel the enforcement order around five months before the Environment Court made its decision on costs.

[4]    The Council says the Environment Court’s decision should be upheld, the Environment Court was not wrong to apply a Wednesbury standard, and that only a broad review was within its jurisdiction. Nor did the Court err in declining to undertake a merits assessment towards costs recovery when, provided the work meets the requirements of the orders, the costs are recoverable under s 315(2)(c) of the RMA. The Council says the third alleged error of law is not relevant to the appeal. The application to cancel the orders was made well after the work required by the Orders was undertaken and paid for. Instead, the appellants are attempting to relitigate…

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Details
Case
[2024] NZHC 3896
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal before the High Court is by Mr Michael Gifford and CRB Transport Ltd (CRB) against a decision of the Environment Court that they pay $130,000 to the Marlborough District Council for the costs of complying with enforcement orders. The orders were made in 2020 for an investigation of an area of Mr Gifford’s property where he had buried organic waste, as the Council considered his actions were generating adverse effects on his and adjoining property, as well as on downstream waterways. Mr Gifford had not complied with the enforcement orders and so the Council undertook the work on his behalf. The work cost much more than was expected; almost double the quote Mr Gifford had earlier obtained but did not proceed with. Mr Gifford’s view is that the Council spent far too much money on an unnecessarily wide investigation that was ultimately inconclusive, and he should not have to shoulder the cost of it. The appellants argue that the Environment Court Judge made three errors of law: (a) The Judge adopted a Wednesbury approach to assess the costs payable to the Council for the steps it took to comply with the enforcement orders. (b) The Judge was wrong to take a restrictive approach, being only a “broad review” of the costs the Council incurred. (c) The Judge incorrectly stated that the appellants had opportunities to seek to refine, amend, or cancel the orders and they have not done so, when the appellants had in fact applied to cancel the enforcement order around five months before the Environment Court made its decision on costs. The Council says the Environment Court’s decision should be upheld, the Environment Court was not wrong to apply a Wednesbury standard, and that only a broad review was within its jurisdiction. Nor did the Court err in declining to undertake a merits assessment towards costs recovery when, provided the work meets the requirements of the orders, the costs are recoverable under s 315(2)(c) of the Resource Management Act 1991. The Council says the third alleged error of law is not relevant to the appeal. The application to cancel the orders was made well after the work required by the Orders was undertaken and paid for. Instead, the appellants are attempting to relitigate the facts that led to the issue of the enforcement orders. The Court found that the Environment Court erred in law by applying a Wednesbury test to the issue of costs. The Environment Court was not, however, concerned with the reasonableness of the Council’s decision to seek its costs of complying with the Orders. The Council was entitled to recoup its costs as a debt due. The Court was only concerned with the level of costs the Council had incurred. Nor is the Council seeking to recover costs of complying with the Orders an exercise of a statutory power, and thus amenable to judicial review. The Environment Court does not have jurisdiction to judicially review a Council’s exercise of its statutory powers. Only the High Court has such jurisdiction. However, the error of law identified does not assist Mr Gifford because the Environment Court nevertheless reached the correct result. The $130,000 the Council sought to recover was its actual costs of complying with the Orders, reduced after an independent review of those costs. The real complaint is that a lot of money was spent to find out that there was no major issue. But that could not have been known until the investigation was completed, and this appeal is not the place to undertake an examination of the merits of the investigation. The short point is that Mr Gifford is the author of his misfortune. He had the opportunity to commission his own report at half the cost and he did not take up that opportunity. The Environment Court also rejected the argument that because further steps might be necessary it was premature to seek recovery of the TT costs, finding that the argument “pays no regard” to the need for the Orders to be complied with in the timeframe set by the Court. Nor did the Court accept that s 294 of the RMA could be invoked to enable the Court to review the consent given under s 315. This was another attempt to impugn the Orders, which was not appropriate in the costs hearing. For the reasons above, while I accept that there was a significant error of law, I find the Environment Court did not reach an incorrect outcome. The Environment Court clearly concluded that the scope of the Report was appropriate and addressed what was required under the Orders. The Environment Court also clearly concluded that the Council had acted fairly in reducing the amount sought from the appellants, having taken independent advice on that point. Therefore, the costs claimed by the Council cannot be said to be manifestly disproportionate in the circumstances. Having set aside the bulk of the appellants’ submissions, there is nothing else to suggest the costs sought by the Council were unconnected to compliance or manifestly disproportionate. For the reasons above, I dismiss the appeal on the basis that the Environment Court did not reach an incorrect conclusion.

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