Gemmell v Norris

Case [2012] NZHC 3339


IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND NELSON REGISTRY

CIV 2012-442-482 [2012] NZHC 3339

UNDER  Part 33 of the High Court Rules

IN THE MATTER OF     an application for a search order

BETWEEN  BRUCE DONALD GEMMELL RHYS JAMES CAIN

Applicants

ANDPATRICK DEAN NORRIS First Respondent

ANDNORRIS MANAGEMENT SERVICES LIMITED

Second Respondent

ANDJACKSON ALEXANDER CHURCHILL Third Respondent

Hearing:         29 November 2012

Counsel:         G K Riach for Applicants

First Respondent in Person
No Appearance for Second Respondent
D Ballantyne for Third Respondent
W F Freeman for R C Parr and NMSNZ, affected persons

Judgment:      3 December 2012

JUDGMENT OF SIMON FRANCE J

BRUCE DONALD GEMMELL V PATRICK DEAN NORRIS HC NEL CIV 2012-442-482 [3 December 2012]

Introduction

[1]      The applicants are liquidators, appointed by the Official Assignee, of four companies in liquidation.  Their appointment arose because the existing liquidator, the first respondent Mr Norris, was convicted of stealing from one of the companies. Because of the conviction  he became ineligible to  be liquidator and  a vacancy thereby arose.

[2]      The applicants obtained a without notice search order enabling them to enter two premises and seize records relating to the liquidation of the companies.   The order was considered necessary because of the circumstances in which Mr Norris’ liquidation had come to an end.

[3]      The search order was executed and documents taken.  The three respondents, together with two other affected persons, have applied to the Court for return of the documents  taken  on  the  basis  that  the  warrant  should  not  have  been  issued. Although there are supporting arguments that will be addressed in due course, the primary proposition is that prior to becoming disqualified, Mr Norris had resigned as liquidator  and  appointed  the  third  respondent,  Mr Jackson  Churchill,  as  his successor.  It is therefore said that the purported appointment of the applicants was invalid, and they were not entitled to obtain the search order.

The various parties

[4]      The various interested persons are now more fully described.

The applicants

[5]      The  applicants  are  experienced  liquidators.     They  were  appointed  on

23 October 2012 by the Official Assignee, consequent on what was believed to be a vacancy due to Mr Norris’ conviction.

[6]      The application for a search order was sourced in the circumstances in which the appointment of the previous liquidator had ended.  As part of the application it was noted that:

(a)      prior  to  the  conviction,  the  Official  Assignee  had  commenced litigation   to   have   Mr Norris   removed   as   liquidator   of   several companies, including these four, for alleged breaches of his obligations;

(b)the conviction related to misuse of money belonging to one of the four companies of which the applicants were now liquidators;

(c)      in relation to that company, part of its file had gone missing for a period.     The  Judge,  when  convicting  Mr Norris,  had  described Mr Norris’  evidence  on  this  as  unreliable,  and  found  him  to  be untruthful;

(d)the Judge also found that Mr Norris and his partner, Ms Parr, had engaged in a blatantly dishonest course of conduct to try and…

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Gemmell v Norris [2012] NZHC 3339
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[2012] NZHC 3339
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

Gemmell v Norris involves a dispute between liquidators appointed to four companies and the former liquidator, Patrick Dean Norris, among others. The applicants, Bruce Donald Gemmell and Rhys James Cain, were appointed liquidators by the Official Assignee after Mr Norris was convicted of stealing from one of the companies, rendering him ineligible to continue in his role. The applicants sought and obtained a without notice search order to seize records from Mr Norris’ residence and business address due to concerns about the safety of the documents if obtained through normal channels. Mr Norris, along with Jackson Alexander Churchill and Norris Management Services Limited, challenged the validity of the search order, arguing that Mr Norris had resigned as liquidator and appointed Mr Churchill as his successor before his conviction. The court considered the legal issues surrounding the validity of Mr Norris’ resignation and Mr Churchill’s appointment, the necessity of the search order, and other challenges to its issuance.

The court ruled that Mr Norris’ resignation and Mr Churchill’s acceptance of appointment were not effective until the necessary documents were lodged with the Registrar of Companies. As these documents were not lodged until after Mr Norris’ conviction, the applicants were validly appointed as liquidators. The court also dismissed other challenges to the search order, including arguments regarding Court approval, consent to appointment, sufficiency of undertakings, disproportionality, material non-disclosure, and the independence of those executing the order. The court concluded that all challenges failed and confirmed the applicants as liquidators, denying the requests to quash the search order or return the seized goods.

The final orders were that the applicants remain confirmed as liquidators, with no basis to quash the search order or direct a general return of the seized goods. The liquidators were required to file a proposal for examining the seized material, with an opportunity for Mr Norris, Ms Parr, and her company to object if unsatisfied. Costs were to follow the event, with the respondents, including Mr Churchill, liable for costs due to their active involvement in the proceedings despite the potential for a simpler resolution through resignation.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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