Gaunt v Police

Case [2017] NZCA 178


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA568/2016
[2017] NZCA 178

BETWEEN

JAMIN GAUNT
Applicant

AND

NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Respondent

Court:

Kós P, Courtney and Williams JJ

Counsel:

J P Miller for Appellant
J Cheng for Respondent

Judgment:

(On the papers)

12 May 2017 at 4.00 pm

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for leave to bring a second appeal is granted.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Courtney J)

  1. Following a judge alone trial in the District Court Mr Gaunt was convicted on one charge of common assault (spitting).[1]  He was not permitted time to make a written application for a discharge without conviction.[2]  His oral application for a discharge without conviction was refused without reasons being given and without the District Court Judge considering the relevant statutory criteria.  His appeal to the High Court was dismissed by Cull J.[3]

    [1]Crimes Act 1961, s 196.

    [2]Contrary to r 2.12(2)(p) of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2012.

  2. We allow Mr Gaunt’s application for leave to bring a second appeal.  In accordance with s 340(3)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 we are not required to give reasons for doing so.

  3. The ground of appeal is whether a miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of the Judge failing to take account of the complainant’s provocative act in spitting at Mr Gaunt first in assessing the gravity of the offending, failing to take account of Mr Gaunt’s difficult personal circumstances in assessing the effect of conviction on his employment prospects, and the effect of these two factors on the proportionality assessment.

Solicitors:
John Miller Law for Applicant
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent


Details
AGLC
Gaunt v Police [2017] NZCA 178
Case
[2017] NZCA 178
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Gaunt v Police, the applicant, Jamin Gaunt, sought leave to bring a second appeal against his conviction for common assault by spitting, which was imposed following a trial before a judge alone in the District Court. Gaunt's initial appeal to the High Court was dismissed, and he now applied for leave to bring a second appeal to the Court of Appeal of New Zealand. The Court of Appeal, comprising Kós P, Courtney, and Williams JJ, granted Gaunt's application for leave to appeal, permitting him to raise the question of whether a miscarriage of justice occurred due to the District Court Judge's failure to consider certain factors in the sentencing process.

The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the District Court's failure to consider specific factors constituted a miscarriage of justice under the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. Specifically, Gaunt argued that the Judge did not appropriately weigh the complainant's initial act of spitting at him, nor did the Judge consider Gaunt's personal circumstances and their impact on his employment prospects. These omissions, Gaunt contended, skewed the proportionality assessment in sentencing, warranting a reconsideration by the appellate court.

In granting Gaunt leave to bring a second appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the statutory criteria for such a leave were satisfied. The Court emphasised that under section 340(3)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011, it was not obligated to provide detailed reasons for granting the leave. The Court observed that the issues raised by Gaunt were significant and could potentially lead to a miscarriage of justice if not properly addressed. The Court concluded that the appeal should proceed to allow a thorough examination of the sentencing process and the factors that the District Court failed to consider.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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