IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND ROTORUA REGISTRY
CRI-2015-470-0003 [2015] NZHC 1568
BETWEEN NIKI GAMBLE-MACKESY
Appellant
AND
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Respondent
Hearing: 2 July 2015 Counsel:
P T Attwood for appellant
H J Sheridan for respondentJudgment:
6 July 2015
JUDGMENT OF KATZ J [Appeal against sentence]
This judgment was delivered by me on 6 July 2015 at 4:45 pm
Pursuant to Rule 11.5 High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors: Ronayne Hollister-Jones Lellman, Crown Solicitor, Tauranga
Counsel: P T Atwood, Barrister, Tauranga
GAMBLE-MACKESY v DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS [2015] NZHC 1568 [6 July 2015]
Introduction
[1] Niki Gamble-Mackesy pleaded guilty to a charge of indecently assaulting a female aged over 16. On 9 March 2015 he was sentenced by Judge L M Bidois, in the District Court at Tauranga, to two years’ imprisonment. Judge Bidois gave Mr Gamble-Mackesy leave under s 80I of the Sentencing Act 2002 (“Act”) to apply for cancellation of the sentence of imprisonment and substitution of a sentence of home detention, if a suitable home detention address could be found.
[2] A subsequent application to substitute a sentence of home detention, under s
80K of the Act, was declined by Judge C J Harding. His Honour’s decision was largely based on concerns raised in a Department of Corrections re-sentencing report. That report referred to ongoing misconduct issues in prison, Mr Gamble- Mackesy’s denial of his offending and lack of remorse (contrary to his position at sentencing) and his refusal to engage in a sex offender treatment programme. There was no issue, however, that the proposed home detention address and its occupants were suitable.
[3] Mr Gamble-Mackesy appeals Judge Harding’s decision not to substitute a sentence of home detention, on two grounds:
(a) That Judge Harding erred in law, because he had no discretion to decline to substitute a sentence of home detention if the requirements of s 80A(2) of the Sentencing Act 2002 were met. Section 80A(2) relates to the suitability of a proposed home detention address and its occupants, and also requires that an offender understands and agrees to comply with the conditions of home detention.
(b)That if Judge Harding did have a discretion to decline to substitute a sentence of home detention, he erred in the exercise of that discretion by taking into account (or giving undue weight to) unfair and unbalanced information provided to him by the Department of Corrections in the re-sentencing report.
[4] The first appeal issue is a particularly significant one, as a previous decision of this Court, White v Police, held that although s 80K(4) of the Sentencing Act states that the court may cancel a sentence of imprisonment and substitute a sentence of home detention when leave has been granted under s 80I, the court is obliged to do so if the preconditions in s 80A(2) (having a suitable home detention address, etc)
are met.1 In effect, the word “may” in s 80K(4) should be read as “must.” The only
exception is where an offender has, since…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the word “may” in s 80K(4) of the Act should be given its natural and ordinary meaning, rather than being read as “must.” This interpretation is supported by the overall statutory scheme and provides the court with a residual discretion to respond appropriately to any new information that is provided as part of the re-sentencing process. The court also found that the Judge did not err in the exercise of his discretion in declining to substitute a sentence of home detention. The more positive information referred to by Mr Gamble-Mackesy's counsel was all available to the Judge and was expressly acknowledged by him in his judgment. The court held that it was appropriate for Judge Harding, in light of the new information contained in the re-sentencing reports, to undertake the sentencing exercise afresh, rather than simply rely on Judge Bidois’ original decision.
The appeal is dismissed.
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