G v Police HC Rotorua CRI 2005-463-70

[2005] NZHC 87

This case has been anonymized

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND ROTORUA REGISTRY

CRI 2005-463-000070

G

Appellant

v

NEW ZEALAND POLICE

Respondent

Hearing:         5 October 2005

Appearances: No appearance of appellant

Ms Simmers for respondent

Judgment:      5 October 2005

ORAL JUDGMENT OF WINKELMANN J

Copies to:

S C G  , PO Box 526, Paihia, Waitangi, Bay of Islands

Ronayne Hollister-Jones Lellman, PO Box 13063, Tauranga

G  V POLICE HC ROT CRI 2005-463-000070  5 October 2005

[1]      Mr G   has filed a notice of general appeal under s 115 of the Summary

Proceedings Act 1957.  The appeal is in relation to convictions of Mr G   on 31

August 2005 for:

(i)failing to display current evidence of vehicle inspection (s 34(1)(b) Land Transport Act 1998;

(ii)        having an unlicensed motor vehicle (s 5(1)(b) & s 5(2) Transport

(Vehicle and Driver Registration and Licensing) Act 1986; and

(iii)       using a motor vehicle without registration plates affixed (s 5(1)(b) &

s 5(2) Transport (Vehicle and Driver Registration and Licensing) Act

1986.

[2]      Mr G   was sentence to pay $150 on each charge together with one

Court costs payment of $130.

[3]      The appeal is described in the notice of appeal as an appeal against sentence. However, on reading the grounds of the appeal it appears that the intent is to appeal against both conviction and sentence.  I propose to deal with the appeal on that basis. Ms Simmers for the Crown accepts that is the appropriate course.  The grounds of the appeal are stated to be as follows:

1.        Subject matter jurisdiction of New Zealand Police.

2.          Failed to recognise or rebut points in affidavit.

[4]      The affidavit to which Mr G   refers sets out the following:

1.        That this is the affidavit of   G  .

2.        That this is an independent and impartial Court.

3.        That I have committed NO crime.

4.        That there was NO injury to either parties.

5.        That NO property was damaged by either parties.

6.        That there were NO costs to either parties.

7.        That this is a subject matter of JURISDICTION.

8.        That I DID NOT enter a contractual arrangement to come under the jurisdiction of the NEW ZEALAND POLICE.

[5]      There has been no appearance by Mr G   in support of his appeal today. I have allowed him 15 minutes past the time at which this matter was scheduled to proceed and have also caused his name to be called in the precincts of the Court. Accordingly I propose to deal with the appeal on the papers as I am satisfied that there is no prospect of the appeal succeeding.

[6]      When this matter was heard in the District Court, Constable Dustow gave evidence  which  established  the  basic  elements  of  the  offence  with  which  the appellant was charged and subsequently convicted.   On cross-examination, that evidence was unchallenged as to its essential elements.  At the hearing the force of Mr G  ’s evidence and also his submission was that the Court and New Zealand Police had no jurisdiction over him as a Maori subject, that the Treaty of Waitangi preserved to Maori the right to govern themselves and that legislation enacted by the New Zealand Parliament did not apply to him   Further, Mr G   challenged whether the District Court was an independent and impartial Court.

[7]      In R  v Mitchell (CA68/04, 23 August 2004)  Hammond J, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal made it clear that arguments of this type could not succeed.  In [12], [13] & [14] of the judgment he said:

In the High Court Mr Mitchell argued that he was outside the jurisdiction of the High Court and “Pakeha laws”. He presented extensive submissions (Gendall J recorded that one document ran to 131 pages) on this issue.

In considering the leave application the Judge carefully explained, by reference to  relevant  authorities  including  the  decision  of  this  Court  in Knowles   v  Police   (CA146/98   12   October   1998),   that   Mr   Mitchell’s proposition was untenable. He explained that our Courts are subservient to Parliament and must apply an Act of Parliament in the terms in which it has been enacted. The issues which Mr Mitchell was seeking to raise could not be “resolved by the Courts [they] being a matter for public and political processes and not a judicial one”. Notwithstanding the care the Judge took over this aspect of the case, Mr Mitchell does not accept that explanation.

This Court has made it plain on a number of occasions now that arguments that are based upon an assertion that the Parliament of New Zealand was not authorised to make law affecting some or all of the persons living in New Zealand  cannot  succeed  before  it.  Our  courts  are  bound  to  accept  the validity of Acts of Parliament, including the Land Transport  Act 1998. Although this issue does involve a point of law, Mr Mitchell’s proposition has been squarely rejected on many occasions in the High Court and Court of  Appeal.  No  useful  purpose  would  be  served  in  retraversing  the authorities. Mr Mitchell was perfectly familiar with them, and indeed was physically in possession of some of those authorities before us, including Knowles.  He just does not accept them. He is not entitled to put himself outside the law of New Zealand.

[8]      Also of note is the judgment of the Randerson J in Barrett v Police (High

Court, Hamilton, CRI 2003-419-64, 14 June 2004).  I refer in particular to paragraph

7 of the judgment in which the Judge said:

It is axiomatic under our constitutional arrangements that the legislative authority of Parliament is supreme. The sovereignty of the New Zealand Parliament was canvassed in a helpful discussion by Fisher J in Berkett v Tauranga District Court [1992] 3 NZLR 206, 212 to 213. His Honour examined all the relevant constitutional enactments and concluded there was an unbroken chain of constitutional authority to support the validity of statutes passed by the New Zealand Parliament including, in particular, the Crimes Act 1961. The New Zealand Parliament has had full and exclusive power to legislate since the adoption in 1947 of the United Kingdom Statute of Westminster 1931. The power to legislate now continues under the Constitution  Act  1986  which  is  not  affected  by  the  Imperial  Laws Application Act 1988. To similar effect, see the unreported decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Knowles (CA.146/98, 12 October 1998 at pp 1 to 3).

[9]      There being no tenable basis upon which the appeal against conviction, if that is indeed what this appeal is, could succeed, the appeal is dismissed.

[10]     Turning to the appeal against sentence.  There is no material before me which suggests that the sentence is in any sense excessive and I am satisfied that it is appropriate in all the circumstances.  Accordingly, the appeal against sentence is also dismissed.

Winkelmann J