France v Police

[2014] NZHC 2193

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CRI-2013-404-325 [2014] NZHC 2193

BETWEEN

MALCOLM FRANCE

Appellant

AND

BETWEEN

AND

NEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent

CRI-2013-404-214

MALCOLM FRANCE Appellant

NEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent

Hearing:	On the papers
Appearances:	Appellant in person W N Fotherby for the Respondent
Judgment:	10 September 2014

JUDGMENT OF BROWN J [On application for leave to appeal]

This judgment was delivered by me on 10 September 2014 at 4 pm, pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:        Crown Solicitors, Auckland

Copy To:         Appellant

FRANCE v POLICE [2014] NZHC 2193 [10 September 2014]

[1]      On 15 July 2014 I delivered judgment1  dismissing an appeal by Mr France against his conviction in the Auckland District Court on 4 October 2013.   On the same day I delivered judgment2  on an appeal by Mr France against his conviction and sentence in the District Court at Manukau on 11 October 2013.

[2]      In both of those appeals Mr France raised a challenge to the jurisdiction of the High Court on the ground that he was a “living man” and that the Court could only have jurisdiction in relation to charges against him if he consented to the Court having jurisdiction, which he did not.   I rejected Mr France’s submission that the High Court did not have jurisdiction to hear his appeals.

[3]      Mr France now applies  to the High Court under s 144 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against my two judgments delivered on 15 July 2014.  The requirements for the grant of leave under s 144 were discussed by the Court of Appeal in R v Slater3 where the Court said:4

It is sufficient to pose the statutory question: is there a question of law which, by reason of its general or public importance or for any other reason, ought to be submitted to this Court for decision.

[4]      The Court of Appeal further observed:5

Section 144 was not intended to provide a second tier of appeal from decisions   of   the   District   Court   in   proceedings   under   the   Summary Proceedings Act.   Parliament intended such proceedings to be brought to finality with the defendant having an appeal to the High Court other than when the conditions that are specified in subss (2) and (3) are met and leave to appeal is granted.  Neither the determination of what comprises a question of law, nor the question whether that point of law raises a question of general or public importance, are to be diluted.

[5]      Both Mr France’s notices of appeal follow the same format and attach as a separate page the matter which I infer is advanced as the relevant question of law.  It states:

5.        If  the  court  believes  our  appeal  of  subject-matter  jurisdiction  in regards to the matter of the legal entity MALCOLM DANIEL FRANCE

1      France v Police [2014] NZHC 1656.

2      France v Police [2014] NZHC 1657.

3      R v Slater [1997] 1 NZLR 211.

4      At 215.

5      At 215.

has been decided on; and in accordance with our Affidavit of truth with regards my sovereign living man rights having been accepted in the proper form and manner and has also been decided on.   Then by what subject- matter jurisdiction does the court claim that it has authority or subject-matter jurisdiction  to  forbid  a  free  and  sovereign  man  to  go  about  his  lawful business.

[6]      As  explained  in  [15]  of  my judgment  [2014]  NZHC  1656,  the  intended appellant sought to draw a distinction between the status of Malcolm-Daniel and the status of Mr France.   The contention was that Mr France is not a living man but merely a fictional entity in a State corporation.  It was said that the Court and the Police can only deal with fictional entities.   However Malcolm-Daniel, being a living, breathing man, is not a fictional entity and the Court has no jurisdiction in relation to him unless he consents to that course.  The same propositions appear to be implicit in the statement quoted above which I understand comprises the alleged question of law.

[7]      I am unable to discern that either of the intended appeals involves a question of law.  However if, contrary to my view, the statement quoted above incorporates some question of law, in my view it is not one which, by reason of its general or public importance or for any other reason, ought to be submitted to the Court of Appeal for decision.

[8]      Accordingly I refuse leave to the intended appellant to appeal to the Court of

Appeal against either of my judgments delivered on 15 July 2014.

Brown J