Fowler v R

[2017] NZHC 1892

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND NEW PLYMOUTH REGISTRY

CRI-2017-443-12 [2017] NZHC 1892

BETWEEN

ANDREW REGINALD FOWLER

Appellant

AND

THE QUEEN Respondent

Hearing:	18 July 2017
Counsel:	J M Woodcock for Appellant I R Murray and J A Eng for Crown
Judgment:	10 August 2017

JUDGMENT OF THOMAS J

Introduction

[1]      Andrew Fowler was sentenced to 12 months’ intensive supervision and four months’ community detention  on three charges  of sexual conduct with a young person1 at the New Plymouth District Court on 3 May 2017.2   The sentencing Judge exercised his discretion to place Mr Fowler on the Child Sex Offender Register (the Register) established under the Child Protection (Child Sex Offender Government Agency Registration) Act  2016  (the Act).    Mr  Fowler  now  appeals  against  the

registration aspect of his sentence.

Facts

[2]      Mr Fowler was 23 years old at the time of the offending and has mental health difficulties.

1      Crimes Act 1961, s 134(1); maximum penalty 10 years’ imprisonment.

2      R v Fowler [2017] NZDC 11180.

FOWLER v THE QUEEN [2017] NZHC 1892 [10 August 2017]

[3]      On 28 July 2016, Mr Fowler and his friend were in the Bell Block public library.  There they met a 15 year old girl and her friend.  Mr Fowler asked the girl and her friend to come back to his house.  The girl told him she was 15 years old. At his house, she performed oral sex on him, and they had sexual intercourse.   The police arrived to pick up the girl’s friend, who had absconded from CYF care.  A police  officer  discovered  the  victim  in  Mr  Fowler’s  bedroom,  wearing  only  a blanket. The officer and the victim made it clear to Mr Fowler she was 15 years old.

[4]      The following day, both Mr Fowler and the victim were again at the library, and again returned to Mr Fowler’s house where they had sex.  The police arrived and discovered her in his bedroom.

[5]      In his initial interview, Mr Fowler denied having sexual intercourse with the victim.  He claimed he had intended to do so, but was interrupted by the police on the first occasion.  He stated on the second occasion he had some sexual contact with her, but that did not extend to sexual intercourse.

[6]      The victim was one month past her 15th birthday at the time of the offending. She has learning and behavioural difficulties which means she only attends school two hours a day.   She states she is easily influenced and “went with it” when Mr Fowler showed her attention.  She said she consented to the sexual conduct, but knew it was wrong due to her age.  Afterwards she felt “gross” and overdosed on pills.

[7]      Mr Fowler’s criminal history contains three convictions only, all for breach of a liquor ban.

The District Court decision

[8]       The sentencing Judge had given a sentencing indication of 10 and a half months’  home  detention,  but  noted  that  depended  upon  the  outcomes  of  any pre-sentence report and an assessment of alternative sentences due to Mr Fowler’s mental health.

[9]      In his final sentencing decision, the Judge duly commuted the sentence to community detention and intensive supervision in light of the pre-sentence report. The decision is brief.   The final paragraph is devoted to the issue on appeal, and reads in full:

[4]       I have also given consideration as to whether you should be placed on the child protection offenders register and I am satisfied that that is an appropriate register for you to be placed on and you are accordingly placed on that register for the appropriate period of time.

Approach to appeal

[10]     The Act provides that a registration order is a sentence for the purposes of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011.3    It is therefore amenable to an appeal under pt 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011.

[11]     In sentence appeals, the appellate court must first find an intrinsic error or one resulting from additional information before assessing whether a different sentence should be imposed.4   The error must be material, and must point to grounds for imposing a different sentence.

[12]     Ms Woodcock, appearing for Mr Fowler, noted there was no assessment of the mandatory considerations for making an order under s 9 of the Act in either the sentencing indication or the final decision, and no written submissions addressed the point.   She submitted, and Mr Murray for the Crown conceded, I may assess the matter afresh.  I now do so.

[13]     I will start with a consideration of the Act and registration orders.  I will then address in general terms the threshold of risk for the making of an order and the factors  relevant  to  the  exercise  of  the  discretion.    Finally,  I will  undertake  the

assessment in relation to Mr Fowler.

3      Child  Protection  (Child  Sex  Offender  Government Agency  Registration) Act  2016  [Child

Protection Act], s 9(4).

4      Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [30] citing R v Shipton [2007]

2 NZLR 218 (CA) at [138].

The Act

General provisions

[14]     The purpose of the Act is set out in s 3, which provides:

3        Purpose

(1)       The purpose of this Act is to establish a Child Sex Offender Register that will reduce sexual reoffending against child victims, and the risk posed by serious child sex offenders, by—

(a)       providing government agencies with the information needed to monitor child sex offenders in the community, including after the completion of the sentence; and

(b)       providing up-to-date information that assists the Police to more rapidly resolve cases of child sexual offending.

[15]     A registered offender must report all “relevant personal information” on an annual basis,5  report any changes to that information within 72 hours,6  and report any change of address or travel plans at least 48 hours prior.7    The list of relevant personal information required is long, and includes information about the offender’s work, sensitive personal  information,  details  of telecommunications  and  internet providers, and the offender’s social media details.8    Unless suppressed, the identity of an offender subject to registration will be publicly available.

[16]     The Register is accessible to the Department of Corrections, the police, and a number of specified government agencies.9    The police may disclose or authorise disclosure of the personal information on the Register to affected persons (a parent, guardian, caregiver or teacher) where there are reasonable grounds to believe there is a threat to a child’s safety.10

[17]     The Act sets out certain “qualifying offences” for which an offender may be

placed on the Register.  Qualifying offences are categorised into classes one, two and

5      Child Protection Act, s 19.

6      Section 20(1)(b).

7      Sections 20(1)(a) and 21.

8      Section 16.

9      Sections 11(3), 41 and 43.

10     Section 45.

three according to ascending seriousness.11     If an offender commits a qualifying offence and is sentenced to imprisonment, the offender must be placed on the Register.12    In those circumstances, reporting obligations for class one offences last for 8 years.13   For class two, the period is 15 years.  For class three, the period is the remainder of the offender’s life, although an offender may apply to the District Court for a suspension of those obligations after 15 years.14

[18]     Section 9 applies where an offender is convicted of a qualifying offence, but sentenced to a non-custodial sentence.   The term “non-custodial sentence” is not defined in the Act.   However, the Sentencing Act 2002 provides that an offender sentenced to home detention is not in custody while serving the sentence.15    It is plain, therefore, that any sentence short of imprisonment will be a non-custodial sentence.  The reporting period for such an offender in respect of any class is eight years.16

[19]    The Court of Appeal has considered the Register in the context of an unsuccessful argument that the retrospective application of registration entitled the appellant to a reduction in sentence.17    The Court commented that the scheme is

protective in nature, but is nonetheless punitive in effect.18

Section 9 registration orders

[20]     Under s 9, a sentencing judge has the discretion to make an order to place an offender sentenced to a non-custodial sentence on the Register only if satisfied the offender poses a risk to the lives or sexual safety of one or more children, or children generally.19   In undertaking the risk assessment, the Court must consider the factors

listed in s 9(3):

11     Section 4 definition of “qualifying offence”, and sch 2.

12     Section 8.

13     Section 35(1).

14     Section 38.

15     Sentencing Act 2002, s 80A(5).

16     Child Protection Act, s 35(1)(d).

17     Bell v R [2017] NZCA 90.

18 At [26].

19     Child Protection Act, s 9(2).

9        Court may make registration order

…

(3)      For the purpose of assessing the risk posed by the person, the court must consider the following matters:

(a)

(b)

the seriousness of the qualifying offence:

the period of time that has elapsed since the offence was

committed:

(c)

the age of the person:

(d)

the age of the person at the time of the offence:

(e)

the  age  of  any  victim  of  the  offence  at  the  time  of  the offence:

(f)

the difference in age between the victim and the person at the time of the offence:

(g)

any written assessment of the risk posed by the person:

(h)

any submission or evidence from any victim of the offence:

(i)

any other submission or evidence relating to the risk posed by the person:

(j)

any other matter that the court considers relevant.

…

[21]   Subsection (3) was added following the select committee report, which recommended the provision to give extra guidance to the courts when assessing the risk posed by an offender.20

[22]      While the Court must be satisfied the offender poses a risk to the sexual safety of  children  before  a  registration  order  is  made,  there  remains  a  residual discretion as to whether the offender is placed on the Register.  There is therefore a two-stage test. The questions then are:

(a)       what is the requisite level of risk for the first stage of the test; and

20     Child Protection (Child Sex Offender Register) Bill 2016 (16-2) (select committee report) at

2 and cl 8(3).

(b)what matters are relevant when exercising the discretion in the second stage.

Threshold of risk

[23]     The court must be satisfied of a risk.  Whether a court is satisfied is a “matter of fact requiring judicial assessment”,21  and is “evaluative rather than discretionary”.22

[24]     Mr Murray conceded the wording requiring there to be a risk is similar to that of s 8 of the Bail Act 2000, and acknowledged the High Court has found such a risk needs to be a “real and significant risk inferred from established facts”.23   Mr Murray nevertheless contended a similar gloss ought not to be applied to s 9 because the ramifications of registration are not as significant as the potential loss of liberty flowing from bail decisions.  More importantly, in my view, is that an analysis of risk

in a bail application is in the context of a defendant who has yet to be found guilty on the charge before the court, whereas s 9(2) is in the context of an offender who has been found or has pleaded guilty.   That difference may well justify a lower threshold of risk in the context of registration orders.   In any event, Mr Murray concluded the risk required under s 9(2) should merely be “real and genuine”.

[25]     The meaning of a statutory provision must be ascertained from its text and in light of the statute’s purpose.24     The purpose of the Act, being to establish the Register which “will reduce sexual reoffending against child victims, and the risk posed by serious child sex offenders”,25 must inform the interpretation of s 9.

[26]     Section 9(1) allows a judge to make a registration order if an offender has committed a qualifying offence.  Section 9(2) requires there to be a risk to the sexual safety of children.  There is no express requirement that a court find the offender to be a serious child sex offender.  The only express limitations to the assessment stem

from the application of s 9(2) and (3).

21     R v Hughes [2008] NZCA 546, [2009] 3 NZLR 222 at [11].

22     Kumar v R [2015] NZCA 460 at [83].

23     R v Kahui HC Auckland CRI-2007-092-14990, 2 October 2007 at [33].

24     Interpretation Act 1999, s 5(1).

25     Child Protection Act, s 3 (emphasis added).

[27]     Reading those provisions strictly, it is conceivable that offenders who are not serious child sex offenders could be placed on the Register but that does not sit well with the scheme of the Act.  Parliament intended a scheme with varying responses according to the level of seriousness of the offences.

[28]     As noted above, registration is automatic for offenders sentenced to prison. The inference which can be drawn from this is that Parliament conceived those sent to prison as more likely to be serious child sex offenders.  In reality, imprisonment is not always a direct indication of relative seriousness, but may instead be the result of other circumstances, for example where a home detention address is unavailable or where an offender is being sentenced on a variety of charges.   Nevertheless, Parliament appears to have chosen that distinction as one way to reflect seriousness.

[29]     In the context of non-custodial sentences, Parliament did not intend every person who commits a qualifying offence and has some measure of risk of reoffending to be placed on the Register.  The s 9 discretion is testament to such a proposition.  Indeed, an order can be made only if the Court is satisfied of the risk.

[30]     No specialist reports are required to assist in assessing the risk unlike, for example, where preventive detention or an extended supervision order is sought.26

In the usual course, therefore, a judge will be required to make a risk assessment armed with a pre-sentence report only.   A pre-sentence report is prepared by a probation officer for a court for use in sentencing an offender charged with an offence punishable by imprisonment.27   It is fair to observe that pre-sentence reports are unlikely ever to assess an offender as “no risk”, given an offender has already offended on at least one occasion.28     If any level of risk were sufficient, every convicted offender would be registered, thus defeating the purpose of the s 9 discretion.  For that reason, I consider the risk must be more than “real and genuine”,

as the Crown suggests.

26     For preventative detention, see Sentencing Act 2002, s 87.  For extended supervision orders, see

Parole Act 2002, pt 1A.

27     Sentencing Act 2002, s 26.

28     That being the crime for which the offender is to be sentenced.

[31]     It could be said, in light of the Act’s purpose, s 9(2) must only apply to serious child sex offenders, otherwise the provision would apply beyond the scope Parliament intended.   Mr Murray submitted that whether an offender is a “serious child sex offender” is established by the s 9 analysis.29

[32]     The issue was recently considered by Dobson J in Johnston v New Zealand

Police, who said the following:30

[30]      The approach I adopt is that the requirement in s 9(2) that the person is one who poses a risk to the lives or sexual safety of a child or children may reflect a standalone assessment of the s 9(3) considerations.   A consequence would be that anyone found to pose such a risk will, as a matter of definition, be a serious child sex offender in terms of the s 3 purpose.

[31]      This approach means that the level of risk identified for the purposes of s 9(2) must be assessed via s 9(3), but that risk must nonetheless be consistent with that created by a person whose offending is that of a serious child sex offender.  If that minimum ranking of the nature of the risk is not applied, then the regime would apply beyond the scope Parliament intended, as reflected in its statutory purpose.

[33]     I agree with that approach.

[34]     The risk must be at a level which warrants the imposition of reporting and other relatively draconian obligations in order to protect the safety of children.  The need for the Court to be satisfied the risk posed by the offender is that of a serious child sex offender is emphasised by the purpose of the Act and the language of s 9(2) requiring the Court to be satisfied of the risk before it has jurisdiction to make the order.

Discretion

[35]     The second step is for the Court to exercise its residual discretion – it may make a registration order, but is not obliged to do so.  Mr Murray noted the Court of Appeal  observation,  in  the  context  of  a  discharge  without  conviction,  that  a favourable exercise of the residual discretion is likely to follow when the relevant

threshold is met.31    That may well be the case in the context of a decision not to

29     Accepting that there will inevitably be anomalies, as discussed above.

30     Johnston v New Zealand Police [2017] NZHC 1718.

31     R v Hughes, above n 28, at [12].

impose a criminal sanction where the precursor threshold is set very high.  A similar approach is not necessarily applicable to a decision which would see the imposition of punitive obligations of long duration.

[36]   This stage of the test includes an assessment of proportionality and a consideration of whether the risk identified in the first stage of the test would be mitigated by the offender being on the Register.   Relevant considerations include balancing the risk to children, adverse impacts of registration, whether registration is proportionate to the risk, and preventing stigmatisation of low-risk offenders.

[37]     Other relevant factors can be drawn from the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act

1990. That the Act imposes restrictions on the freedom of movement and freedom of expression was acknowledged by the Attorney-General in his s 7 report on the Bill as introduced.32   Specific aspects of the Bill also raised concerns regarding the right to

be free from disproportionately severe treatment or punishment.33     The Attorney-

General did not consider what became s 9 of the Act to be inconsistent with those rights.    Nevertheless,  they  are  relevant  to  the  discretion  to  ensure  its  exercise infringes on rights only to an extent justifiable in a free and democratic society. Again, I adopt the observations of Dobson J in Johnston when he said Bill of Rights Act considerations provide an overarching constraint on the exercise of the discretion.34

[38]     The discretion involves a balancing exercise between, on the one hand, the scale of the risk and the ability of registration to ameliorate that risk and, on the other, the extent of punishment such an order would represent in terms of additional stigma and intrusion on an offender’s rights.

Application to the facts

[39]     Ms Woodcock drew the Court’s attention to Bird v New Zealand Police, and noted Ellis J considered a straightforward application of s 9(3) in that case indicated

32     Christopher Finlayson Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act

1990 on the Child Protection (Child Sex Offender Register) Bill (6 May 2015) at [12];   and

New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, ss 14 and 18.

33     Finlayson, above n 32, at [9]–[24]; and New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 9.

34     Johnston, above n 30, at [22].

Mr Bird was not a risk.35     Predominant factors for Ellis J were the pre-sentence report conclusion Mr Bird was a low risk, the recommendation of supervision, and the age of the victim.   Ms Woodcock undertook a comparison of the offending in Bird with that in the present case.  Differences such as the relative vulnerability of the victims and the seriousness of the offending were acknowledged, but she pointed out the age discrepancy was less.   She considered several other factors – lack of physical coercion, the consensual nature of the activities, and the fact Mr Fowler was also mentally impaired – point away from registration.

[40]     Mr Murray submitted the decision to place Mr Fowler on the Register was properly made, particularly in light of Mr Fowler’s persistence despite being warned by the police and in light of his mental health difficulties, drug use and lack of insight.

[41]     I will now undertake the s 9(3) analysis, which will include consideration of the submissions and the approach taken in Bird.

Seriousness of the qualifying offence (s 9(3)(a))

[42]     Sexual conduct with a young person carries a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment.  The offence covers a myriad of circumstances.  The focus is on the exploitation of a young person by an older person.  The sexual activity concerned may be consensual, but the thinking behind the provision is that young people need to be “saved from themselves”, irrespective of consent.  The provision is necessarily arbitrary in that whether the victim is indeed a victim is determined by his or her age rather than level of maturity.

[43]     Mr  Murray  submitted  the  offending  was  moderately  serious,  taking  into account the victim’s vulnerability.  He distinguished the case from Bird because the victim in Bird was not as vulnerable and was almost 16; the physical contact and grooming in Bird was less serious; Mr Bird recognised the breach of trust; and he

was more stable, had better support and had no prior offences.

35     Bird v New Zealand Police [2017] NZHC 1296.

[44]     Bird involved a period of grooming and manipulation, including Mr Bird warning the victim not to tell anyone because he would get into trouble.  The victim regularly babysat for Mr Bird, and would stay the night at his family home when doing so. Thus the relationship between them was one of greater trust.

[45]     Mr Bird’s offending escalated over a period of time.  It began with touching the victim’s stomach underneath her clothing.   Mr Bird gradually became more persistent, despite the victim’s expressed concerns.   On a later occasion, Mr Bird texted the victim asking if she had had sex before, and suggested they would have sex the next time she stayed if the timing was right.  Mr Bird’s wife intercepted these texts, contact between Mr Bird and the victim was discontinued, and the police were informed.  It can be said, therefore, that the extent of physical abuse was less in Bird only because Mr Bird’s activities were forestalled.

[46]     I tend to agree  with Ms Woodcock’s submission that Mr Bird displayed equally, if not more, poor judgment and, given the protective factors present in his case at the time of offending (employment, stable home life), he should have been at less risk of offending than Mr Fowler who was living in the unstable circumstances referred to below.  I agree that in many ways the offending in Bird can be considered of greater than or similar seriousness to the present case.

[47]     In my assessment the offending in this case was at the lower end of the crime of sexual conduct with a young person.

Time that has elapsed since the offence was committed (s 9(3)(b))

[48]     The offending is recent.

The  age  of  the  person,  the  age  of  the  victim  and  the  difference  between  them

(s 9(3)(c)–(f))

[49]     Mr Fowler was 23 at the time of the offence and is now 24.   Mr Murray submitted youth is not a mitigating factor. That might be the case, but the issue is his relative youth and the discrepancy between that and the victim’s age.   The victim was 15 years and one month old at the time, less than a year from the age at which

the conduct would have been lawful.   Mr Fowler was eight years older, but still himself relatively young.  In this case the age discrepancy must also be considered in light of other factors.   Age discrepancy may suggest a power imbalance where a mature offender is, by dint of his or her age, likely to be perceived as a figure of authority by a younger victim.  The discrepancy in the present case is less likely to give rise to concerns that the victim was manipulated by a figure of authority in the context of Mr Fowler’s own mental health difficulties, discussed in more detail below.   The significance of what was a relatively small age discrepancy to the assessment of risk is therefore reduced.

Any written assessment of the risk posed by the person (s 9(3)(g))

[50]     The pre-sentence report stated Mr Fowler has a low risk of reoffending.

[51]     In Mr Murray’s submission, Mr Fowler knew what he was doing was illegal, but did not understand the seriousness of that fact.  He also has limited insight into his illness and impaired judgment.

[52]     Mr Fowler’s pre-sentence report includes important context.  He is currently under the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 and has been in and out of hospital many times over the last few years.  He was discharged just three days prior to the offending.   His circumstances over the last few years include Mr Fowler having lived on the street and in  dump sites.   Mr Fowler’s mother, who attended the pre-sentence report interview, described Mr Fowler’s feelings of loneliness.  Having “come from the bottom”, Mr Fowler now says he is focused on making good changes for his future and is willing to work with the Probation Service in order to address his offending-related factors.   Mr Fowler’s mental health nurse noted positive changes recently in Mr Fowler, apparently due to his being on bail and being in a more stable environment.  However, she described Mr Fowler as someone whose judgement “isn’t flash”.

[53]     The pre-sentence report assessed Mr Fowler as at moderate risk of alcohol and drug use.   Mr Fowler expressed himself willing to attend counselling in this regard.

[54]     The pre-sentence report recommended a sentence of intensive supervision, coupled with community detention.  The combination of sentences was designed to allow Mr Fowler to attend any necessary appointments concerning his mental health, work with community probation to address offending-related features, and restrict him to remaining at home in the evenings.

[55]     In the context of assessing Mr Fowler’s fitness to stand trial, a report pursuant to s 38(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003 was provided in December 2016.  Relevantly, it stated:

Mr Fowler had difficulty answering my questions as to why he took the girl to his home a second time when he knew she was under 16 years of age.  He stated that he was aware that it is illegal to have sex with a person under the age of 16 years, but he somehow did not manage to understand the seriousness of this fact.

Concerning the future, Mr Fowler told me that he has talked to his mother and has come to the conclusion that the next time he wants to invite a girl to his house to have sex, he will have to ask her for her identification first to find out whether she is actually over the age of 16 years.  He stated that he is certain that he will do so in the future.

Comments from the victim (s 9(3)(h))

[56]     The  victim  impact  statement  records  the  victim’s  vulnerabilities  and  the serious effect of the offending on her.   I do not mean to discount or diminish the impact on the victim, but note the sexual contact was consensual.  She was distressed by what happened, compounded no doubt, it would be fair to observe, by being spoken to by the police about the events.

Any other evidence relating to the risk and any other matter the court considers relevant (s 9(3)(i)–(j))

[57]     I consider the recommendation of the pre-sentence report and the sentence in fact imposed to be highly relevant.

[58]     The recommended conditions of intensive supervision which, although not specifically referred to by the sentencing Judge, can be inferred to be included in the sentence were:

(a)      not to communicate in any way or associate with the victim without the prior written approval of a probation officer;

(b)to attend an assessment for alcohol and drug counselling as directed by a probation officer and to attend and complete any counselling, treatment  or  programme  as  recommended  by  the  assessment  as directed by and to the satisfaction of a probation officer;

(c)       to  attend  an  assessment  with  the  Department  of  Education  and

Employment Officer;

(d)      not to associate or otherwise have contact with  any person under

16 years of age except in the presence and under the supervision of an “Approved Informed Adult”, which means a person who has been given prior approval in writing by a probation officer as being suitable for the purpose of this condition; and

(e)      to attend a psychological assessment with a departmental psychologist as directed by a probation officer and complete any treatment and/or counselling as recommended by the assessment to the satisfaction of a probation officer.

[59]     When all these matters are taken together they can be considered protective factors.   The restrictive conditions of Mr Fowler’s intensive supervision and the “safety plan” he has agreed with his mother will help protect against any risk, while the  rehabilitative  focus  of  the  counselling  required  by his  intensive  supervision should also protect against any risk of further offending.

Conclusion on risk

[60]     In all the circumstances, I assess the risk posed by Mr Fowler as relatively low.   I am not satisfied he poses the requisite level of risk to the sexual safety of children to enable me to exercise my discretion to make a registration order.

Discretion

[61]     In the event that my analysis of the requisite threshold of risk to be applied under s 9(2) is in error, I now assess whether or not I would exercise my discretion to order Mr Fowler to be placed on the Register.   When it comes to exercising my discretion, I need to balance the potential for the consequences of registration to ameliorate the risk Mr Fowler poses to the sexual safety of children against the considerable impact on Mr Fowler and his rights of being on the Register.   I am satisfied in all the circumstances that the balance weighs against such an order, and Mr Fowler should not be placed on the Register.

Result

[62]     For the  reasons  given,  the appeal  is  allowed  and  I quash  the order that Mr Fowler be registered under s 9 of the Act.  The other elements of the sentence are undisturbed – that is, 12 months’ intensive supervision and four months’ community detention.

Thomas J

Solicitors:

Crown Law, Wellington