Flavell v Police

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

CRI 2012-485-110 [2013] NZHC 481

TAKURUA POMARE FLAVELL

Appellant

v

NEW ZEALAND POLICE

Respondent

Hearing:         29 January 2013

Submissions:  14, 27 February 2013

Counsel:         S J Iorns for Appellant

A J Ewing for Respondent

Judgment:      13 March 2013

JUDGMENT OF RONALD YOUNG J

[1]      On 17 March 2012 the owner of a house in Trentham arrived home.   The back door of his house had been left unlocked. As he arrived he saw a man trying to open a window from inside his house.  He shouted at the man and shortly afterwards called the Police.   He saw the man leave the house and jump over a fence.   The property owner gave chase. A police dog handler arrived and tracked and located the appellant at a nearby property.  The appellant ran off but was caught by the police

dog.

FLAVELL V NEW ZEALAND POLICE HC WN CRI 2012-485-110 [13 March 2013]

[2]      At  his  trial  Mr Flavell  initially  faced  a  charge  of  burglary  contrary  to s 231(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1961.   He admitted he had been in the house.   The Judge concluded, however, that he could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that when Mr Flavell entered the house he intended to commit a crime inside.  And so the Judge amended the information to s 29(1)(a) of the Summary Offences Act

1981 that Mr Flavell was found in the house without reasonable excuse.  The Judge convicted the appellant.

[3]      The appellant’s case on appeal is that the Judge failed to consider whether the appellant had proved the defence available in s 29(2) that he had no intention to commit any other crime.  This, the appellant emphasised, was especially important because the Judge had already concluded that the prosecution could not prove (in the charge of burglary) that when the appellant entered the house he was intending to commit a crime.

[4]      Two other grounds of appeal were raised; that the Judge failed to recognise the onus of establishing reasonable excuse was on the appellant; the prosecution failed to prove the necessary mens rea required by s 29(1).

District Court Judgment

[5]      Although property had been stolen from the house sometime that evening, there was nothing to link the appellant with this crime.   Given the Judge in the District Court said that he could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that when the appellant entered the house he intended to commit a crime, an essential element of the charge of burglary could not be established.

[6]      After the Judge amended the burglary charge to one pursuant to s 29 of the Summary Offences Act 1981, he concluded that the effect of the appellant’s evidence was that he had no reason to be at the house.  Thus, the Judge said the appellant had no reasonable excuse for his presence in the house.   He, therefore, convicted the appellant.

Discussion

Onus in s 29(1)

[7]      Section 29 of the Summary Offences Act 1981 provides as follows:

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Details
Case
[2013] NZHC 481
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this appeal, the appellant, Mr. Flavell, challenged his conviction for being found in a house without a reasonable excuse, as per section 29(1)(a) of the Summary Offences Act 1981. The case originated in the District Court where Mr. Flavell was initially charged with burglary but was later convicted under the amended charge of being found in the house without a reasonable excuse. Mr. Flavell appealed this conviction on several grounds, including the trial judge's failure to consider his defence under section 29(2) of the Act, the onus of proof concerning the reasonable excuse, and the prosecution's failure to prove the necessary mens rea.

The court first addressed the issue of the onus of proof concerning the reasonable excuse. The appellant argued that the trial judge did not consider where the onus of proving a reasonable excuse lay, and suggested it should be on the defendant. The Crown, on the other hand, argued that the onus was on the defendant, as per section 67(8) of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957. However, the court concluded that the onus was actually on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant did not have a reasonable excuse for being in the building. This conclusion was based on the analysis of the statutory language and the distinction between offences made innocent by exceptions and prima facie innocent acts made offences by conditions.

Next, the court examined the second ground of appeal, which was the trial judge's failure to consider the statutory defence provided in section 29(2). The court agreed with both parties that the judge had indeed failed to consider this defence, and that this oversight required the conviction to be quashed. However, the court was not satisfied that the appellant had established on the balance of probabilities that he did not have an intention to commit any other offence when found in the house, and therefore, the case needed to be reheard in the District Court.

Finally, the court considered the third ground of appeal, which argued that the prosecution had not proved the necessary mens rea required by section 29(1). The court rejected this argument, stating that the prosecution did not need to prove any specific intent related to being present in the house, as the obligation to disprove a reasonable excuse effectively gathered up any such intent. Therefore, the court was satisfied that the prosecution did not have to prove any form of specific intent in section 29(1) related to being present in the house.

In conclusion, the court quashed the conviction and ordered the case to be reheard in the District Court, subject to the court's conclusions on the second ground of appeal.

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