IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
CIV-2015-485-686 [2015] NZHC 2136
UNDER the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 IN THE MATTER
of a proceeding for breach of contract
BETWEEN
FIRST SOVEREIGN TRUST LIMITED First Applicant
NZL LOCAL LIMITED, NZL OFFICE LIMITED AND NZL MARQUIS LIMITED
Second Applicants
AND
INFINITY FOUNDATION LIMITED Respondent
Hearing: 31 August 2015 Counsel:
M S Smith and S T Cottrell for Applicants
A G Sherriff and S A Barker for RespondentJudgment:
31 August 2015
Reasons:
4 September 2015
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF CLIFFORD J
Introduction
[1] The first applicant, First Sovereign Trust Limited (Sovereign), and the respondent, Infinity Foundation Limited (Infinity) are gaming trusts or, to use the more technical term from the Gambling Act 2003, “gambling operators”.
[2] The second applicants (the NZL Companies) operate bars and taverns in which Infinity operated gambling machines. As such, the NZL Companies are, again
to use the technical term, “venue operators”.
FIRST SOVEREIGN TRUST LIMITED v INFINITY FOUNDATION LIMITED [2015] NZHC 2136 [31 August
2015]
[3] Sovereign and the NZL Companies have entered into contracts for Sovereign to operate gambling machines at a number of venues in substitution for Infinity.
[4] In their substantive proceedings Sovereign and the NZL Companies allege that Infinity is unlawfully frustrating and interfering with those contracts.
Interlocutory application for injunctive relief
[5] At the time of filing those substantive proceedings on Monday 31 August, Sovereign and the NZL Companies applied for a mandatory interim injunction requiring Infinity to revoke and extend notices of surrender of venue licence it had given to the regulator, the Department of Internal Affairs (the Department). Sovereign and the NZL Companies also sought a mandatory order that Infinity was not to “in any way frustrate the transfer” of the NZL Companies’ venues to Sovereign.
[6] Sovereign and the NZL Companies gave notice to Infinity of that interlocutory application, albeit very short notice. The application was urgent as, from Sovereign and the NZL Companies’ perspective, Infinity’s notices of surrender were to expire at 12.00 pm on Monday evening. When that occurred, gambling at the NZL Companies’ venues would have to cease.
[7] I heard that application on the afternoon of Monday 31 August 2015. At the end of the hearing, I declined that application, giving brief reasons for doing so. I said I would give written reasons for my decision in somewhat greater detail later. I now do so.
Reasons
[8] To conduct the gambling operations at a particular venue, a gambling operator requires a current class 4 venue licence for the particular venue and a current class 4 venue agreement with the relevant venue operator. Venue licences may not be transferred, only surrendered. Therefore the “transfer” of a gambling venue from one operator to another requires the “transferee” operator, here
Sovereign, to obtain a new venue licence for the relevant venue, and to enter into a new venue agreement with the relevant venue operator.
[9] Sovereign brings its substantive proceedings under the Contracts (Privity) Act
1982 and…
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- Case
- [2015] NZHC 2136
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether there was a serious question to be tried and where the balance of convenience lay. The court was required to determine whether damages would be an adequate remedy and whether maintenance of the status quo would be of value. The contractual position was not at all clear. While both sides had arguable cases, it could not be said that the contractual position was clear in the context of the application for a mandatory injunction. The court was not persuaded that “damages” would not be an adequate remedy. Clifford J concluded it was likely that the grant of the relief sought by the applicants would be futile. The court declined the application for mandatory interim injunctive relief.
This interlocutory application was something of a commercial arm-wrestle between the parties, neither of whom came to Court with completely “clean hands”. Clifford J determined that costs on this interlocutory application should lie where they fall.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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