Firmin v Police

[2025] NZHC 3097

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WHANGANUI REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WHANGANUI ROHE

CRI-2025-483-35

[2025] NZHC 3097

BETWEEN

PETER JOHN FIRMIN

Applicant

AND

NEW ZEALAND POLICE

Respondent

Hearing:

15 October 2025

Appearances:

Appellant in person

K D Turner for Respondent

Judgment:

16 October 2025

JUDGMENT OF ISAC J

[Appeal against conviction]

[1]    Following a summary hearing before Judge Dawson on 12 August 2011,    Mr John Firmin was convicted of trespass under s 4(4) and  11(2)(a)  of  the  Trespass Act 1980.1 He was sentenced to a fine of $650.2

[2]Mr Firmin now seeks leave to appeal his conviction 14 years out of time.

The offending

[3]    The appellant was charged that on 17 December 2010 having been warned by an occupier to stay off Papahaua Station, he wilfully trespassed on that place within two years of receiving the warning.3 Mr Firmin’s defence was that he was not on the property on the relevant date.

1      Maximum penalty 3 months’ imprisonment, $1,000 fine.

2      He was also ordered to pay $100 in witness expenses, and $132.89 in Court costs.

3      Police v Firmin CRI-2011-067-000003, 12 August 2011 at [1].

FIRMIN v POLICE [2025] NZHC 3097 [16 October 2025]

[4]    At trial, Mr Firmin represented himself. Evidence was heard from both witnesses for the prosecution and the defence, including the defendant himself.

[5]    The evidence established that the land in question was owned by the Ātihau-Whanganui Incorporation, a Māori corporation farming the Station for the benefit of its shareholders. Mr Firmin accepted that he had been served with a trespass notice on 8 October 2010, and that had he entered the property he would have been guilty of trespass.4 The evidence also established that the notice had been issued because Mr Firmin had previously breached hunting privileges on the property. There was also a history of ill-feeling between Mr Firmin and employees of the Station.

[6]    The Police relied on the identification evidence of a Mr Hawira. He said he saw Mr Firmin on the property and talked to him at 9.30am on 17 December 2010. The witness described Mr Firmin’s appearance and that of his dog. He also confirmed he had seen Mr Firmin in the area before, and knew where he lived. During cross-examination the following exchange occurred between Mr Firmin and the witness:

Q.   …Now, in this brief of evidence that I got from the police, you said   that, it states here that: “I knew it was Peter Firmin who I had spoken to because my mother used to go out with his cousin and I met him many times while with her”?

A. I haven’t met you many times, I’ve seen you.

Q. You’ve seen me but you’ve never been formally introduced?

A. No.

Q. And you’re absolutely 100% positive that it was me that you saw on that day?

A. Yes, yes.

[7]    The Judge considered Mr Hawira a truthful and credible witness, with no reason to lie.5 He did not accept Mr Firmin’s suggestion that the witness was lying in order to restrict hunting on the property for himself.

4 At [2].

5 At [5].

[8]    While injuries and physical impairments led Mr Firmin to suggest he could not have walked the distance from the Station back to his home in time to have turned on a computer at 10.41am, the Judge was satisfied it was feasible for the appellant to have done so.6

[9]    Having heard the evidence and assessed  the  credibility  of  the witnesses, the Judge was satisfied to the criminal standard that Mr Firmin was guilty of trespass.

Leave to appeal out of time

[10]   The proceeding in question occurred prior to  the  enactment  of  the  Criminal Procedure Act 2011.7 The appeal must therefore be heard and determined in accordance with the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 as if it is still in force.8

[11]   The appellant has a general right of appeal to the High Court against his conviction.9 An appeal must be brought within 28 days of the sentencing date,10 in this case, by 19 September 2011. Under s 123 of the Summary Proceedings Act, the  High Court can extend the time for filing a notice of appeal.11

[12]   The Supreme Court has said the touchstone of applications for an extension of time to appeal “will always be the interests of justice”.12 As the Court of Appeal noted in R v Slavich, extension of time applications will generally reduce to two questions:13

(a)why the appeal was filed late; and

(b)what merit the prospective appeal appears to have.

6      Mr Firmin had called evidence from a computer expert who found that he had turned his computer on at 10.41am.

7      Stage 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 came into force on 1 July 2013, see Criminal Procedure Act Commencement Order 2013 (SR 2013/162).

8      Criminal Procedure Act, s 397(2).

9      Summary Proceedings Act 1957.

10     Summary Proceedings Act, s 116.

11     Section 123.

12     Ellis v R [2019] NZSC 83 at [15] citing R v Knight [1998] 1 NZLR 583 (CA) at 587; and R v Lee

[2006] 3 NZLR 42 (CA) at [95]—[99].

13     R v Slavich [2008] NZCA 116 at [14], as recently affirmed in R v R [2024] NZCA 535 at [8].

[13]   The reason for the delay in bringing the appeal is also a significant consideration.14

The application

[14]   Mr Firmin explains that the reasons for his delay were a lack of understanding he could bring an appeal and lack of legal aid to instruct a lawyer. He only became aware of an ability to appeal from other cases in which appeals had been brought out of time.

[15]   In terms of the merits, Mr Firmin contends the Judge wrongly excluded medical evidence about his injuries, which went to his ability to walk home from the Station in the time required. This arose because Mr Firmin’s doctor was not available to attend the hearing, and the medical papers and reports Mr Firmin had brought were therefore inadmissible hearsay.

[16]   Second, Mr Firmin wishes to argue on appeal that the Māori Land Court    has exclusive jurisdiction to determine trespass  on  Māori  Land  under  s  144  of  Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993. Furthermore, the solicitor for the Corporation purported to serve the trespass notice, and its Chairman signed it, but in Mr Firmin’s submission as a matter of law the notice had  to be both signed and  served  by         a beneficiary or shareholder of the Corporation. For these reasons, the trespass notice was invalid.

[17]   Third, Mr Firmin wishes to  challenge the  evidence  admitted during trial.  He suggests that Police altered witness statements, and that the key witness who claimed to recognise Mr Firmin could not have known him as he had claimed because Mr Firmin had been in prison for a long period of the witness’ childhood.

[18]   Fourth, the applicant submits there was a delay in charging him, as he was charged 5 January 2010, for events occurring 17 December 2009. This led to the loss of opportunity to gather timely witness evidence and breached the right in s 25(b) of the Bill of Rights Act to be tried without undue delay.

14 At [14].

[19]   Finally, the applicant submits his conviction raises serious concerns about     a disregard for his rights under tikanga Māori. He says that the Judge failed to consider the tikanga implications of convicting tangata whenua for trespassing on ancestral land. Doing so amounts to a violation of mana whenua and a fundamental miscarriage of justice has occurred.

[20]   In relation to a proposed sentence appeal, Mr Firmin argues there was an error in the sentence. He says that while the fine imposed was only $650 with Court costs of $130, his bank records reveal that he has paid “at least” $1,060.

Consideration

[21]   Unfortunately for Mr Firmin, I am unable to accept that the 14-year delay can be entirely attributed to lack of awareness of court process, or a lack of legal representation. Most members of the community are aware that first instance decisions are often capable of being challenged on appeal.

[22]I also consider there is no merit in the proposed grounds of appeal.

[23]   In terms of the medical evidence Mr Firmin claims was excluded by the Judge, the evidence before the District Court  disclosed  that  Mr  Firmin  had  hunted  on the Station and in doing so had walked there from his home on prior occasions:

Q. And when you go hunting, what sort of vehicle do you use?

A. If I can get a bike, a quad, I’ll use a quad. Otherwise, I have to use my own vehicle as far as I can go.

Q. And do you walk?

A. Yes, I walk.

Q. So at the times you hunted on Papahaua Station with the permit, did you walk on Papahaua Station?

A. Yes, of course I did.

[24]   There was also evidence that Mr Firmin had used a quad bike on occasions to access the Station using an adjacent road. So the absence of medical evidence of

Mr Firmin’s injuries does not seem likely to have made any difference to the result, particularly given his frank concessions in evidence.

[25]   Nor is there anything in the legal points Mr Firmin wishes to raise concerning the jurisdiction of the Māori Land Court, or the manner in which the trespass notice was served and signed. Mr Firmin had advised the Judge that he did not take issue with the trespass notice and accepted that if he had been on the Station as alleged he would be guilty of trespass. Having made that concession, it is not in the interests of justice to grant an extension of time to permit Mr Firmin to run an entirely contrary position on appeal.

[26]   Section 144 of the Te  Ture Whenua  Māori Act  relates to the recovery of,   or trespass or injury to, Māori customary land. Such proceedings may only be brought by the Māori Trustee on behalf of the owners of the land. However, Mr Firmin has understandably failed to distinguish between an action for trespass to land, which is a civil claim governed by s 144, and a prosecution for criminal trespass, which is not subject to the Te Ture Whenua Māori Act.

[27]   Corporations as legal persons may only carry on their affairs through the acts of their agents. There is no requirement in law for a trespass notice issued by a Māori corporation to be signed and served by  a shareholder or beneficiary, as  opposed to  a duly authorised agent, such as the Corporation’s chair or solicitor.

[28]   Nor do I accept there is any merit in Mr Firmin’s argument that Mr Hawira’s statement had been unlawfully altered by Police. It seemed from the documents that Mr Firmin referred me to in the hearing that he was likely conflating the handwritten Police statement provided by Mr Hawira as part of the initial Police investigation with the brief of evidence prepared for the summary hearing. They are different statements and may not always be entirely consistent with one another.

[29]   Finally, there is nothing in the points Mr  Firmin raised  about undue delay   to trial, or tikanga Māori. It is clear the charges and prosecution were brought on swiftly, and the recognition of tikanga as law in Aotearoa New Zealand has not reached the point of establishing a defence to criminal trespass. Indeed, as the

Law Commission paper, He Poutama, acknowledges, the common law cannot give effect to tikanga where it is excluded by statute.15 That is the case here.

[30]   The proposed sentence appeal also lacks merit. Mr Firmin was fined. He has paid the fine. The materials provided do not establish any error in the District Court.

[31]   Finally, Police have destroyed their files in the intervening 14-year period.    It would be most unfair to expect the State to relitigate matters in circumstances where witnesses may be unavailable, or unable to recall the relevant events.

Conclusion and result

[32]The application for an extension of time to appeal is dismissed.

[33]   This will be disappointing for Mr Firmin, but he presented his case clearly and articulately in the District Court, and before me. The evidence adduced clearly supported the conviction. Given the passage of time, and the nature of the conviction, which is not serious, I hope he is able to focus on more positive things rather than dwell on past frustrations.

Isac J

Solicitors:
Crown Law, Wellington for Respondent

15 Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission He Poutama (NZLC SP24, 2023) at [8.39(f)], citing Ellis v R (Continuance) [2022] NZSC 114, [2022] 1 NZLR 239 at [119] per Glazebrook J, [182] per Winkelmann CJ and [266] per Williams J.