| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA |
| CA95/2020 [2020] NZCA 199 |
| BETWEEN | FINANCIAL SERVICES COMPLAINTS LIMITED |
| AND | THE CHIEF OMBUDSMAN |
| Court: | Kós P and Courtney J |
Counsel: | K I Murray for Applicant |
Judgment: | 29 May 2020 at 11 am |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The application for transfer of the proceeding to the Court of Appeal, under s 59 of the Senior Courts Act 2016, is declined.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Kós P)
FSCL provides independent dispute resolution services for financial services providers and their customers. It was the first approved scheme under the Financial Service Providers (Registration and Dispute Resolution) Act 2008. Two later‑approved schemes had previously obtained consent from the then-Chief Ombudsman, Sir John Robertson, to use the word “ombudsman” in their names under s 28A(1) of the Ombudsmen Act 1975.
In May 2015 FSCL applied to the then-Chief Ombudsman, Dame Beverley Wakem, for written consent pursuant to s 28A(1) to describe itself as a “Financial Ombudsman Service”. The application was declined. In November 2015 the applicant sought judicial review. Dame Beverley applied to strike that out. Toogood J declined her application in April 2016.[1]
[1]Financial Services Complaints Ltd v Wakem [2016] NZHC 634, [2016] NZAR 717.
In May 2016 Mr Peter Boshier, by now the Chief Ombudsman, agreed to reconsider the May 2015 application and make a fresh decision. In July 2016 FSCL’s application was again declined.
FSCL again applied for judicial review. Its application was dismissed by Simon France J in March 2017.[2] FSCL appealed successfully to this Court.[3] Mr Boshier was directed to reconsider the applicant’s application under s 28A(1). In June 2019 Mr Boshier again declined FSCL’s application.[4]
[2]Financial Services Complaints Ltd v Chief Ombudsman [2017] NZHC 525, [2017] NZAR 521.
[4]It may be noted that in April 2019 the Ombudsmen (Protection of Name) Amendment Bill was introduced. It was passed and came into force in March 2020. It further restricts use of the “ombudsman” name in New Zealand, and transfers decision-making to the Minister of Justice. However, a saving applied to FSCL, allowing it to use the name “ombudsman” if its extant s 28A application was granted by Mr Boshier. Which it was not.
FSCL now seeks:
(a)judicial review of this, the third declinature decision and, if successful, an order that the Court substitute its decision for that of Mr Boshier; and
(b)an order for removal and transfer of its judicial review proceeding against Mr Boshier from the High Court to this Court under s 59 of the Senior Courts Act 2016.
This judgment deals with (b).
Section 59 provides:
59 Transfer of civil proceeding from High Court to Court of Appeal
(1) A party to a civil proceeding in the High Court may apply for an order…
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- Case
- [2020] NZCA 199
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal declined the application to transfer the proceeding. While the proceeding raises important issues, the Court of Appeal held that it is not "exceptional" in the sense that the term is used in s 59 of the Senior Courts Act. The Court of Appeal also held that it is not the appropriate court to deal with the issue of whether the Chief Ombudsman complied with the Court of Appeal's orders. The first appellate court benefits from factual findings made by the High Court and the Court of Appeal should not leapfrog the High Court. The application for transfer of the proceeding to the Court of Appeal, under s 59 of the Senior Courts Act 2016, is declined.
Background
Background to the litigation
FSCL first applied for consent to use the term "ombudsman" in May 2015, which was declined by Dame Beverley Wakem. FSCL sought judicial review of this decision, and the application was dismissed by Simon France J in March 2017. FSCL appealed to the Court of Appeal, which found in their favour. The Court of Appeal directed Mr Boshier to reconsider the application, and in June 2019, Mr Boshier again declined FSCL's application. FSCL now seeks judicial review of this decision and has applied to transfer the judicial review proceeding from the High Court to the Court of Appeal under section 59 of the Senior Courts Act 2016.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is the application for transfer of the proceeding to the Court of Appeal under section 59 of the Senior Courts Act 2016 justified, given the circumstances of the case?
2. Should the Court of Appeal substitute its decision for that of Mr Boshier, the Chief Ombudsman, in declining FSCL's application for consent to use the term "ombudsman" in its name?
3. What are the implications of the Ombudsmen (Protection of Name) Amendment Bill, which came into force in March 2020, for FSCL's application?
Held
1. The application for transfer of the proceeding to the Court of Appeal under section 59 of the Senior Courts Act 2016 is declined.
2. The Court of Appeal will not substitute its decision for that of Mr Boshier, the Chief Ombudsman, in declining FSCL's application for consent to use the term "ombudsman" in its name.
3. The implications of the Ombudsmen (Protection of Name) Amendment Bill, which came into force in March 2020, are not directly relevant to the outcome of FSCL's application.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court of Appeal considered whether the circumstances of the proceeding were exceptional enough to justify leapfrogging the High Court and transferring the case directly to the Court of Appeal. The court examined the grounds for transfer under section 59 of the Senior Courts Act 2016 and concluded that none of the exceptional circumstances outlined in the statute were met. The court emphasised the importance of preserving the ordinary appellate rights of parties and highlighted the potential delay and inefficiency caused by leapfrogging. The court noted that the High Court was well-equipped to handle the factual findings and analysis required in this case. Additionally, the court found that the urgency of the case did not necessitate leapfrogging since the High Court could determine the matter in an appropriate timeframe. The court also observed that the allegations of non-compliance with prior court orders and bad faith against a senior Parliamentary officer did not automatically make the case exceptional enough for transfer to the Court of Appeal. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Court of Appeal will not transfer proceedings to itself unless the circumstances are truly exceptional, and in this case, they were not. The court's decision aligns with its primary role as an appellate court and respects the well-established principle of preserving the ordinary appellate rights of parties.