IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
CIV-2015-485-985 [2016] NZHC 3153
UNDER the Accident Compensation Act 2001 IN THE MATTER OF
an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court pursuant to s 162 of the Act
BETWEEN
DEREK LAWRENCE FARRELLY Applicant
AND
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION
Respondent
Hearing: 2 December 2016 Counsel:
J P Temm for applicant
F L Becroft for respondentJudgment:
20 December 2016
RESERVED JUDGMENT OF DOBSON J
[1] On 20 December 2013, Judge Ongley dismissed an appeal brought by Mr Farrelly (the applicant) in the Wellington District Court against the decision of the Accident Compensation Corporation (the Corporation) to decline his claim for backdated weekly compensation from 2003 to 2007.1 The applicant applied for leave to appeal against that decision, and his application was declined by Judge Henare in a decision dated 13 November 2015.2
[2] The applicant then applied to the High Court for special leave to appeal against the District Court decision, pursuant to s 162(3) of the Accident
Compensation Act 2001 (the Act). Counsel cited slightly different formulations of
1 Farrelly v Accident Compensation Corporation [2013] NZACC 420.
2 Farrelly v Accident Compensation Corporation [2015] NZACC 344.
FARRELLY v ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION [2016] NZHC 3153 [20 December 2016]
the principles that apply to the determination of an application for special leave. They are substantially the same:
(a) The purpose of requiring leave is to ensure the sensible allocation of scarce judicial time. The issue must be of sufficient importance to outweigh the cost and delay of a further appeal. Leave ought not to be granted as a matter of course.
(b)It is normally necessary to show either that there is an issue of principle at stake and that there is a reasonable prospect of success (or that the question is capable of bona fide argument). Given that leave has been refused by the District Court, there will normally need to be some extraordinary factor that has not been properly taken into account.
(c) Granting leave must be in the interests of justice.3
Background
[3] In 2003 the applicant was a self-employed forensic accountant and insolvency practitioner. He suffered a back injury during October that year, when he was hit by a chairlift at Turoa ski field. The applicant was immobilised for a short time but thereafter returned to work.
[4] The applicant had cover for the injury from 2003 but did not claim weekly compensation for incapacity. In July 2007, he suffered a further injury, was certified as being incapacitated and started to receive weekly compensation. The applicant then claimed he had in fact been incapacitated since 2003, with the effect that his weekly compensation entitlement should be calculated on the basis of his earnings prior to 2003 and that he should receive backdated weekly compensation for the years between October 2003 and July 2007.
[5] After investigation, the applicant was denied the claim for backdated compensation on the basis that there was insufficient evidence that he was
3
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- Case
- [2016] NZHC 3153
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The applicant argued that the District Court erred in excluding his own evidence of incapacity, which he claimed was reliable and corroborated by subsequent medical reports. The court found that the District Court was not obliged to ignore the applicant's own evidence and that it was not appropriate to have regard to a claimant's own characterization of their medical condition in all circumstances. The court also found that the applicant's failure to consult medical practitioners at the time did not necessarily invalidate his subsequent claims, as long as they were corroborated by medical reports. The court concluded that the District Court's approach to assessing incapacity was not erroneous and dismissed the appeal on that ground. The court declined special leave for the process-related questions, finding that they did not raise issues of sufficient importance to outweigh the cost and delay of further appeal. The court found no prejudice in the Corporation's decision to re-open the review hearing to consider new evidence and no estoppel arising from a letter sent to the applicant in 2007.
Orders
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Background
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Evidence
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