Farrelly v Accident Compensation Corporation

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

CIV-2015-485-985 [2016] NZHC 3153

UNDER the Accident Compensation Act 2001

IN THE MATTER OF

an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court pursuant to s 162 of the Act

BETWEEN

DEREK LAWRENCE FARRELLY Applicant

AND

ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION

Respondent

Hearing: 2 December 2016

Counsel:

J P Temm for applicant
F L Becroft for respondent

Judgment:

20 December 2016

RESERVED JUDGMENT OF DOBSON J

[1]      On  20 December  2013,  Judge  Ongley  dismissed  an  appeal  brought  by Mr Farrelly (the applicant) in the Wellington District Court against the decision of the Accident Compensation Corporation (the Corporation) to decline his claim for backdated weekly compensation from 2003 to 2007.1     The applicant applied for leave to appeal against that decision, and his application was declined by Judge Henare in a decision dated 13 November 2015.2

[2]      The applicant then applied to the High Court for special leave to appeal against   the   District   Court   decision,   pursuant   to   s   162(3)   of   the  Accident

Compensation Act 2001 (the Act).  Counsel cited slightly different formulations of

1      Farrelly v Accident Compensation Corporation [2013] NZACC 420.

2      Farrelly v Accident Compensation Corporation [2015] NZACC 344.

FARRELLY v ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION [2016] NZHC 3153 [20 December 2016]

the principles that apply to the determination of an application for special leave. They are substantially the same:

(a)      The purpose of requiring leave is to ensure the sensible allocation of scarce judicial time.   The issue must be of sufficient importance to outweigh the cost and delay of a further appeal.  Leave ought not to be granted as a matter of course.

(b)It  is  normally  necessary  to  show  either  that  there  is  an  issue  of principle at stake and that there is a reasonable prospect of success (or that the question is capable of bona fide argument).  Given that leave has been refused by the District Court, there will normally need to be some extraordinary factor that has not been properly taken into account.

(c)       Granting leave must be in the interests of justice.3

Background

[3]      In   2003   the  applicant   was   a  self-employed   forensic   accountant   and insolvency practitioner.  He suffered a back injury during October that year, when he was hit by a chairlift at Turoa ski field.  The applicant was immobilised for a short time but thereafter returned to work.

[4]      The applicant had cover for the injury from 2003 but did not claim weekly compensation for incapacity.  In July 2007, he suffered a further injury, was certified as being incapacitated and started to receive weekly compensation.  The applicant then claimed he had in fact been incapacitated since 2003, with the effect that his weekly compensation entitlement should be calculated on the basis of his earnings prior to 2003 and that he should receive backdated weekly compensation for the years between October 2003 and July 2007.

[5]     After investigation, the applicant was denied the claim for backdated compensation  on  the  basis  that  there  was  insufficient  evidence  that  he  was

3      

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Details
Case
[2016] NZHC 3153
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Farrelly v Accident Compensation Corporation, the applicant sought special leave to appeal to the High Court against the Wellington District Court's decision to dismiss his claim for backdated weekly compensation from 2003 to 2007. The applicant, a self-employed forensic accountant, suffered a back injury in 2003 but did not claim weekly compensation for incapacity. He later claimed that he had been incapacitated since 2003 and sought backdated weekly compensation. The District Court found that the applicant had not provided reasonably persuasive medical evidence of his incapacity during the relevant period. The applicant applied for special leave to appeal on four grounds, two of which related to the process followed by the District Court in assessing the appeal and two of which related to the substantive test for determining incapacity. The court declined special leave for the process-related questions, finding that they did not raise issues of sufficient importance to outweigh the cost and delay of further appeal. The court granted special leave for the substantive question of whether the District Court erred in excluding the applicant's own evidence of incapacity. However, the court found no error in the District Court's approach to assessing incapacity and dismissed the appeal on that ground.

The applicant argued that the District Court erred in excluding his own evidence of incapacity, which he claimed was reliable and corroborated by subsequent medical reports. The court found that the District Court was not obliged to ignore the applicant's own evidence and that it was not appropriate to have regard to a claimant's own characterization of their medical condition in all circumstances. The court also found that the applicant's failure to consult medical practitioners at the time did not necessarily invalidate his subsequent claims, as long as they were corroborated by medical reports. The court concluded that the District Court's approach to assessing incapacity was not erroneous and dismissed the appeal on that ground. The court declined special leave for the process-related questions, finding that they did not raise issues of sufficient importance to outweigh the cost and delay of further appeal. The court found no prejudice in the Corporation's decision to re-open the review hearing to consider new evidence and no estoppel arising from a letter sent to the applicant in 2007.

Orders

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Background

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Evidence

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Decision

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