IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND TAURANGA REGISTRY
CIV-2010-470-000052
UNDER the Trustee Act 1956
IN THE MATTER OF an application under ss 66, 67 and 68 of the Act in the ESTATE OF THOMAS JOHN FALOON
BETWEEN CLARENCE JOHN FALOON First Applicant
ANDRUTH ENID FALOON Second Applicant
ANDTHREE TRUSTEES IN THE 1977-YEAR DIVERSION OF THE KAWAU STREAM TRUST
Third Applicant
ANDPUBLIC TRUST Respondent
Hearing: 6 December 2011
Counsel: First Applicant in person
HGP Stokes for Respondent
Judgment: 6 December 2011
JUDGMENT OF ASHER J
Solicitors:
Public Trust, DX GX10100, Hamilton. Email: henry.stokes@publictrust.co.nz
Copy to:
CJ Faloon, 43B Twentieth Avenue, Tauranga 3112. Email: randcfaloon@clear.net.nz
FALOON V PUBLIC TRUST HC TAU CIV-2010-470-000052 6 December 2011
[1] Clarence John Faloon and Ruth Enid Faloon seek leave to appeal from a decision of Duffy J delivered on 15 August 2011.[1] In that decision Duffy J declined to grant a review of a decision of Associate Judge Doogue of 30 September 2010 striking out this proceeding.[2]
[1] Faloon v Public Trust HC Tauranga CIV-2010-470-52, 15 August 2011.
[2] Faloon v Public Trust HC Auckland CIV-2010-470-52, 30 September 2010.
[2] In the course of this application for leave he seeks to cross-examine Daniel Bernard O’Dea. Mr O’Dea is a senior trust officer for the Public Trust. He swore two affidavits of 5 May 2010 and 29 May 2010 on behalf of the Public Trust in support of its application to strike out. It is necessary to rule on whether under r 7.28 of the High Court Rules Mr O’Dea should be ordered to attend for cross- examination.
[3] Rule 7.28 provides that a Judge may “in special circumstances” order the attendance for cross-examination of a person who has made an affidavit in support of, or in opposition to, an interlocutory application. I have not heard argument on the point and am prepared to accept for the purposes of this decision that an application for leave to appeal is an interlocutory application within the ambit of r 7.28.
[4] The meaning of “special circumstances” was considered by the Court of
Appeal in Kidd v Van Heeren:[3]
There is no dispute that, as has been accepted in other contexts, “special circumstances” are wide, comprehensive and flexible words indicating something abnormal, uncommon or out of the ordinary but something less than extraordinary or unique ….
[3] Kidd v Van Heeren (1997) 11 PRNZ 422 (CA) at 424.
[5] Examination of some cases Sleeman v ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd,[4]
[4] Sleeman v ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd (1994) 7 PRNZ 508 (HC).
Burslem Holdings Ltd v G.B. & J.M. Bockett Ltd[5] and Walls & Roche Royal Oak
Pharmacy Ltd v Oceania Care Company (No 1) Ltd[6] indicates that when special circumstances are found any order for attendance for cross-examination is precisely
defined so as to be limited to a determinative or directly relevant issue of narrow ambit. I have not been referred to, and have not been able to find, any case where attendance for cross-examination…
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- Case
- [2011] NZHC 1791
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the court was whether Rule 7.28 of the High Court Rules permitted ordering the attendance for cross-examination of Mr O’Dea, given that the Faloon applicants had not sought to cross-examine him during the hearings for the strike-out application and the review application. The court considered whether the term "special circumstances" under Rule 7.28, which allows for such attendance in exceptional cases, applied to the present situation. The court also examined whether the circumstances of the offer of settlement, which Mr Faloon identified as relevant for cross-examination, were determinative or directly relevant to the issues at hand.
The court found that there were no special circumstances warranting the attendance of Mr O’Dea for cross-examination. The offer of settlement did not feature in the decisions of either Associate Judge Doogue or Duffy J, as their judgments focused on the pleadings and whether causes of action were made out. The court also noted that Mr Faloon had not sought to cross-examine Mr O’Dea during the earlier hearings, and no new circumstances had arisen to justify ordering his attendance for cross-examination in the leave application. The court concluded that even if leave to appeal were granted, it was unlikely that leave to cross-examine Mr O’Dea would be granted by the Court of Appeal. Therefore, the application for an order that Mr O’Dea attend for cross-examination was refused.
The court did not provide specific final orders but effectively denied the Faloon applicants' request for leave to cross-examine Mr O’Dea and upheld the decision to refuse the application for leave to appeal.
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