Faloon v Commissioner of Inland Revenue

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA208/2016
[2017] NZCA 5

BETWEEN	CLARENCE JOHN FALOON Applicant
AND	COMMISSIONER OF INLAND REVENUE Respondent

Court:

Randerson, Cooper and Winkelmann JJ

Counsel:

Applicant in person
D W Jacyk for Respondent

Judgment:

(On the papers)

9 February 2017 at 3 pm

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The second application for recall is declined.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Winkelmann J)

Mr Faloon has filed a second application for recall or reopening of the judgment delivered by us in this proceeding on 11 November 2016.[1]
[1]Faloon v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2016] NZCA 537.
In support of his application for recall, Mr Faloon seeks to advance arguments already raised and determined in these proceedings and in others. Mr Faloon does not therefore make out a ground for recall in accordance with the test established in Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2).[2]
[2]Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2) [1968] NZLR 632 (SC) at 633.
The second application for recall is declined.

Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Clarence John Faloon has applied for a recall or reopening of a judgment delivered by the Court of Appeal of New Zealand against the Commissioner of Inland Revenue. The matter, originally heard and decided in November 2016, involves the applicant's objections to certain tax assessments made by the Commissioner. The Court of Appeal, comprising Randerson, Cooper, and Winkelmann JJ, was asked to reconsider the earlier judgment. Faloon appeared in person while D W Jacyk represented the Commissioner. The Court handed down its decision on the second application for recall on 9 February 2017.

The central legal issue the Court addressed was whether there were sufficient grounds to recall or reopen the judgment made in the earlier proceedings. Mr Faloon argued that there were new grounds warranting reconsideration of the judgment. The Court needed to determine if these grounds met the stringent criteria for recalling a judgment, which are established in precedents such as Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2). The Court had to assess whether the arguments presented by Mr Faloon constituted exceptional circumstances that warranted a reopening of the case, or if they merely rehashed arguments that had already been considered and rejected.

The Court found that Mr Faloon's application did not meet the threshold for recalling the judgment. It concluded that the arguments he sought to advance had already been considered and resolved in previous proceedings. The Court emphasised that recall of a judgment is an exceptional remedy and is only granted in cases where there has been a manifest injustice or where significant new evidence has come to light. As Mr Faloon's arguments did not satisfy these conditions, the Court declined his application for recall. The Court's reasoning was rooted in the principle that repetitive or repackaged arguments do not constitute valid grounds for reopening a judgment.

The Court ordered that the second application for recall be declined. This decision reinforces the stringent criteria required for recalling a judgment and underscores the importance of presenting new and compelling arguments to warrant such a remedy. The Court's judgment stands, and the earlier decision remains in effect.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established