F v The King

[2024] NZHC 2383

ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF NAMES OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF THE PARTIES AND THE CHILD(REN).

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE

CRI-2024-409-133

CRI-2024-409-134 [2024] NZHC 2383

BETWEEN

F

Appellant

AND

THE KING

Respondent

Hearing:

22 August 2024

Appearances:

J D Lucas for Appellant

B W D Alexander for Respondent

Judgment:

23 August 2024

JUDGMENT OF EATON J

(appeal against sentence)

This judgment was delivered by me on …….. at ……… pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:

F v R [2024] NZHC 2383 [23 August 2024]

Introduction

[1]        Shortly before his scheduled trial, F1 pleaded guilty to two charges of sexual conduct with a child under 122 and two charges of indecent communication with a young person under 16.3

[2]        On 8 May 2024 F was sentenced to two years and three months’ imprisonment by Judge Crosbie. He appeals that sentence. He says the sentence is manifestly excessive and that the appropriate sentence is home detention.

Background facts

[3]        There are two victims of F’s offending. I will refer to them as victim one and victim two.

[4]        Victim one was F’s step-daughter. In 2015, she was aged around seven years. F took her for a drive up the Port Hills and for a period allowed her to steer the car while sitting in his lap. At one point he pulled the car over to the side of the road, he took the victim’s hand and put her hand inside his pants. As soon as she realised what was happening, she withdrew her hand from inside his pants. She thinks her hand was inside his pants for about two seconds.

[5]        In 2019, when aged about 11, victim one was at an address overnight where the appellant was residing. At around 4.00 am, F settled another child who was staying at the address and as he did so he asked victim one to go into the kitchen and speak with him. While in the kitchen, he took hold of her left wrist and attempted to put her hand down his pants. She resisted. He kept hold of her wrist and put his other hand under her clothing. She was wearing pyjama pants and underwear. He moved his hand underneath her clothing, touching her legs and stomach and he also moved his hand inside her underwear touching the exterior of her genitals. As he sexually assaulted the victim, he engaged her in conversation about plans for the day.

1      The appellant’s name is anonymized to protect the statutory suppression of the identities of the victims.

2      Crimes Act 1961, s 132(3) — maximum penalty 10 years’ imprisonment.

3      Section 124A — maximum penalty three years’ imprisonment.

[6]        Those two incidents are reflected in the charges of sexual conduct with a child under 12 years.

[7]        Victim two is the appellant’s biological daughter. Victim two went to stay with the appellant at a Christchurch address on an unknown date in 2018. She was aged eight years. He was watching a movie in the lounge. He went to his bedroom and called for the victim to join him. He sat on the bed and on several occasions suggested she touch his penis. He stood up to pull his pants down. Victim two made it clear she did not want to touch his penis. F again suggested she “play” with his penis, but she again refused and returned to the lounge. There was no physical sexual interaction. This incident is reflected in an indecent communication charge.

[8]        On a later occasion in 2018 victim two was staying at F’s address. He had purchased some confectionary. He typed a text on his mobile phone reading “you can have a kit-kat if you play with my thing, but if you don’t you can still have the kit-kat”. He showed the victim the text. The victim refused to play with his thing. F deleted the text without sending it. He then closed the curtains, placed a blanket over his lap on the couch, slid his pants down and touched his penis with his own hand. Again, this offending is reflected in an indecent communication charge.

Victim impact statements

[9]        Victim impact statements were provided by each of the victims’ mothers. Victim one’s mother said the offending had changed her as a mother, a person, a friend and as a partner. She expresses extreme guilt for not being able to protect her daughter, feeling she has failed as a mother. She now struggles to trust others.

[10]      Victim two’s mother says she too feels she has failed her daughter and expresses devastation that her later memories of her daughter [who tragically took her own life earlier this year] are tainted by the appellant’s offending.

District Court decision

[11]      The Judge acknowledged the victims, their families, the appellant’s wife, and her ongoing support of the appellant. The Judge observed that the guilty pleas were

entered at the call-over ten days before trial. The Judge assessed the primary sentencing purpose to be one of deterrence, both of the appellant personally and for the wider community, ensuring that a clear message is sent to those in positions of responsibility that if they abuse that trust they can expect to be dealt with seriously by the Court.

[12]      The Judge described the offending as being at the lower end of the spectrum and adopted a starting point of ten months for the Port Hills indecency, 16 months for the 2019 skin-on-skin offending and six months for the two indecent communication offences, leading to an overall starting point of 32 months’ imprisonment. The Judge resolved not to make any adjustment for totality, describing the indecencies committed against victim one as being four years apart and different in kind so as to require separate and discrete sentences. The Judge took the same view in relation to the indecent communication offending.

[13]      A five per cent deduction was permitted for the late guilty plea. A 10 per cent deduction was permitted to reflect the appellant’s personal background including trauma he faced as a child and the possibility of a connection between his childhood experiences and his offending. That deduction took into account the appellant’s rehabilitative steps in the form of counselling and medication.

[14]      Applying a global discount of 15 per cent, the Judge imposed an end sentence of two years and three months’ imprisonment. That sentence was applied to both sexual conduct charges, with a six-month concurrent sentence imposed for the indecent communication offending. Compulsory registration on the child sex offender register was ordered.

Principles on appeal

[15]      Appeals against sentence are allowed as of right by s 244 Criminal Procedure Act 2011 and must be determined in accordance with s 250. An appeal against sentence may be allowed by this Court only if it is satisfied that there has been an error in the imposition of the sentence and that a different sentence should be imposed.4 As

4      Criminal Procedure Act 2011, ss 250(2) and 250(3).

the Court of Appeal stated in Tutakangahau v R, with reference to the lower court’s decision, a “court will not intervene where the sentence is within the range that can properly be justified by accepted sentencing principles”.5 It is appropriate for this Court to intervene and substitute its own views only if the sentence being appealed is “manifestly excessive” and not justified by the relevant sentencing principles.6

Submissions

Appellant’s submissions

[16]      Mr Lucas submits the Judge erred in the application of the totality principle. First, Mr Lucas says the Judge was wrong not to have considered the totality principle after adjusting the sentence to reflect factors personal to the appellant. He submits that to do so is consistent with the approach taken by the Court in considering the gravity of the offending in the context of an application for a discharge without conviction. Secondly, Mr Lucas contends the Judge erred in declining to allow a totality adjustment.

[17]      Next,  Mr Lucas  submits  that  a deduction  of 15  per cent  rather than the  10 per cent allowed by the Judge was appropriate to reflect F’s personal circumstances as outlined in the report of clinical psychologist, Paul Neilson. He submits the Judge understated the degree of connection between events in the appellant’s childhood and his offending.

[18]      In support of the third ground of appeal, Mr Lucas seeks leave to file affidavits from F’s grandmother and his wife. These affidavits detail changes in the appellant’s family situation since his incarceration. Mr Lucas submits the “fresh” evidence highlights very serious consequences for both F’s grandmother and his wife and their new-born child. This factor is said to justify a further 10 per cent sentence deduction.

[19]      Overall, and without reliance on a totality deduction, Mr Lucas submits that from a starting point of 32 months’ imprisonment, the Judge should have imposed credits of five per cent for guilty plea, 15 per cent for background and rehabilitative

5      Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [36].

6      Ripia v R [2011] NZCA 101 at [15].

steps and 10 per cent for the impact on family, leading to an adjusted end sentence of

22.5 months’ imprisonment. He submits that a sentence of home detention is appropriate given the steps taken by F towards his rehabilitation. Mr Lucas refers to ss 16(1) and (2) of the Sentencing Act and the obligation of the court to impose a sentence short of imprisonment if that sentence meets the principles and purposes of sentencing.

Respondent’s submissions

[20]      Mr Alexander, for the Crown, submits the sentence of 27 months’ imprisonment was not manifestly excessive.

[21]      He submits the Judge did not err in declining to impose a totality deduction. He supports the 32-month starting point as being proportionate to the gravity of the offending.

[22]      Mr Alexander does not accept that the Judge failed to accurately portray the matters raised by Mr Neilson. He says Mr Neilson reached no clear conclusion as to a causative connection between F’s childhood experiences and his offending. He submits the Judge was alive to all matters raised in the Neilson report. Counsel contends that the 10 per cent deduction, which included recognition of rehabilitative efforts was adequate.

[23]      In relation to impact on family, Mr Alexander opposes the application for leave to adduce fresh evidence. He acknowledges the affidavits are credible and fresh but submits they could have no effect on the end sentence and so should not be admitted. Mr Alexander submits that personal or family hardship is inevitable when a sentence of imprisonment is imposed. He acknowledges that F’s wife has given birth to their child since F was incarcerated but highlights that it is not proposed F would be the primary caregiver of the child if he were to be released. Mr Alexander submits that the appellant has no existing bond with the child and the Court must not overlook that the index offending occurred within the context of a family relationship. He submits the evidence the appellant seeks to offer does not reach the threshold where it could be said a further sentence deduction is appropriate.

[24]      Addressing the question of home detention, Mr Alexander submits the offending was too serious to be met by a sentence short of imprisonment. He says the sentencing purposes of denunciation and deterrence require a sentence of imprisonment.

Analysis

Totality

[25]Section 85 of the Sentencing Act relevantly provides:

85       Court to consider totality of offending

(1)Subject to this section, if a court is considering imposing sentences of imprisonment for 2 or more offences, the individual sentences must reflect the seriousness of each offence.

(2)If cumulative sentences of imprisonment are imposed, whether individually or in combination with concurrent sentences, they must not result in a total period of imprisonment wholly out of proportion to the gravity of the overall offending.

[26]      Having assessed an overall starting point of 32 months’ imprisonment, the Judge resolved that a totality deduction was not required. The Judge observed that the two offences in relation to victim one were separated by four years and considered those offences to be different in kind. That led the Judge to conclude that separate and discrete sentences were appropriate. In a similar vein, the Judge described the indecent communication offending as “separate, different in kind and one that requires a discrete sentence”.

[27]      Mr Lucas submits that it was not suggested that the different offences did not justify a discrete sentence. The live issue was whether, having assessed the appropriate cumulative sentences for the discrete offences, a 32-month term of imprisonment was “wholly out of proportion to the gravity of the overall offending”.7 He challenges the Judge’s categorisation of the offences as different in kind.

[28]      Other than the age of the victim, what distinguished the two offences against victim one was that over and above the act of trying to put the victim’s hand inside his

7      Sentencing Act 2002, s 85(2).

pants, on the second occasion the appellant put his hand down the victim’s pants, touching her genitals. Further, the Port Hills incident did not involve skin-on-skin contact. Of real significance, both offences involve genital touching with a related child. I agree with Mr Lucas that both offences are similar in kind.

[29]      The first indecent communication occurred on an unknown date in 2018. That was in effect an attempt to get victim two touch the appellant’s penis. The second offence, later that year was again an attempt to get the victim touch his penis. That latter occasion was accompanied by the appellant engaging in an act of low-level masturbation in front of the victim. I also consider that offending to be similar in kind, albeit at a lower level than the offending against victim one.

[30]      In all four instances the appellant sought to either touch the victim’s genitals or to get the victim to touch his genitals. Both victims were very young and, at the time, in the care of the appellant. I regard the offending as reflecting an ongoing pattern of similar conduct and engaging the totality principle.

[31]      The Judge did consider the totality principle. He did so at what is described as the first stage of  sentencing  —  when  assessing  the  appropriate  starting  point.  Mr Lucas submits this was an error. He relies on the brief observation of Cooke J in Giles v R where the Judge said the totality assessment should be made at the end of the sentencing methodology.8 Mr Lucas says a totality deduction should be considered at stage two of sentencing — after consideration of personal aggravating and mitigating factors.

[32]      In Dudley-Tough v R Johnstone J dealt with the opposite argument.9 In that case, the appellant submitted the sentencing Judge erred in considering totality after stage two of sentencing. The appellant had argued, with reference to Polaapau v R10 and Jacobson v R11 that totality should be considered prior to consideration of personal factors in order to avoid the risk of a disproportionate response to offending being masked by meritorious personal circumstances of the offender. Johnstone J described

8      Giles v R [2020] NZHC 2372 at [47].

9      Dudley-Tough v R [2023] NZHC 3459.

10     Polaapau v R [2020] NZCA 227.

11     Jacobson v R [2023] NZHC 1358.

the law on the timing of the totality assessment as “unsettled” and referred to the conflicting approaches in the authorities. Johnstone J did not consider it necessary to express a view as to the timing issue.

[33]      I am not persuaded the Judge erred in considering totality at stage one of sentencing. I respectfully agree with the views expressed by Campbell J in Jacobson12 and the observation that:

If totality is considered only after allowances have been made for personal factors, there is a risk that the totality assessment is influenced by factors that are irrelevant to the gravity of the offending.

[34]      Mr Lucas rightly observes that in considering an application for a discharge without conviction factors personal to the offender are considered in the assessment of the gravity of the offence. But I have doubts as to whether that approach is appropriate in the of application of the totality principle.

[35]      An application for a discharge without conviction requires the Court to engage in a proportionality evaluation to determine whether a conviction should be entered.13 Factors personal to an offender and that mitigate or aggravate the offending must be considered in sentencing “or otherwise dealing with an offender”.14 Within the s107 evaluation, the only opportunity for mitigating factors personal to the offender to be considered is under the umbrella of the gravity of the offending.

[36]      The totality principle comes into play post-conviction, and only if the Court is imposing cumulative sentences of imprisonment. The purpose of the totality principle is to ensure that when imposing cumulative sentences, the total period of imprisonment is not wholly out of proportion to the gravity of the overall offending. Having made that assessment, and on application of the orthodox sentencing approach prescribed in Moses,15 the Court will then consider personal mitigating (and aggravating) factors.

12 Above n 11 at [14].

13     Sentencing Act 2002, s 107.

14     Section 9.

15     Moses v R [2020] NZCA 296.

[37]      In my view the approach adopted for considering an application for a discharge without conviction is particular to addressing the s 107 proportionality evaluation. I prefer the view that the gravity of the overall offending for the purposes of s 85 requires the Court to focus on the accumulated starting point. Post-conviction, an offender’s personal circumstances are properly considered at stage two of sentencing.

[38]      As the Supreme Court observed in Hessell, the sentencing Judge “in the end, must stand back and decide whether the outcome of the process followed is the right sentence”.16 The argument advanced by Mr Lucas that a totality deduction should be considered at the end of the sentencing process does not, in my view sit comfortably with that approach and supports the view that totality should be considered at the first stage.

[39]      I did not hear full argument on this issue. Further, F’s appeal is not the opportunity to resolve the “unsettled issue” as to the timing of a totality deduction because in my view, at whatever stage that principle might be considered, neither the adjusted starting point of 32 months’ imprisonment nor the end sentence of 27 months’ imprisonment could be described as wholly out of proportion to the gravity of the overall offending.

[40]      This offending involved two child victims, a relationship of the utmost trust, repeat offending against each victim and an incident of skin-on-skin genital touching. That is very serious offending. The start and end sentences assessed by the Judge were within range. I therefore find myself in agreement with the Judge, albeit for different reasons, that a deduction for totality was not available.

Neilson report

[41]      In Berkland v R the Supreme Court considered the impact of background factors on a sentence and the degree of connection between background and offending required in order to justify a sentence deduction.17 The standard adopted was that of “causative contribution”.18

16     Hessell v R [2010] NZSC 135, [2011] 1 NZLR 607 at [77].

17     Berkland v R [2022] NZSC 143.

18 At [109].

[42]      In sentencing F, the Judge said “Mr Neilson does not go so far as saying that what  occurred to  you is the cause of your offending” and further “I do not  have   Mr Neilson saying that there is a clear nexus between what occurred to you…and what you did to these children”.

[43]      Notwithstanding the absence of a clear causal contribution, the Judge allowed a 10 per cent deduction reflecting the possibility of a connection and the initial rehabilitative efforts made by F. Mr Lucas says there was a direct connection and not a mere possibility of a connection between the trauma F faced as a child and his offending. He highlights the following paragraph from the report:

It would seem that many of these identified dynamic personal and interpersonal deficits likely have their roots in the [abusive treatment he experienced in the hands of his mother] up to his late teens.

[44]      Mr Neilson, in reliance on F’s account, described a picture of F’s mother behaving in a callous, [redacted] manner with her naïve son, [redacted]. The report refers to the consequences  of  that  abuse,  including  F  experiencing  [redacted].  Mr Neilson described this as progressing to [redacted]. He refers to the added complication of his mother’s abuse as leading F to confuse physical [redacted] with emotional intimacy.

[45]      Mr Neilson identified a common feature of F’s offending being that he was in an angry, frustrated mood with either [redacted]. This is described as often relating to the current status of F’s relationship [redacted]. Mr Neilson described F as using sexual arousal and gratification as a means of managing his feelings of anger and frustration.

[46]      Mr Neilson concluded that when the relevant static, dynamic factors and clinical factors are taken into account, using best practice applied to F, he has found to have a number of the static and dynamic factors associated with offending sexually and rates an estimate of moderate-high risk of future sexual offending. Of particular interest is that his main contributors to risk of re-offending come from his deficits in personal and social skills areas, dynamic factors that are amenable to change.

[47]      I agree with Mr Alexander that Mr Neilson’s report does not go so far as to identify any clear and relevant causal connection with his offending. Mr Lucas invites the Court to infer a more direct causal connection. I do not think that is appropriate.  I am satisfied the Judge did not err in his assessment of Mr Neilson’s report or its relevance in assessing F’s culpability. The discount of 10 per cent to reflect background factors and rehabilitative measures was within range.

Family separation

[48]      The principles that apply in considering whether fresh evidence ought to be admitted on appeal have been helpfully summarised by the Court  of Appeal  in Mark v R as follows:19

The principles for assessing the admissibility of fresh evidence for appeals against conviction are now well established. There is no reason why different principles should be engaged where an appellant wishes to adduce fresh evidence for an appeal against sentence. Thus, if the fresh evidence is not credible it should not be admitted. If it is credible, an assessment needs to be made as to whether or not it could have been presented to the sentencing Court with reasonable diligence. If the evidence is both credible and fresh it should be admitted unless the appellate court is satisfied it would have had no effect on the sentence. If the evidence is credible but not fresh, the appellate court should assess its strength and its potential impact on the sentence. If the appellate court considers that the sentence could be manifestly excessive if the evidence is excluded, then it should be admitted notwithstanding that it is not fresh.

(footnote omitted)

[49]      It is not contested that the affidavits from the appellant’s grandmother and partner are both credible and fresh. Essentially, they address matters that have arisen since his incarceration.

[50]      Both affidavits raise personal circumstances that I accept have caused and will continue to cause distress to F’s family. I accept he has a longstanding and close relationship with his grandmother and that her most recent medical diagnosis is such that his unavailability to offer her both practical and emotional support will negatively impact her wellbeing. Further, it is clear that F’s wife has endured had a very recent and troubling childbirth and that over and above the struggles of being denied the

19     Mark v R [2019] NZCA 121 at [16].

immediate support of F, she is struggling with the additional pressures of raising a baby on her own.

[51]      It is a regrettable reality that incarceration will cause hardship to third parties and more particularly to family members. Circumstances will inevitably arise during the course of incarceration where the unavailability of the offender to provide support to family members aggravates any hardship the family member might then face.

[52]      I am not persuaded there are any grounds for a discrete deduction to reflect the hardship  caused  by  F’s  incarceration  for  his  grandmother  or  wife.   I  accept  Mr Alexander’s submission that the consequences outlined in the affidavits do not reach the threshold to justify a sentence deduction.

[53]      Further, I am not satisfied that a deduction is appropriate to reflect F’s separation from his new born child.

[54]As I have recently recognised:20

The factors to consider when assessing whether a discount is appropriate to reflect parental separation include the importance of children growing up in a familial environment, absence of remorse or lack of rehabilitative steps taken, whether the defendant is the primary caregiver, the nature and seriousness of the offending, the loss of a supportive presence in the family home, and the strength of the bond with the child and the impact imprisonment may have.

(footnotes omitted)

[55]      F has admitted sexual offending against children in his care. Although, I accept he has taken the first step on the path to rehabilitation, he has some way to go. The new born child is in the full-time care of F’s partner. Whilst of course, I acknowledge that the bond between father and child faces real challenges when contact is initially limited to prison visits, I am not satisfied that a discrete deduction is available.

[56]I decline leave to adduce the evidence from F’s grandmother and wife.

20     Allen v R [2024] NZHC 1972 at [38].

[57]      Standing back, I am satisfied the sentence of 27 months’ imprisonment was not manifestly excessive.

Would home detention be appropriate?

[58]      A focus of Mr Lucas’s submission is that a sentence of home detention is the least restrictive appropriate outcome. I have found that the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive and so the question of home detention does not arise. Had I concluded otherwise, I would not have commuted the sentence to one of home detention.

[59]      The central sentencing purposes at play are denunciation and deterrence, holding the offender accountable for the offending and the offender’s rehabilitation. The Judge was right to focus on deterrence.

[60]      As a starting point, any sexual offending against a child will be assessed as very serious. In Mullan v R,21 Palmer J helpfully drew together relevant case law involving sexual offending against children and both the availability and appropriateness of a sentence of home detention in such cases. As the Judge observed, sexual offending against children will usually attract a sentence of imprisonment, however the option of home detention is available and must be carefully considered on a case-by-case basis.22

[61]      In 2011 the Court of Appeal in Kennedy v R observed that “it will be recognised that the likely sentencing outcome for sexual offending against children is imprisonment”.23

[62]In ZZ (CA369/11) v R24 the Court again acknowledged that:

In practice the nature and degree of an offender’s culpability in sexual offending against young children will frequently require imposition of a sentence of imprisonment even where the term is below two years.

21     Mullan v R [2022] NZHC 3053.

22 At [10].

23     Kennedy v R [2011] NZCA 569 at [8].

24     ZZ (CA369/11) v R [2011] NZCA 662 at [36].

However, the Court did expressly acknowledge that exceptional circumstances need not be established for home detention to be imposed.

[63]      Mr Lucas referred to Parkin v R25 as an example of an appellate Court commuting a sentence of imprisonment to one of home detention for sexual offending against a young person. Mr Parkin was sentenced in 2018 on two charges of indecent assault on a girl, a relative of his then wife, aged 11 or 12 between May 1980 and August 1981, some 37 years prior to his sentencing. The offender had put his hand inside the victim’s pyjama top, fondling her chest around her nipples before caressing her inner thighs and vagina. On a different occasion while sitting at the dinner table he exposed his erect penis, made the victim sit on his thigh and took her hands and made her stroke his penis several times before saying, “I’m sorry”. No immediate complaint was made. In 1992 the offending was disclosed to the victim’s mother, who contacted the Police. The victim did not wish to pursue the matter to prosecution. In the mid-1990s the victim confronted the appellant directly. He apologised. The offending was not reported to the police again until 2016.

[64]      The Court considered the Judge’s failure to take into account the lapse of time since the offending to be a material error. That lapse of time negated the need to deter the appellant from further offending or to protect the community from him. The Court also relied on the opinion of the pre-sentence report writer who assessed the appellant as being a low risk of reoffending and supported a sentence of home detention.

[65]      As Mr Lucas highlights, in Parkin the Court referred to a small number of cases where an offender had been sentenced to home detention for child sexual offending. But ultimately each case must be determined on its own merits and a review of the applicable sentencing purposes and principles. Mr Lucas places great emphasis on F’s prospects for rehabilitation given he has engaged with Mr Neilson. He submits that rehabilitative options will be far more accessible to F in the community than within the prison.

[66]      F has offended against two children with whom he had a relationship of trust and care. The offending involved a significant breach of that trust. By virtue of the

25     Parkin v R [2018] NZCA 404.

children’s age, they were highly vulnerable. This was not one-off offending. In relation to each child, he offended twice. One of the offences involved skin-on-skin contact. But for the resistance of the victims to F’s sexual advances, it is inevitable that further skin-on-skin offending would have taken place.

[67]      There is no single category of case for which a sentence of home detention might be seen as unavailable, but in my view the relevant sentencing purposes and principles in play in a case of child sexual offending involving the aggravating features that arise in this case, do not permit an end sentence short of imprisonment.

[68]      I acknowledge that F’s rehabilitation might be better served in the community but, with the progress he has made through the involvement of Mr Neilson, further rehabilitative measures can be made through either courses that might be made available within the prison, psychological counselling that might be available within the prison or privately, or otherwise as conditions of his ultimate release.

Result

[69]The appeal is dismissed.

...................................................

Eaton J

Solicitors:
Crown Solicitors, Christchurch

Counsel:
J D Lucas, Barrister, Christchurch