Ewens v The Queen - [2014] NZCA 318

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA11/2014
[2014] NZCA 318

BETWEEN	STEVEN JASON EWENS Appellant
AND	THE QUEEN Respondent

Hearing:	8 July 2014
Court:	Wild, Ronald Young and Cooper JJ
Counsel:	J J Corby for Appellant BCL Charmley for Respondent
Judgment:	14 July 2014 at 10 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The appeal, which is against conviction, is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Wild J)

There is no merit in the short point taken on this appeal.
Mr Ewens was at a party in suburban Auckland. A fight had broken out with punching and kicking. One of the people involved had an air rifle. Another was waving a pole around.
The appellant fetched a shotgun from his vehicle, went into the house and loaded the gun, then went outside and fired it. That had the effect of breaking up the fight and also the party. The police arrived shortly afterwards.
When the police spoke to Mr Ewens, he denied he had been at the party. The following day he told the police that was a lie and he had been there. He continued to deny that he had a gun or had fired it.
Mr Ewens went to trial in the Auckland District Court on one charge of possession of a firearm in a public place and one charge of reckless discharge of a firearm. Those are offences under ss 51 and 53(3) of the Arms Act 1983 respectively. He was convicted on both charges but appeals only against the reckless discharge conviction.
At trial Mr Ewens’ defences were:
(a)he had not fired the gun;
(b)alternatively, if the jury accepted he had fired the gun, he had reasonable excuse to fire it (although what that excuse was was not explicit in the defence closing).
The challenge on appeal is to this part of Judge Mathers’ summing up:[1]
[46] Here the issue is whether you think that Mr Ewens acted reasonably, not whether he thought he acted reasonably. You might well think that firing a firearm in the circumstances described to you in a residential area with a number of people in the vicinity might not be considered reasonable but that is a matter for you of course.
[1]R v Ewens DC Auckland CRI-2013-004-0756, 21 November 2013 (Summing Up).
Mr Corby submits this observation trespasses into the province of the jury and renders the reckless discharge verdict unsafe.
For three reasons, we reject this. First, as this Court reiterated in Waara v R,[2] trial judges are not precluded from expressing views to the jury about the facts of the case, as long as they make it clear it is for the jury to determine the facts. Here, Judge Mathers’ “you might well think” comment was immediately followed by her statement “but that is a matter for you of course”.
[2]Waara v R [2010] NZCA 517 at [59].
Secondly, the Judge also directed the jury in the usual way that it was for the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2014] NZCA 318
Decision Date: 14 July 2014 at 10 am

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, Steven Jason Ewens, the appellant, challenged his conviction for reckless discharge of a firearm, an offence under the Arms Act 1983. The appeal was heard by Wild, Ronald Young, and Cooper JJ, and the judgment was delivered on 14 July 2014. Ewens was involved in a party that escalated into a violent altercation. He retrieved a shotgun from his vehicle and fired it outside, effectively breaking up the fight and dispersing the party. Ewens denied being present at the party and having fired the shotgun, but later admitted to the police that he had lied about his presence. He was convicted in the Auckland District Court on charges of possession of a firearm in a public place and reckless discharge of a firearm, but only appealed against the latter conviction.

The central legal issue in this appeal was whether the trial judge's summing up improperly influenced the jury's decision. Specifically, the appellant argued that the judge's comment, "You might well think that firing a firearm in the circumstances described to you in a residential area with a number of people in the vicinity might not be considered reasonable," improperly expressed a view on the facts. This, it was submitted, rendered the verdict unsafe. The court considered whether the judge's comments exceeded the permissible bounds of judicial guidance and whether they influenced the jury's determination of the facts. The court found that the judge's remarks were permissible because they were immediately followed by a clear statement that it was for the jury to determine the facts. Additionally, the judge had repeatedly directed the jury that the facts were for them to decide and provided a question trail to assist in their deliberations. Given these factors, the court concluded that the judge's comments did not improperly influence the jury's decision, and the appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal confirmed that the trial judge's comments did not render the verdict unsafe. The court emphasized that the judge made it clear that it was for the jury to determine the facts and reiterated this point multiple times in the summing up. Furthermore, the judge provided a structured question trail to guide the jury through their deliberations, which helped ensure that the jury's decision was based on the evidence and the applicable legal standards. The court held that the appellant's appeal against conviction was without merit, and the conviction for reckless discharge of a firearm was upheld.

Orders