Eight One Two Limited v Ryan

[2025] NZHC 3029

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2025-404-000492 [2025] NZHC 3029

UNDER  the Personal Property Securities Act 1999

IN THE MATTER OF       Financing Statement number

FA2N8Y5H3MA9G884 and F75KAJ4D85B24R69

BETWEEN  EIGHT ONE TWO LIMITED

Applicant

AND  MATTHEW PETER RYAN

Respondent

Hearing:                   On the papers

Appearances:           R McNaughton for the Applicant

S Dalgleish for the Respondent

Judgment:                14 October 2025

JUDGMENT OF WALKER J

[Costs]

This judgment was delivered by me on 14 October 2025 at 11 am Pursuant to Rule 11.5 High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:

MBC Law Limited, Auckland Peter Brinsley, Wellington

EIGHT ONE TWO LIMITED v RYAN [2025] NZHC 3029 [14 October 2025]

[1]    A bitter dispute between former associates Laurence  Pope,  director  of  Eight One Two Limited (Eight One Two), and Matthew Ryan resulted in an application by Eight One Two to remove a financing statement from the personal property securities register  under  Part  10  of  the  Personal  Property  Securities  Act 1999.1 The registrations related to cars sold by Eight One Two in the course of its business selling luxury and high-performance cars.

[2]    There were procedural irregularities from the outset including an omission to file an originating document to commence the proceeding. While that was regularised, the state of the filings has been problematic ever since.

[3]    Mr Ryan opposed the removal. He sought amendment to the financing statement to include other vehicles owned by Eight One Two, alleging that the security interest proffered by Mr Pope in support of the loan to him was not owned by Mr Pope or his business. Mr Ryan applied for interlocutory injunctive relief to “perfect” his security interest over the collateral purportedly offered by Mr Pope by substituting other vehicles in the Eight One Two fleet.2

[4]    Eight One Two opposed the application for injunctive relief on various grounds. It contends that no valid security exists, the loan (if any) has been repaid, and it has offered security over two luxury high-value vehicles as a compromise until matters are resolved by agreement or the Court determines the issues between the parties.

[5]    I pause to note that this was one of a suite of claims and cross-claims between the protagonists, which also included the lodging of caveats against titles to land owned by other entities associated with Mr Pope.

[6]    Various interlocutory skirmishes followed and a half-day hearing was allocated.

1      Interlocutory  application  on  notice  for  an  order  to  remove  a  financing  statement,  dated  24 February 2025.

2      Interlocutory application on notice in support of an urgent application for injunctive relief opposing that a financing statement be removed but maintained by way of a court order, dated 21 March 2025.

[7]    Mr Ryan then applied to vacate the hearing on several grounds including non-compliance with timetabling directions.3 Eight One Two opposed the application. The Civil List Judge declined to vacate the hearing and urged the parties and respective counsel to focus on resolving their substantive dispute rather than engaging in procedural wrangling.4

[8]    The parties filed a joint consent memorandum dated 29 May 2025. The Court made orders/directions accordingly by minute on 3 June 2025 as follows:5

(a)Mr Ryan will immediately remove all financing statements except for:

(i)Nissan Skyline 1989 GTR, registration number GZILR; and

(ii)Dodge Challenger RT plus, registration number LLM899.

(b)The parties will cooperate in good faith in the appointment of an independent mechanic and valuer to assess the motor vehicles outlined [above] within 10 days. If the parties cannot agree on an independent mechanic or valuer, either party may request that the president of the New Zealand Law Society make the appointment.

(c)Mr Ryan  is to file his substantive claim against Eight One Two  by  27 June  2025.  If  Mr  Ryan  does  not  file  his  substantive  claim   by 27 June 2025, then the remaining financing statements against the vehicles [above] will become invalid. Mr Ryan must then remove all financing statements. Mr Ryan will have no further security interest from that point on.

(d)Mr Ryan undertakes to the Court that he or any associated person or entity will not register further financing statements against any current

3      Interlocutory application on notice for an order to vacate hearing, dated 8 May 2025.

4      Eight One Two Limited v Ryan, HC Auckland CIV-2025-404-492, dated 13 May 2025. (Minute of Gault J).

5      Eight One Two Limited v Ryan, HC Auckland CIV-2025-404-492, dated 3 June 2025. (Minute of Walker J).

or after-acquired property of Eight One Two, Mr Pope, or any entity associated with him.

[9]    The consent memorandum referred to payment of half of the scheduled hearing costs by Mr Ryan in the sum of $416 and reserved costs until determination of the substantive matter.

Next steps

[10]   The next step  so  far  as  the  Court  is  concerned,  is  that  counsel  for  Eight One Two filed a memorandum dated 3 July 2025 noting that Mr Ryan had not filed a substantive claim against it and seeking costs. It noted that other matters between the parties were before the Court on 15 July 2025, and sought a direction that costs could be dealt with at that date.

[11]   Regrettably, delay at the Court’s end prompted a further memorandum from counsel for Eight One Two. That memorandum confirmed that as at 18 July 2025, Mr Ryan had not filed any substantive claim in the District or High Court and reiterated the costs claim, seeking indemnity costs in the matter. No affidavit evidence or invoices were filed in support of the claim to indemnity costs.

[12]   Counsel for Mr Ryan responded by memorandum dated 18 July 2025, opposing the request for directions. Counsel submitted:

(a)Eight One Two had failed to provide access to two motor vehicles for independent inspection and valuation as stipulated in the directions made by consent.

(b)This was a material breach of a key term and demonstrated a lack of good faith.

(c)The consent directions mandated that Eight One Two provide access to the vehicles within 10 days to facilitate the process of valuation.

(d)On 9 June 2025, an email was sent to counsel for Eight One Two proposing arrangements for inspection and valuation but no response was received.

(e)The assertion that Mr Ryan was required to file a substantive claim  by 27 June 2025 is misconceived, because the terms of the consent memorandum required that all conditions be met sequentially and the breach by Eight One Two disentitled it to rely on other terms.

(f)Mr Ryan intends to file pleadings in the High Court against Mr Pope personally along with Eight One Two.

(g)The application for costs is premature and unfounded as no notice of discontinuance has been filed. Further, any delay lies squarely with Eight One Two’s failure to comply with the terms of the consent position.

[13]Instead, counsel for Mr Ryan sought directions whereby:

(a)Eight One Two must confirm access to the motor vehicles within five working days; and

(b)On appointment of a valuer and delivery of the valuation to both parties, taking into account the mechanical soundness of the motor vehicles, Mr Ryan is to have three weeks to file substantive pleadings.

[14]   As I apprehend it, the position would be a return to that immediately following the making of the consent directions.

[15]   The response on behalf of Eight One Two denied an obligation of good faith, stating in a memorandum by counsel:6

6      Updating memorandum of counsel (for Eight One Two) as to costs, dated 18 July 2025.

Having the two cars valued and a mechanic entering the respondent’s premises served no purpose. It was simply a waste of money for both parties. Good faith was not a term of the agreement reached between counsel. Mr Ryan had until 27 June 2025 to file his substantive claim, and he did not.

[16]   This response flies in the face of clause 3(b) of the joint consent memorandum of counsel dated 29 May 2025 and the orders/directions made by this Court in reliance on the consent position reached.7

[17]   Mr Ryan continues to oppose the discontinuance of the proceedings and the costs application.8 By memorandum of 26 August 2025, counsel for Mr Ryan indicated that he had instructions to file a substantive claim on Mr Ryan’s behalf and sought a direction to do so within 30 days from the date of the memorandum.9 Counsel also signalled an intention to consolidate all related matters into the substantive claim, describing these as “claims related to barrister costs for wrongful arrest, action in contract, the Grey Rhino Trust and other interrelated matters.” Counsel submitted that any costs determination should be held over until conclusion of the intended substantive proceedings.

Costs

[18]   The first question is whether an application for costs is justified. The consequence of failing to file a substantive claim within the stipulated period is that Mr Ryan’s application is brought to an end and Eight One Two achieved the outcome it sought on its application to remove the financing statement. I accept that it is clear that these stipulations in the consent directions are triggered by Mr Ryan’s omission to file a substantive claim. To be clear, it does not follow that fresh proceedings cannot be brought by Mr Ryan as signalled. What cannot stand at present, however, is the financing statement currently registered.

[19]   The attitude taken by Eight One Two in respect of the commitment to cooperate in good faith in the appointment of an independent mechanic is vexing and inadequately explained. Nonetheless, the obligations of each party in respect of those

7 See [8](b) above.

8      Memorandum of counsel for (Mr Ryan) seeking directions regarding substantive claim and vehicle inspection and opposing discontinuance and costs, dated 26 August 2025.

9      Enquiries with the Registry disclose that no substantive proceedings have been filed.

directions are not co-dependent so this is not disentitling conduct to the consequential orders in the consent orders.

[20]   All matters relating to costs are discretionary.10 The discretion must be exercised on a principled basis and, so far as possible, the determination of costs should be predictable and expeditious.11 The usual rule is that costs follow the event; the party who fails with respect to a proceeding (including an application) pays costs to the successful party.12 However, it must not be overlooked that the overall objective of costs determinations is to achieve an outcome that best meets the interests of justice.

[21]   Under r 14.6(3) of the High Court Rules 2016 (HCR), a court may make an order for a party to pay increased costs if:

(3)The court may order a party to pay increased costs if—

(a)the nature of the proceeding or the step in it is such that the time required by the party claiming costs would substantially exceed the time allocated under band C; or

(b)the party opposing costs has contributed unnecessarily to the time or expense of the proceeding or step in it by—

(i)failing to comply with these rules or with a direction of the court; or

(ii)taking or pursuing an unnecessary step or an argument that lacks merit; or

(iii)failing, without reasonable justification, to admit facts, evidence, documents, or accept a legal argument; or

(iv)failing, without reasonable justification, to comply with an order for discovery, a notice for further particulars, a notice for interrogatories, or other similar requirement under these rules; or

(v)failing, without reasonable justification, to accept an offer of settlement whether in the form of an offer under rule 14.10 or some other offer to settle or dispose of the proceeding; or

(c)the proceeding is of general importance to persons other than just the parties and it was reasonably necessary for the party

10     High Court Rules 2016, r 14.1.

11     Rule 14.2(1)(g).

12     Rule 14.2(1)(a).

claiming costs to bring it or participate in it in the interests of those affected; or

(d)some other reason exists which justifies the court making an order for increased costs despite the principle that the determination of costs should be predictable and expeditious.

[22]   Generally, increased costs may be ordered where there is a failure by the paying party to act reasonably.13 However, increased and indemnity costs are the exception rather than the rule.

[23]   The asserted basis for the claim to indemnity costs of $37,103.57 in relation to the defence of the interlocutory application brought by Mr Ryan is that the application was vexatious and should never have been brought. Eight One Two also seeks additional costs of $1,748 which it says it has incurred since 16 June 2025. I apprehend these primarily relate to the costs claim.

[24]   As already noted no invoices have been provided but, in any event, I am not satisfied there is any disclosed basis for increased or indemnity costs in the material submitted. In my view, the apparent omission by Eight One Two to follow one of the directed steps also precludes a claim to increased costs, even if otherwise justified.

[25]   Instead, I make an order for 2B costs  and  disbursements  in  favour  of  Eight One Two in respect of the removal of the financing statements and opposition to  the  interlocutory  injunction  filed  by  Mr  Ryan.  Chiefly,  this  is  because  Eight One Two is notionally the successful party as a result of Mr Ryan’s failure to file his substantive claims in accordance with this Court’s directions of 3 June 2025, the agreed consequences of which match the relief Eight One Two sought.

[26]   However, the submitted schedule of costs is confusing, duplicative and overstates the steps taken. The scheduled half day hearing on 29 May 2025 was reduced to an hour-long hearing once a consent position was intimated. Neither is costs on costs justified in the circumstances of this case. In my assessment, only the following steps are allowable on a 2B basis:

13     Bradbury v Westpac Banking Corporation [2009] NZCA 234, [2009] 3 NZLR 400 at [27].

(a)Item 37:14 Originating application seeking removal of financing statements and supporting affidavit — $4,780.

(b)Item 38: Notice of opposition to application for maintenance of financing statement and supporting affidavit — $2,390 replicative of

(a) above, so restricted to 50 per cent of $4,780).

(c)Item  11: Memoranda  dated  20  March  2025,  6  May  2025 and 29 May 2025 — 0.8 days or $1,912. (reduced given limited content and purpose of memorandum)15

(d)Item  24:   Preparation  of  submissions  for  hearing   —  1.5  days    or $3,585.

(e)Item 31: Preparation of common bundle — 0.6 days or $1,434.

(f)Item 26:16 Appearance (short hearing of one hour) on 29 May 2025 —

0.25 days or $597.50.

Total 2B costs of $14,698.50

[27]   In addition, filing disbursements of $621 in respect of the notices of opposition and sealing order are claimable, along with the half cost of the scheduling fee of $416.

Result

[28]   The remaining financing statements against the following vehicles must be removed by Mr Ryan:

(i)Nissan Skyline 1989 GTR, registration number GZILR; and

(ii)Dodge Challenger RT plus, registration number LLM899.

14     Category correction in accordance with High Court Rules, sch 3.

15     Other memoranda for which a claim for costs was made are expressly excluded on the basis they were not necessary.

16     Category correction in accordance with High Court Rules, sch 3.

[29]These proceedings are at an end.

[30]   I make a costs order in favour of Eight One Two against Mr Ryan in the sum of $15,735.50.

............................................................

Walker J