Edwards v District Court, Dunedin
[2013] NZHC 3049
•18 November 2013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND DUNEDIN REGISTRY
CIV-2013-412-000001 [2013] NZHC 3049
BETWEEN JOHN ANTHONY EDWARDS Applicant
ANDTHE DISTRICT COURT, DUNEDIN First Respondent
ANDTHE DISTRICT COURT, OAMARU Second Respondent
ANDWAITAKI DISTRICT COUNCIL Third Respondent
Hearing: 14 November 2013
Counsel: J A Edwards in person
P G Hope for Third Respondent
Judgment: 18 November 2013
JUDGMENT OF PANCKHURST J
An application for judicial review
[1] In December 2012 Mr Edwards filed this application for judicial review, naming the District Court at both Dunedin and Oamaru as first and second respondents, respectively. District Court Judges sitting in those Courts had made decisions, or given directions, which Mr Edwards challenges by way of review. These respondents abide the decision of the Court, whereas the Waitaki District Council opposes the application through counsel, Mr Hope.
[2] The genesis of this proceeding is a District Court judgment in favour of the Waitaki District Council (the Council) by which Mr Edwards was ordered to pay rates arrears, and penalties, totalling $9,871.55 plus interest and costs. As best I can
tell the review concerns various interlocutory orders or directions made prior to the
EDWARDS v THE DISTRICT COURT, DUNEDIN AND ORS [2013] NZHC 3049 [18 November 2013]
entry of judgment, as well as challenge to preliminary rulings made by Judge Doherty before he entered judgment for the arrears in favour of the Council. It does not seem that any of the grounds raised in the statement of claim relate directly to the substance of the dispute, rather to aspects of the District Court proceeding that occurred prior to the entry of judgment.
[3] Mr Edwards lives in Lower Hutt. In light of previous difficulties in securing his attendance at hearings, a hearing of the proceeding by way of an audio visual linkup between Christchurch, Wellington and Oamaru was arranged and argument was heard in this manner. I have concluded that the application for review must be dismissed. The following brief reasons explain why I have reached this conclusion.
The District Court proceeding
[4] In May 2009 the Council filed a claim in the District Court seeking judgment for unpaid rates, penalties and interest relating to two properties in Oamaru of which Mr Edwards is the registered owner. The arrears had accrued over the six previous years. Mr Edwards filed a statement of defence by which he challenged that the arrears were payable.
[5] On 21 September 2009 the proceeding was transferred from Oamaru to the Dunedin District Court. On 29 October 2009 Judge Kellar presided at a settlement conference. Settlement of the case did not result. Administrative directions were then made for the case to be set down for hearing and a fixture was allocated for 1
March 2010. On 27 November 2009 Mr Edwards advised the Court that there was “no possibility whatever”, that he would be in a position to proceed to trial on the allocated date. This was not accepted, and normal pre-trial directions were made for the exchange of evidence and the like.
[6] Judge Doherty was to preside at the substantive hearing in Dunedin on 1
March 2010. One working day prior to the hearing Mr Edwards filed an interlocutory application raising nine concerns about previous steps in the proceeding. These arose from a scheduling conference in September 2009, the settlement conference and exchanges surrounding the allocation of, and continuation with, the 1 March 2010 hearing date. The Judge heard submissions concerning this
application at the outset. He delivered a brief oral judgment beginning with the observation that leave was required to bring the application because the case had been set down for hearing. Judge Doherty then noted that the application sought to re-litigate past matters about which Mr Edwards was dissatisfied. He found:
At this late stage, and bearing in mind the nature of the applications with the matter having been set down, I decline leave for the filing of the notice of interlocutory application and the matter ought to proceed today.
[7] Mr Edwards then applied for an adjournment of the case. Following inquiry of counsel, Mr Hope, and Mr Edwards the Judge expressed himself satisfied that there had been adequate time for an exchange of briefs of evidence and that he could see no basis for the concern that Mr Edwards would be prejudiced in the conduct of his defence. He noted that there had been a settlement conference and added “there can be no sense of complaint of ambush”. The application for an adjournment was denied.
[8] At this point Mr Edwards withdrew. Correctly, Judge Doherty noted the need for formal proof of the claim, and a council officer gave evidence to establish Mr Edwards’ ownership of the rateable land and the passing of Council resolutions by which rates were struck for each of the six relevant years. Further, the evidence established that rates assessments had been sent to Mr Edwards, but no payment had resulted. Accordingly, the Judge entered judgment for $9,871.55 together with interest from the filing of the claim.
[9] Costs were reserved, since the Council wished to seek increased costs on account of what the Judge termed the “many twists and turns” in the procedural history of the case. On 9 April 2010 Judge Doherty delivered a costs decision. The Council had filed submissions, whereas Mr Edwards declined to do so as he was by then intent on an appeal. Indemnity costs were sought, but the Judge concluded that while Mr Edwards conduct “might be seen as attempting to prolong the inevitable” it was not “so egregious or out of the ordinary” as to justify indemnity costs. Instead costs on scale 1A were awarded. These, with Court fees and disbursements, totalled
$4,379.20.
Developments subsequent to the District Court hearing
[10] Mr Edwards filed an appeal against the decision. However, the appeal was dismissed for failure to pay security for costs into Court within the time provided.
[11] In July 2011 the Council obtained and registered a charging order against
Mr Edwards land (which although in two titles comprises one vacant section).
[12] In January 2013, almost three years after the District Court decision, Mr Edwards filed this judicial review application. In February Chisholm J made directions following a telephone conference, including a direction for the joinder of the Council as third respondent and a direction that the review would be heard in Dunedin on 12 April 2013.
[13] The following month Whata J determined an application concerning cross- examination of a deponent and also directed that the issues for determination be agreed and recorded in a joint memorandum. In two respects the directions were in error; a misunderstanding concerning the identity of the deponent to be cross- examined and Mr Edwards was omitted as a party to help define the issues in the case. Instead of a recall application or some other proportionate response, Mr Edwards filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal based on these inaccuracies. Made aware of the errors Whata J recalled the judgment.
[14] Nonetheless, Mr Edwards sought to advance the appeal. It, however, was deemed to have been abandoned when a case on appeal was not filed within three months. This led to Mr Edwards applying to the Court of Appeal for an extension of time, but this was declined in a recent judgment of that Court.1
[15] This resulted in an application to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal, together with an application for stay of proceedings. This application was pending when the case was called before me last week. In light of my assessment that the application for leave to appeal was unlikely to succeed, I required that the hearing
continue. On 15 November the Supreme Court dismissed the leave application.2
1 Edwards v District Court, Dunedin [2013] NZCA 382 (Ellen France, Harrison and French JJ)
2 Edwards v District Court, Dunedin [2013] NZSC 124 (Elias CJ, McGrath and Glazebrook JJ).
[16] Accordingly, there is no impediment to this judgment resolving the judicial review application.
The grounds of review
[17] The amended statement of claim is unconventional. Paragraph [3] records:
Applicant avers that every procedural action by the Court officers involved in the proceedings presently under review was sufficiently mistaken or unauthorised or unlawful or unfair or otherwise invalid is to make the entire process a travesty of justice.
On this basis Mr Edwards sought an order setting aside the liability and costs decisions given by Judge Doherty in 2010.
[18] The statement of claim ended on this note:
The Court and the respondents may detect, and possibly complain, that the present statement of claim is a conglomeration of claims, evidence and submission. Applicant apologies, with the explanation that he has attempted to encompass the essentials of his case in one document. There will, of course, be affidavits attesting to his claimed facts, and he will have written, and hopefully brief, submissions.
[19] Given the elusive nature of the statement of claim I tried to get Mr Edwards to explain the grounds of review in the course of argument. This resulted in his referring to matters not mentioned in the statement of claim and which seemed to provide the genesis of his underlying concern that the rates arrears were not legally recoverable by the Council. I shall refer to these concerns in a moment. The grounds raised in the statement of claim seem to be confined to procedural actions that occurred in the run up to the substantive District Court hearing.
Assessment of the merits
[20] As best I can tell the first grounds of review is that a District Court Registrar convened a settlement conference of the Council’s claim against Mr Edwards without his input. The next ground concerns the settlement conference itself, and how it was conducted by Judge Kellar.
[21] In my view neither of these complaints are now relevant. The fact is that a settlement conference occurred, but a resolution was not found. The rights and wrongs of the settlement conference, and how it eventuated, did not influence the final decisions in the District Court, namely that Mr Edwards was liable for the rates arrears and costs.
[22] Turning to these decisions I think there are two grounds of review, namely that insufficient notice was given of the substantive hearing on 1 March 2010 and that Judge Doherty should have dealt with Mr Edwards’ interlocutory application before he gave judgment.
[23] For the reasons explained by Judge Doherty I am satisfied that neither complaint is valid. The District Court is bound to deal with civil disputes promptly, and avoid unnecessary expense. The history of the District Court proceedings speaks for itself. The Council’s claim was ready for hearing by 1 March 2010 and Judge Doherty was well able to dismiss Mr Edwards’ interlocutory application - effectively on the basis that it was a delaying tactic. In submissions Mr Edwards contended that the District Court Rules 1992 applied rather than the 2009 Rules, but whichever Rules applied interlocutory applications may only be filed with leave once a case has been set down for hearing. It follows that there was nothing inappropriate in relation to the manner in which the case was handled in the District Court.
[24] In the course of oral submissions Mr Edwards revealed his underlying concern about the rates arrears. He said that an immediate neighbour to his land in Oamaru was an employee of the Council who in the past had used Mr Edwards’ land for grazing and had also moved the position of the boundary fence to Mr Edwards’ disadvantage. The neighbour also expressed interest in acquiring the land. Sometime in the early 1990’s cheques tended by Mr Edwards in payment of rates were refused by the Council. Mr Hope described them as promissory notes, not cheques, but acknowledged that the Council was wrong to refuse them. Building on this foundation Mr Edwards said that he was the victim of collusion, a conspiracy, to which the Council was a party whereby it sought to facilitate its employee’s acquisition of his land.
[25] Mr Edwards said that he could establish fraud and that its existence vitiated the Council’s entitlement to rates. Indeed, at one point he described the judicial review as “irrelevant” because he will issue a “Part 18” proceeding to expose the fraudulent conspiracy.
[26] Obviously, this conspiracy thesis is not relevant to the judicial review application. Nor is there evidence to substantiate it.
Conclusion
[27] For these reasons the application for judicial review is dismissed.
[28] Costs are reserved. The Council may file a memorandum in support of costs within seven working days and Mr Edwards will have five working days within which to reply.
[29] In light of the difficulties with the statement of claim in this proceeding and the history of the District Court claim and of this proceeding, I make an administrative direction that if a Part 18 proceeding is filed by Mr Edwards, as he indicated, it be received for filing only with the leave of a Judge. If such a proceeding has already been filed the direction cannot apply.
Solicitors:
E Devine and P Gunn
P G Hope, Oamaru