Easton v Wellington City Council
[2025] NZCA 413
•19 August 2025 at 11.00 am
| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA |
| CA164/2025 |
| BETWEEN | BENJAMIN MORLAND EASTON |
| AND | WELLINGTON CITY COUNCIL |
| Court: | Campbell and Whata JJ |
Counsel: | Appellant in person |
Judgment: | 19 August 2025 at 11.00 am |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The appeal is struck out.
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REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Campbell J)
On 21 March 2025, Mr Easton filed an appeal against a decision of Boldt J.[1] Cooke J directed that Mr Easton be given notice under r 44A of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005 that the appeal was to be considered as a potential abuse of process, including for lack of jurisdiction. Cooke J also directed that the matter was to be determined on the papers and that the respondents need not participate.
[1]Morland (Easton) v Wellington City Council HC Wellington CIV-2025-485-166, 20 March 2025 (Minute of Boldt J).
Mr Easton has filed submissions in response to Cooke J’s directions. He says his appeal is not an abuse of process and is within this Court’s jurisdiction.
Background
In 2024, Mr Easton brought a claim for judicial review in the High Court at Wellington. The respondents were the two respondents to this appeal.
Mr Easton’s claim for judicial review made three core allegations:[2]
(a)A claim that the introduction of the Care of Children Bill in 2003 was inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Bill of Rights Act).[3]
(b)A claim concerning a dispute about the sale of land at Shelly Bay. Mr Easton sought to challenge trespass notices that had been served on him in relation to his occupation of land at Massey Road, which is on the same stretch of road as the Shelly Bay land.
(c)A claim that the Fast‑track Approvals Bill was deficient as the Attorney‑General’s report under s 7 of the Bill of Rights Act was not tabled on the day the Bill was introduced to the House of Representatives.[4]
[2]This summary is taken from the decision of McHerron J striking out Mr Easton’s claim: Morland [Easton] v Wellington City Council [2025] NZHC 596.
[3]Care of Children Bill 2003 (54).
[4]Fast-track Approvals Bill 2024 (31-1).
The respondents applied to strike out Mr Easton’s claim on the basis it did not disclose a reasonable cause of action. McHerron J heard the strike‑out application on 26 November 2024 and reserved judgment.
Judgment was still reserved when, on 20 March 2025, Mr Easton appeared in person at the Wellington Registry of the High Court. There he filed an application, purportedly in his judicial review proceeding, styled as an “urgent interlocutory without notice application” seeking an injunction “to cease the [Wellington City Council] from all sub judicaea activity as commenced 20 March 2025”.[5]
[5]We note that Mr Easton’s hand-written application was entirely capitalised. We have not retained his approach to capitalisation.
The application is difficult to follow, but it appears Mr Easton was complaining about being arrested that morning and about the Wellington City Council issuing a fresh trespass notice against him in respect of his occupation of land at Massey Road. The application concluded with the heading “Habeas corpus + orders sought”, under which Mr Easton sought four orders:
1. That the police detention breached authority
2. That the [Wellington City Council] are to cease and desist the refreshed trespass (and other parties trespassing)
3. That the applicant is reinstated to occupying 270 Massey Road (as‑home)
4. That habeas corpus is active before the Court
The High Court Registry appears to have treated the application as one made under the Habeas Corpus Act 2001 as well as for an injunction. The application was referred to Boldt J, who promptly issued a minute.[6] The Judge recorded that Mr Easton was still in the Registry of the Court and was refusing to leave. The Judge declined the application for habeas corpus on the basis that Mr Easton was not subject to any form of detention.[7] The Judge then addressed the application for an injunction, saying:
[4] As to Mr Morland’s application for an injunction, it presently falls well short of compliance with the High Court Rules 2016. I am happy to give him the opportunity to withdraw the application as it stands to avoid the possible application of r 5.35A and 5.35B. Any application against the Council and the Attorney‑General must either be served on the respondents, or must, at a minimum, comply with the strict rules governing without notice applications.
[6]Minute of Boldt J, above n 1.
[7]At [2].
Mr Easton filed an appeal against Boldt J’s decision the next day, 21 March 2025. Later that day, McHerron J delivered his reserved judgment, striking out Mr Easton’s judicial review claim.[8]
Mr Easton’s appeal
[8]Morland [Easton] v Wellington City Council, above n 2.
In his notice of appeal, Mr Easton says that Boldt J “misreads” the interlocutory application as “there is no application for habeas corpus”. He says the Habeas Corpus Act does not apply. Mr Easton says his application was interlocutory to his judicial review proceeding. He says there was no basis for Boldt J to apply rr 5.35A and 5.35B of the High Court Rules 2016.
Mr Easton concludes his notice of appeal by asking that “orders 1, 2 and 3” be made by this Court. We take this to be a reference to the first three of the four orders sought by Mr Easton in his “urgent interlocutory” application to the High Court. The fourth order, which Mr Easton does not seek in this Court, was that “habeas corpus is active before the Court”.
This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Mr Easton’s appeal
Mr Easton’s notice of appeal makes it clear that he is not seeking any order under the Habeas Corpus Act. He is, therefore, not appealing against that part of Boldt J’s decision in which the Judge declined to grant a writ of habeas corpus. Rather, Mr Easton is appealing against the directions made by Boldt J in relation to the application for an injunction.
In making those directions, Boldt J referred to the “possible application” of rr 5.35A and 5.35B.[9] This is the focus of Mr Easton’s appeal and the submissions he has filed. But the Judge did not apply those rules and did not make any decision under them. This Court’s jurisdiction is (relevantly) limited to hearing appeals from judgments, decrees or orders of the High Court.[10] Boldt J made no judgment, decree or order in respect of the application of rr 5.35A or 5.35B. This Court has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal against a mere observation that a rule might apply. Mr Easton’s attempt to appeal from this matter is an abuse of this Court’s process.
[9]Minute of Boldt J, above n 1, at [4].
[10]Senior Courts Act 2016, s 56(1)(a).
For completeness, we note that Boldt J did make a direction that Mr Easton either serve his application on the respondents or comply with the requirements in the High Court Rules governing without notice applications. The decision to make that direction is potentially appealable. However, Mr Easton raises no issue with that decision in his notice of appeal. Further, the decision was one made on Mr Easton’s interlocutory application. Under s 56 of the Senior Courts Act 2016, the decision is appealable only with the leave of the High Court or this Court. Mr Easton has not obtained leave. Nor even has he applied for leave. This Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from that decision.
For these reasons, we consider that Mr Easton’s appeal should be struck out under r 44A of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules as an abuse of process.
Result
The appeal is struck out.
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