Easton v Attorney-General - [2025] NZHC 2975

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE

CIV2025-485-690

[2025] NZHC 2975

BETWEEN
BENJAMIN MORLAND EASTON

Applicant

AND

ATTORNEY-GENERAL

First Respondent

AND

WELLINGTON CITY COUNCIL

Second Respondent

AND

LAND INFORMATION NZ

Third Respondent

Hearing: On the Papers

Appearances:

Applicant in person

Judgment:

9 October 2025

JUDGMENT OF CHURCHMAN J

[1] By minute dated 2 October 2025 I struck out, pursuant to r 5.35A of the High Court Rules 2016 (HCR), proceedings issued by the applicant. By application dated 7 October 2025 the applicant seeks a recall of the minute.

[2]The grounds upon which the statement of claim was struck out were that:

(a)it was incomprehensible;

(b)it disclosed no valid cause of action; and

(c)it was not possible to discern any relief which the Court had jurisdiction to grant.

EASTON v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2025] NZHC 2975 [9 October 2025]

The law

[3] The law in relation to recall of a judgment is clear. Rule 11.9 HCR provides that a Judge may recall a judgment. The case law indicates that the discretion to recall a judgment must be exercised with circumspection and must not in any way be seen as a substitute for an appeal.1

[4] The principal reason justifying circumspection on a recall application is the policy need to ensure that once Court orders are made, the principle of finality in litigation means that such orders should stand unless overturned by appeal or some other corrective pathway.2

[5] The leading case on applications for recall is Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2).3 In that case Wild C J said:4

Generally speaking, a judgment once delivered must stand for better or worse subject, of course, to appeal. Were it otherwise there would be great inconvenience and uncertainty. There are, I think, three categories of cases in which a judgment not perfected may be recalled — first, where since the hearing there has been an amendment to a relevant statutory regulation or a new judicial decision of relevance and high authority; secondly, where counsel have failed to direct the Court’s attention to a legislative provision or authoritative decision of plan relevance; and thirdly, where for some other very special reason justice requires that the judgment needs to be recalled.

Applicant’s arguments

[6] It is not easy to understand what the legal basis for the applicant’s recall application is. The first two paragraphs of the recall application refer to the fact that the minute was dated 2 October 2025 but not received by him from the registry until
5.04 pm on 3 October 2025. The applicant does not explain why that should result in a recall. A delay of a day between the date of a judgment and its receipt by a part is not a ground for recall.

1      Faloon v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2006) 22 NZTC 19,832; Erwood v Maxted [2010] NZCA 93.
2      Fitzgerald v IAG New Zealand Limited [2019] NZHC 632 at [8].
3      Horowhenua County v Nash…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Easton v Attorney-General and more:

Read every judgment in full
Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
Download judgments as PDF or Word

Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details

Case: [2025] NZHC 2975
Decision Date: 9 October 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Easton v Attorney-General involved the applicant, Benjamin Morland Easton, seeking a recall of the court's decision to strike out his proceedings under r 5.35A of the High Court Rules 2016. The Attorney-General and the Wellington City Council were the first and second respondents, respectively, while Land Information New Zealand was the third respondent. The applicant's original proceedings were struck out due to the statement of claim being incomprehensible, disclosing no valid cause of action, and not identifying any relief the Court could grant. The applicant's recall application was heard on the papers, with the applicant appearing in person.

The primary legal issue the Court had to address was whether there were grounds for recalling the minute that struck out the applicant's proceedings. The Court noted that recall of a judgment is permissible under r 11.9 of the High Court Rules but must be exercised with circumspection. The Court referenced the leading case of Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2), which outlined the limited circumstances in which a judgment might be recalled, such as an amendment to relevant statutory regulation, a new judicial decision of high authority, or a special reason requiring justice to recall the judgment. The Court also highlighted the principle of finality in litigation, which generally requires court orders to stand unless overturned by appeal.

In evaluating the applicant's recall application, the Court found that the applicant's arguments did not meet the recognised grounds for recall. The applicant's reference to a delay in receiving the minute and reliance on unrelated decisions did not constitute valid grounds for recall. The applicant's claims regarding the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908 and the Treaty of Waitangi were also not supported by the facts or law. The Court concluded that the applicant's statement of claim did not identify any interest in the construction or validity of the Treaty of Waitangi, and any claims regarding breaches of the Treaty should have been pursued through the Waitangi Tribunal, not the High Court.

The Court dismissed the applicant's recall application, finding no basis for recalling the minute. The Court emphasised that the recall of a judgment should not be seen as a substitute for appeal and should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances. As the applicant had not established any recognised grounds for recall, the application was properly dismissed.

The final orders of the Court were that the application for recall be dismissed, and no further orders were made.

Orders