Easton v Attorney-General

[2025] NZHC 2975

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE

CIV2025-485-690

[2025] NZHC 2975

BETWEEN

BENJAMIN MORLAND EASTON

Applicant

AND

ATTORNEY-GENERAL

First Respondent

AND

WELLINGTON CITY COUNCIL

Second Respondent

AND

LAND INFORMATION NZ

Third Respondent

Hearing:	On the Papers
Appearances:	Applicant in person
Judgment:	9 October 2025

JUDGMENT OF CHURCHMAN J

[1]    By minute dated 2 October 2025 I struck out, pursuant to r 5.35A of  the  High Court Rules 2016 (HCR), proceedings issued by the applicant. By application dated 7 October 2025 the applicant seeks a recall of the minute.

[2]The grounds upon which the statement of claim was struck out were that:

(a)it was incomprehensible;

(b)it disclosed no valid cause of action; and

(c)it was not possible to discern any relief which the Court had jurisdiction to grant.

EASTON v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2025] NZHC 2975 [9 October 2025]

The law

[3]    The law in relation to recall of a judgment is clear. Rule 11.9 HCR provides that a Judge may recall a judgment. The case law indicates that the discretion to recall a judgment must be exercised with circumspection and must not in any way be seen as a substitute for an appeal.1

[4]    The principal reason justifying circumspection on a recall application is the policy need to ensure that once Court orders are made, the principle of finality in litigation means that such orders should stand unless overturned by appeal or some other corrective pathway.2

[5]    The leading case on applications for recall is Horowhenua County v Nash  (No 2).3 In that case Wild C J said:4

Generally speaking, a judgment once delivered must stand for better or worse subject, of course, to appeal. Were it otherwise there would be great inconvenience and uncertainty. There are, I think, three categories of cases in which a judgment not perfected may be recalled — first, where since the hearing there has been an amendment to a relevant statutory regulation or a new judicial decision of relevance and high authority; secondly, where counsel have failed to direct the Court’s attention to a legislative provision or authoritative decision of plan relevance; and thirdly, where for some other very special reason justice requires that the judgment needs to be recalled.

Applicant’s arguments

[6]    It is not easy to understand what the legal basis for the applicant’s recall application is. The first two paragraphs of the recall application refer to the fact that the minute was dated 2 October 2025 but not received by him from the registry until

5.04 pm on 3 October 2025. The applicant does not explain why that should result in a recall. A delay of a day between the date of a judgment and its receipt by a part is not a ground for recall.

1      Faloon v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2006) 22 NZTC 19,832; Erwood v Maxted [2010] NZCA 93.

2      Fitzgerald v IAG New Zealand Limited [2019] NZHC 632 at [8].

3      Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2) [1968] NZLR 632 at [633].

4 At [633].

[7]    Paragraph three of the document refers to two earlier unrelated decisions (Poutama Kaitiaki Charitable Trust v Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga [2022] NZHC 3509 and Mau Whenua Inc v Mulligan CIV-2019-485-366). The claim for a recall is that:

“…these judgments pattern an unreasonable as ordered process built to excuse arguments that coherently, competently and correctly in law test the competencies in the New Zealand jurisdiction — independent to sovereign threat.”

[8]Whatever that might mean, it is not a recognised ground for recall.

[9]    In paragraph five of the application takes issue with the finding at [13] of the minute and in particular the words “The statement of claim is incomprehensible. It discloses no valid cause of action.” The applicant leaves out the final sentence in [13] of the minute which was: “It is not possible to discern any relief which the Court has jurisdiction to grant.”

[10]   Paragraph six of the application, the applicant claims that [7] of my minute “unreasonably mandates that the treaty [sic] is not subject to s 3 of the Act.” The applicant appears to be referring to the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908.

[11]   The applicant sets out in [6] of the application an extract from s 3 of the Declaratory Judgments Act including the paragraph which reads:

Where any person claims to have acquired any right under any statute, regulation, bylaw, deed, will, document of title, agreement, memorandum, articles or instrument, or to be in any other manner interested in the construction or the validity there of….

[12]   The words “or to be in any other manner interested in the construction or the validity there of” are in yellow high-lighter which presumably signifies that the applicant see them as being of critical importance.

[13]   The statement of claim that was struck out did not identify any interest that the applicant had in the construction or validity of the Treaty of Waitangi. Indeed, the claim seemed to be advanced by the applicant on behalf of unspecified groups of Maori who did not sign the Treaty of Waitangi.

[14]   The applicant then goes on to challenge the finding that it was not possible to discern any relief which the Court had jurisdiction to grant. He seems to be suggesting that he is able to apply for:

A declaration of inconsistency with s 8 and s 28 (being extinguished fundamental rights to life and quality of life) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990….

[15]   He then goes on to refer to chiefs who had not signed either the Declaration of Independence 1835 and/or the Treaty of Waitangi 1840 being declared to hold Perfect Title of their lands.

[16]   Chiefs who didn’t sign the Treat of Waitangi (who are not anywhere identified in the statement of claim) were not a party to that document and cannot say that their interests were affected by it.

[17]   There is no explanation how a treaty entered into in 1840 could have been inconsistent with legislation not passed until 150 years later. Neither is there any explanation as to how the applicant’s right to life or quality of life was breached by the Treaty.

[18]   There is a process for historical claims for breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi and that is set out in the Treaty of Waitangi  Act  1975.  That  Act  gave  the  Waitangi Tribunal exclusive jurisdiction to  inquire  into  such  claims,  not  the  High Court.

Outcome

[19]   The applicant does not establish any of the grounds recognised by the Court for a recall.

[20]   Accordingly, there is no basis upon which the minute can be recalled, and the application is dismissed.

Churchman J