Dunstan v North Shore District Court

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA

CA430/2024
[2024] NZCA 381

BETWEEN	TANYA FELICITY DUNSTAN Applicant
AND	NORTH SHORE DISTRICT COURT Respondent

Counsel:	Applicant in person No appearance for Respondent
Judgment: (On the papers)	12 August 2024 at 11.00 am

JUDGMENT OF GODDARD J
(Recall)

The application for recall is declined.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

On 16 July 2024 I delivered a judgment in which I declined an application for review of a decision of the Deputy Registrar declining a fee waiver application.[1]
[1]Dunstan v North Shore District Court [2024] NZCA 319.
Ms Dunstan has applied to recall that judgment.
Nothing in Ms Dunstan’s application for a recall refers to, or engages with, the recognised criteria for the recall of a judgment.[2] Much of the application does not relate to the judgment that she seeks to recall: rather, it sets out various criticisms of other decisions of this Court, and of decisions of other courts. That material is simply irrelevant. In so far as the application does address the judgment that Ms Dunstan seeks to recall, her application appears to be made on the basis that the judgment is “plainly wrong”. That is not a recognised ground for recall.
[2]See Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2) [1968] NZLR 632 (SC) at 633, affirmed in Craig v Williams [2019] NZSC 60 at [10]; and Saxmere Company Ltd v Wool Board Disestablishment Company Ltd (No 2) [2009] NZSC 122, [2010] 1 NZLR 76 at [2].
The application for recall is declined.

Solicitors:
Crown Law Office | Te Tari Ture o te Karauna, Wellington for Respondent

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Dunstan v North Shore District Court concerns an application by Tanya Felicity Dunstan for a recall of a previous judgment delivered by Goddard J on 16 July 2024. The earlier judgment declined a review of a decision made by the Deputy Registrar, which had in turn declined Ms Dunstan’s application for a fee waiver. Ms Dunstan sought to recall the Court of Appeal’s judgment, asserting it was "plainly wrong." The Court of Appeal was required to determine whether there were grounds for recalling the earlier judgment, considering whether Ms Dunstan’s application met the recognised criteria for such a recall. The recognised criteria for recall include instances where there has been a clear error in law, a significant procedural error, or if the judgment was based on material not available at the time of the original decision.

The Court of Appeal found that Ms Dunstan's application did not adequately engage with the recognised criteria for recall. Notably, her application did not refer to any such criteria and largely contained criticisms of other court decisions, which were deemed irrelevant. The Court also observed that the assertion the judgment was "plainly wrong" did not constitute a recognised ground for recall. The Court referenced established case law to highlight the stringent criteria necessary for a successful recall application, ultimately concluding that Ms Dunstan’s application failed to meet these standards.

Goddard J, in dismissing the application for recall, emphasised that Ms Dunstan’s arguments did not address the established criteria for such an application. The Court reiterated that recall applications must be based on clear error in law, significant procedural errors, or the availability of new material. Given that Ms Dunstan’s application did not meet these requirements, the appeal was declined. The Court maintained that the original judgment stood, and no recall was warranted.

The Court of Appeal declined Ms Dunstan's application for recall and confirmed the earlier judgment remained in effect. No further orders were made beyond the dismissal of the recall application.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established