Dunstan v Attorney-General

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI MANA NUI O AOTEAROA

 SC 63/2023
 [2023] NZSC 92
BETWEEN

TANYA FELICITY DUNSTAN
Applicant

AND

ATTORNEY‑GENERAL
Respondent

Court:

Ellen France, Williams and Kós JJ

Counsel:

Applicant in person
S P R Conway for Respondent

Judgment:

27 July 2023

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe application for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal is dismissed.

B        The applicant must pay the respondent costs of $2,500.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

Introduction

  1. Ms Dunstan has filed an application to appeal directly from a decision of the High Court.[1]  In that decision, Powell J struck out proceedings brought by Ms Dunstan relating to a hearing undertaken by a Benefits Review Committee on behalf of the Ministry of Social Development.  As the application is out of time, an extension of time is required.

Procedural background

[1]Dunstan v Ministry of Social Development [2022] NZHC 3319. The Court of Appeal declined Ms Dunstan’s application to add the Attorney‑General as a party for the purposes of representing the High Court and granted the Ministry of Social Development’s application to substitute the Attorney‑General as the sole respondent: Dunstan v Ministry of Social Development [2023] NZCA 164. This judgment’s intituling reflects that decision.

  1. The current application has its genesis in a hearing of the Benefits Review Committee convened to consider whether payment of Ms Dunstan’s disability allowance should be backdated.  There is no dispute that Ms Dunstan was not notified of the hearing because the notice of the hearing was sent to the wrong address.  Ms Dunstan sought judicial review of the decision of the Benefits Review Committee arguing that conducting the hearing in her absence was in breach of her rights to natural justice in terms of s 27(1) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.  Ms Dunstan sought costs and damages for distress caused by having to pursue these proceedings.  After the Attorney‑General applied to strike out the proceedings, Ms Dunstan appealed the Benefits Review Committee decision to the Social Security Appeal Authority.

  2. In striking out the claim, Powell J accepted that Ms Dunstan may have had a “reasonably arguable case” that the Benefits Review Committee acted unfairly in depriving her of the right to attend the hearing.  However, the Judge considered that omission had effectively been rectified because the Ministry continued to offer Ms Dunstan the opportunity of a further Benefits Review Committee hearing.  Further, Ms Dunstan was continuing on with her appeal to the Appeal Authority and the Authority would consider afresh whether payment should be backdated.  Accordingly, the Judge found that the claim that Ms Dunstan’s rights to natural justice under s 27(1) were breached was now moot.  The Court said that the claim was properly struck out on the basis it was frivolous and otherwise disclosed no reasonably arguable cause of action.

  3. The High Court also accepted the submission for the respondent that the claim was in essence one for administrative law damages.  Where the only arguable breach…

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Details
Case
[2023] NZSC 92
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of New Zealand, Tanya Felicity Dunstan sought an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal against a decision of the High Court. The High Court had previously dismissed proceedings brought by Ms. Dunstan, who argued that a Benefits Review Committee had breached her rights under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 by not notifying her of a hearing. The court found the claim was moot and dismissed it. The Court of Appeal had substituted the Attorney-General as the respondent, and Ms. Dunstan applied to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal directly. The application was out of time, requiring an extension.

The key legal issues were whether the application met the criteria for leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court and whether it was necessary in the interests of justice for the Court to hear and determine the appeal. Ms. Dunstan argued that a miscarriage of justice would result if the appeal was not heard because her rights had been breached and no remedy was otherwise available. The Court considered whether the proposed appeal raised questions of general or public importance or if there was an appearance of a miscarriage of justice. The Court found that the decision of the High Court rested on the particular circumstances of the case and that no question of general or public importance arose. The Court also found no appearance of a miscarriage of justice.

The Supreme Court dismissed the application for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal. The Court found that the High Court's decision was correct and that no grounds for appeal existed. The Court ordered that Ms. Dunstan pay the respondent's costs of $2,500.

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