| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI MANA NUI O AOTEAROA |
| SC 65/2023 [2023] NZSC 100 |
| BETWEEN | TANYA FELICITY DUNSTAN |
| AND | ATTORNEY-GENERAL |
| Court: | Glazebrook, O’Regan and Kós JJ |
Counsel: | Applicant in person |
Judgment: | 9 August 2023 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
B The applicant must pay the first respondent costs of $2,500.
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REASONS
Ms Dunstan applies for leave to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeal refusing extension of time to appeal against a judgment of the High Court dismissing judicial review of a decision of the District Court declining to authorise the commencement of five private prosecutions.[1] In a judgment delivered on 26 February 2021, the High Court Judge concluded none of the grounds advanced for judicial review had merit, and the application failed “by some margin”.[2]
[1]DFT v Attorney-General [2023] NZCA 225 [CA judgment]; and Dunstan v The District Court at Manukau [2021] NZHC 311 [HC judgment].
[2]HC judgment, above n 1, at [62].
Almost two years later, on 28 December 2022, Ms Dunstan applied to the Court of Appeal for extension of time to appeal the High Court judgment. On 12 June 2023 the Court of Appeal declined the application, noting the unexplained delay, absence of public interest in the grounds advanced and the apparent absence of any basis on which to conclude the High Court judgment might be properly challenged”.[3]
Application for leave to appeal
[3]CA judgment, above n 1, at [10]–[12].
Ms Dunstan advances 14 grounds. As Mr Jones submits for the respondent, they are difficult to understand and summarise. Several take issue with factual and procedural findings. Others traverse “delays due to distress and exhaustive measures to protect my children in all family court proceedings”. Others assert intimidation and harassment, and misconduct, by various courts.
Our assessment
None of the criteria for appeal provided in s 74(2) of the Senior Courts Act 2016 are made out here. The proposed appeal turns on its particular facts. No question of general or public importance arises.[4] Nor does anything raised by Ms Dunstan give rise to the appearance of a miscarriage of justice.[5]
Result
[4]Senior Courts Act 2016, s 74(2)(a).
[5]Section 74(2)(b); and Junior Farms Ltd v Hampton Securities Ltd (in liq) [2006] NZSC 60, (2006) 18 PRNZ 369.
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
The first respondent having filed submissions on the application, the applicant must pay the first respondent costs of $2,500.
Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington for First Respondent
- AGLC
- Dunstan v Attorney-General [2023] NZSC 100
- Case
- [2023] NZSC 100
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the application for leave to appeal met the criteria outlined in section 74(2) of the Senior Courts Act 2016, and whether the proposed appeal raised questions of general or public importance or indicated the appearance of a miscarriage of justice. The court assessed Ms. Dunstan's 14 grounds for appeal, which included issues with factual and procedural findings, claims of distress, intimidation, and misconduct by various courts. The court found that none of the statutory criteria for appeal were satisfied, and that the proposed appeal did not turn on a question of general or public importance nor did it indicate the appearance of a miscarriage of justice.
The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered that Ms. Dunstan pay the first respondent’s costs of $2,500. The court concluded that Ms. Dunstan had not demonstrated that the appeal would meet the statutory criteria or that it raised issues of broader significance.
Orders
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Background
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Evidence
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
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