Du v M5 Holdings Ltd
[2019] NZHC 2313
•13 September 2019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2015-404-2124
[2019] NZHC 2313
BETWEEN JIANYING DU
Plaintiff
AND
M5 HOLDINGS LIMITED
First Defendant (discontinued)
DAVID COTTER
Second Defendant (discontinued)YUE YANG
Third Defendant (discontinued)FENG SHI
Fourth Defendant
Hearing: 12 April 2019 (last submission 12 August 2019) Counsel:
D Zhang for plaintiff
A Manuson for fourth defendant
Judgment:
13 September 2019
JUDGMENT OF KATZ J
[Application to set aside formal proof judgment]
This judgment was delivered by me on 13 September 2019 at 4:00pm Pursuant to Rule 11.5 High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors: Amicus Law, Auckland
Prestige Lawyers Limited, Auckland
DU v M5 HOLDINGS LIMITED & ORS [2019] NZHC 2313 [13 September 2019]
Introduction
[1] The plaintiff, Ms Jianying Du, issued proceedings against four defendants in respect of an investment that she made (or attempted to make) in the first defendant, M5 Holdings Limited (“M5”), which is a New Zealand company. The claims against the first, second and third defendants have now been discontinued.
[2] On 9 March 2017, I delivered judgment in favour of Ms Du against the fourth defendant, Mr Feng Shi, following a formal proof hearing (“the Judgment”). Mr Shi was not present or represented by counsel at the hearing. Both Ms Du and Mr Shi live in China.
[3] I found that in 2014, Ms Du had decided to invest in M5, which is in the business of manufacturing honey. She entered into an agreement with Mr Shi, pursuant to which he agreed to transfer to her his 22.5 per cent shareholding in M5 to her for $270,000. The parties entered into a share transfer agreement (the “Agreement”) which included a number of representations, covenants and warranties on the part of Mr Shi as transferor. On 27 June 2014, Ms Du had paid the full amount of the share purchase price. Although she was initially added to the share register by Mr Shi, she was removed shortly thereafter, due to Mr Shi’s failure to comply with the necessary requirements for transferring his shares (including the pre-emptive rights provisions in M5’s Constitution).
[4] The end result was that Ms Du had paid the full contract price for transfer of the shares, but Mr Shi had not fulfilled his part of the bargain and transferred the shares to her. I found that Ms Du was accordingly entitled to the return of the purchase price for the shares, together with costs and interest.
[5] On 18 April 2018, I issued a further judgment awarding costs in favour of Ms Du. Ms Du is currently taking steps to enforce the Judgment in the People’s Republic of China (“China”). (I will refer to the two judgments collectively as “the Judgments”).
[6] Mr Shi now applies to set aside the Judgments on the ground that he was not properly served with the proceeding. He says that he only became aware that there
were New Zealand court proceedings against him in July 2018, when Ms Du sought to enforce the Judgments in China.
[7] At the hearing of Mr Shi’s application, the parties focussed on whether service of the proceeding was effected in accordance with the High Court Rules 2016 and, in the event that service was compliant, whether the Judgments should nevertheless be set aside on the basis that Mr Shi has a substantial ground of defence.
[8] On my subsequent review of the Court file, however, I discovered that the notice of proceeding purportedly served on Mr Shi did not comply with r 6.31 of the High Court Rules 2016 and, further, that the plaintiff had sealed the formal proof judgment without leave of the Court, contrary to r 15.11 of the High Court Rules. I accordingly sought further submissions from the parties, addressing those issues.
Background and relevant law
Serving an originating document on an overseas defendant
[9] Rule 6.27 of the High Court Rules provides that an originating document, such as a statement of claim, may be served out of New Zealand without leave of the Court, if the proceeding comes within one of the listed categories.
[10] An originating document permitted by the High Court Rules to be served outside New Zealand may be served using one of the methods specified in r 6.1.1 The authorised methods of service relevantly include personal service. Alternatively, an originating document may be served outside New Zealand by a method permitted by the law of the country in which it is to be served.2 No service outside New Zealand is valid if effected contrary to the law of the country where service is effected.3 In this case the plaintiff says that its statement of claim and notice of proceeding were personally served on Mr Shi.
1 High Court Rules 2016, r 6.32.
2 High Court Rules 2016, r 6.32(1)(b).
3 High Court Rule 2016, r 6.32(4).
The evidence as to how service was effected on Mr Shi
[11] Mr Huiqing Zhang, Ms Du’s lawyer in China, swore an affidavit of service on 22 August 2016, prior to the formal proof hearing. In it he stated that on 18 September 2015 he had served Mr Shi with the statement of claim, the notice of proceeding, the affidavit of Ms Du (dated 17 October 2014) and the initial disclosure documents. He deposed that service was effected by placing the documents in front of Mr Shi when both men were outside the entrance of a particular building (which I understand to be Mr Shi’s apartment building). Mr Huiqing Zhang deposed that he believed the person was Mr Shi as he had seen him in court before and, further, he had a copy of Mr Shi’s photographic identification, with his residential address on it. Mr Huiqing Zhang did not mention, at this stage, that he had actually picked up the documents and taken them away with him after Mr Shi had walked away.
[12] In support of his application to set aside the Judgments, Mr Shi swore an affidavit on 10 October 2018 in which he deposed that:
I became aware of the judgment dated 9 March 2017 made by the New Zealand High Court when I participated in a proceeding issued by the plaintiff in July 2018, in the Shanghai Court. It was in the Shanghai Court in July 2018 that I was able to identify Hui Qing Zhang as likely the person who tried to hand me a parcel in 2015. In 2015, Hui Qing Zhang, or someone who looks like him, handed me a parcel outside my residence in Shanghai.
I asked him what it was, as in China it is dangerous to accept any parcel from a stranger. He refused to tell me and simply left the parcel on the ground and walked away. I walked away as well, in fear that it may be something dangerous. After I walked away, he walked back and picked up the parcel and left. I never saw what was inside the parcel.
[13] Mr Shi’s reference to the July 2018 Shanghai court appearance appears to be a reference to the legal proceedings taken in China to enforce the Judgments.
[14] Mr Huiqing Zhang swore an affidavit in response, on 19 December 2018. In it he deposed that:
2. I contacted Feng Shi by phone to tell him I had service documents from New Zealand for him. Feng Shi agreed to meet.
3. On 18 September 2015, I met Feng Shi outside of his residence. I recognized him because I have met in court in China before three times. I also have his photographic ID. In fact, the reason why I met him in court was for
the present dispute over the shares transfer. Nonetheless, I asked him if he was Feng Shi to confirm his identity again.
4. After I confirmed Feng Shi’s identity, I handed the parcel of service documents to him….
5. I clearly remember telling Feng Shi that the parcel contained service documents for a legal proceeding in New Zealand.
6. Feng Shi refused to take the service documents from me. Therefore, I left the parcel on the ground and walked away.
7. As I walked away, I noticed that Feng Shi had left too, and the parcel was still lying on the ground. Since Feng Shi was not going to take the documents, I decided to take the documents back because it would be unsafe to leave important legal documents lying around unattended.
[15] Mr Shi swore an affidavit in reply on 17 January 2019. He denies that Mr Huiqing Zhang told him in the initial phone call (arranging the meeting) that he had service documents for him. He said that Mr Huiqing Zhang merely called to check his name:
He told me he acted for the plaintiff and asked to meet up. He did not provide any further information, and he certainly did not make any mention of documents from New Zealand. At the time, the plaintiff had already withdrawn proceedings against me in Shanghai I assumed that the plaintiff would be suing Yue Yang, the third defendant, and was seeking evidence from me. Hence, I agreed to meet up with him outside my residence and planned to go to a café nearby with him. However, when I went to meet him, there was only a man trying to hand me a parcel.
[16] Mr Shi reiterated his earlier evidence that Mr Huiqing Zhang did not tell him what the parcel contained and that he was apprehensive about taking it.
The notice of proceeding
[17] If a defendant is served with a statement of claim out of New Zealand, the accompanying notice of proceeding must include a notice informing the defendant of:4
(a)the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of claims against persons who are not resident in New Zealand; and
(b)the grounds alleged by the plaintiff in relying on that jurisdiction; and
4 High Court Rules 2016, r 6.31.
(c)the defendant’s right to enter an appearance and objection to the jurisdiction of the Court under r 5.49.
[18] The notice of proceeding purportedly served on Mr Shi in this case did not include any reference to these matters. Rather, the standard notice of proceeding (appropriate for service within New Zealand) was used. It is accordingly not known on what specific basis the plaintiff asserts that the New Zealand Court has jurisdiction in relation to this matter.
Entry of judgment by default
[19] If a defendant does not file a statement of defence within the number of working days required by the notice of proceeding, r 15.9 provides a procedure for obtaining judgment by default where the claim is not for payment of a liquidated demand. In such cases the proceeding must be listed for formal proof, on the application of the plaintiff, and no notice is required to be given to the defendant. That process was followed here, culminating in the plaintiff obtaining the Judgment.
Setting aside a judgment entered by default
[20] Any judgment obtained by default under r 15.9 may be set aside or varied by the Court on such terms as it thinks just, if it appears to the Court that there has been, or may have been a miscarriage of justice.5 The issue for the Court is possible miscarriage of justice if the judgment is allowed to stand.6 The answer will generally vary depending on whether the judgment was irregularly obtained (for example because there was some defect in service) or regularly obtained.
[21] In EA v Rennie Cox Lawyers, the Court of Appeal considered New Zealand and English authority as to the extent of the court’s discretion, and concluded:7
[20] In summary where a judgment has been irregularly obtained, there will almost always be a miscarriage of justice such that the judgment should be set aside without considering the merits. However, that is not an inflexible rule that must be applied in every case, regardless of circumstances. There may be cases where the irregularity in obtaining the judgment was so minor
5 High Court Rules 2016, r 15.10.
6 KBR MacKinder Ltd v Fine Art Productions Ltd HC Wellington A372/84, 17 April 1986 at 4.
7 EA v Rennie Cox Lawyers [2018] NZCA 33, [2018] 3 NZLR 202.
and inconsequential that it could not have caused prejudice and there is no arguable defence. If the court can safely conclude that there is no risk of a miscarriage of justice, it might properly decline to set aside the judgment.
(Emphasis added)
[22] The Court’s discretion is unrestricted,8 however, where a judgment has been regularly obtained, the factors which are generally considered to be of particular importance in determining whether it is just, in all the circumstances, to set aside the judgment, are:9
(a)whether the defendant has a substantial ground of defence;
(b)whether the defendant’s failure, earlier, to take any steps is reasonably explained; and
(c)whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the judgment is set aside.
[23]Mr Shi bears the onus of establishing that the Judgments should be set aside.10
Was the Judgment regularly obtained?
[24] Ms Manuson submitted that there were two significant irregularities in the manner in which the Judgment was obtained:
(a)personal service was not validly effected; and
(b)the notice of proceeding was defective.
The requirements of personal service
[25]Rule 6.11 sets out the requirements for personal service:
A document may be personally served by leaving the document with the person to be served, or, if that person does not accept it, by putting it down and bringing it to the notice of that person.
8 Russell v Cox [1983] NZLR 654 (CA) at 659; Norwich Winterthur Insurance (NZ) Ltd v Erikson CA370/91; Nottingham v Registered Securities Ltd (in liq) (1998) 12 PRNZ 625 (CA); and Smith v Penney [2013] NZHC 2988 at [37].
9 Andrew Beck and others McGechan on Procedure (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at [15.10.05].
10 Korochine 15 Ltd v R P Charans Investments Ltd HC Hamilton M338/94, 13 December 1994.
[26] Where a document is enclosed in an envelope or package the person it is being served on should be informed of the nature of the document.11 If a defendant, knowing the nature of the documents, chooses not to open them or take them, service will nevertheless be valid.12
[27] Ms Manuson relied on the decision of Singapore Airlines v Jitesh Mohan Mistry.13 In that case Mr Mistry successfully applied to set aside a summary judgment against him on the basis that he had not been properly served with the proceeding. On arrival at Mr Mistry’s family home, the process server had spoken to someone standing behind a curtain at the window of the property. He asked the person if he was Mr Mistry. The person replied that he was not, but the process server believed that he recognised Mr Mistry’s voice. The process server then said, “I have something for you” and left the service documents in a sealed envelope on the front doorstep. Associate Judge Smith held that, even if Mr Mistry was the person behind the curtain, service had not been validly effected, because the “nature of the document must be brought to the mind of the person to be served”.14 Even on the process server’s account of what had occurred, he had not drawn to Mr Mistry’s attention the nature of the documents that were inside the sealed envelope. The default judgment was accordingly set aside.
Was Mr Shi made aware of the nature of the documents?
[28] The first issue is whether Mr Shi was made aware of the nature of the documents contained in the package. There is a direct conflict in the affidavits of Mr Huiqing Zhang and Mr Shi on this issue. Neither party applied to cross-examine the opposing party’s witness, and it is therefore necessary to try and resolve this
11 Re A Debtor [1939] Ch 251; and Taylor v Maramas [1954] VLR 476 at 480.
12 See for example Taylor v Maramas [1954] VLR 476 where personal service of an application was sufficiently effected notwithstanding that the defendant rejected the envelope containing the application without ever opening it.
13 Singapore Airlines v Mistry [2014] NZHC 1055.
14 Singapore Airlines v Mistry [2014] NZHC 1055 at [29] citing Re A Debtor [1939] Ch 251; and
Taylor v Maramas [1954] VLR 476 at 480.
dispute, so far as possible, on the documents. I keep in mind that the defendant, Mr Shi, bears the onus of proving that service was not validly effected.
[29] Mr Huiqing Zhang and Mr Shi give differing accounts of when they first met, and whether they had met prior to the Shanghai court appearance (relating to enforcement of the Judgments in China) in July 2018. Mr Huiqing Zhang asserts that he had met Mr Shi in court in China three times prior to attempting to serve him with the New Zealand documents. Mr Shi acknowledges that there were Chinese legal proceedings between the parties, but says that these had been withdrawn prior to 18 September 2015, when service was purportedly effected.
[30] That assertion appears to be contradicted by an email from Ms Du to Mr Shi dated 3 December 2016 (annexed to Ms Du’s affidavit of 9 March 2017). In that email Ms Du demands repayment of the monies allegedly owing to her by Mr Shi. She concludes that if she is not paid within seven days she will “pursue your full liabilities” including, but not limited to, a current proceeding in the Chinese commercial court (referenced as “(2015) – PuMin2 – (Commercial) – Chu – 919”). Hence, as at 3 December 2016, the Chinese proceeding appears to have still been on foot.
[31] Mr Huiqing Zhang’s evidence that he had met Mr Shi during the course of the Chinese court proceedings, prior to attempting to deliver the New Zealand court documents to him, is inherently plausible. In his affidavit in reply Mr Shi did not challenge, or even engage with, this evidence. The previous interactions between the two men is relevant to the plausibility of Mr Shi’s claim that he did not take the package because he believed that it might contain something dangerous. In any event, I note that Mr Shi acknowledged in his 17 January 2019 affidavit that Mr Huiqing Zhang had told him on the phone, when arranging the meeting, that he acted for Ms Du.
[32] Mr Huiqing Zhang deposes that he can “clearly remember” telling Mr Shi that the parcel contained service documents for a legal proceeding in New Zealand. Mr Shi denies that and goes so far as to allege that Mr Huiqing Zhang “refused” to tell him what was contained in the parcel. Mr Shi says that he then walked away, because he feared that the contents of the package could be something dangerous.
[33] I find it inherently implausible that a lawyer, having arranged to meet with a person, would then refuse to tell that person the nature of the documents they were attempting to serve on them, in response to a specific request. There would be no apparent advantage to Mr Huiqing Zhang in not telling Mr Shi what was in the package.
[34] Given this context, Mr Shi’s claim that he believed the package might contain something dangerous, and that is why he would not take it, is not credible. This was not a situation where a stranger had approached Mr Shi and tried to give him a package. Mr Shi knew that Mr Huiqing Zhang was Ms Du’s lawyer and had likely had previous dealings with him. It is likely, in my view, that Mr Shi declined to accept the package because he did know that it contained New Zealand legal documents. He made a strategic (albeit ill-advised) decision not to accept them.
[35] As noted previously, Mr Shi bears the onus of proving that service was not validly affected. One of the defects of service that Mr Shi relies on is that Mr Huiqing Zhang did not make him aware of the nature of the documents in the package. At best, Mr Shi has raised a dispute about this issue. However, in the absence of any cross-examination of Mr Huiqing Zhang, Mr Shi had not discharged the burden of proving that Mr Huiqing Zhang did not make him aware of the nature of the documents he was attempting to serve.
Was service invalidated because Mr Huiqing Zhang picked up the documents?
[36] The other alleged irregularity in the manner in which service was effected is that Mr Huiqing Zhang picked up the parcel and took it with him after Feng Shi had walked away. If he had not done so, service would have been validly effected in that Mr Huiqing Zhang had put the parcel down, brought it to the notice of Mr Shi, and informed him of the general nature of the documents it contained. The issue therefore is whether service is invalidated because Mr Huiqing Zhang picked up the parcel after Mr Shi had walked away and took it with him.
[37] Ms Manuson submitted, on behalf of Mr Shi, that the irregularity in this case is more severe than that in Mistry because in that case the parcel was at least left on the porch of the defendant’s house, so he could retrieve and open them later if he
wished. Here, Mr Shi did not have that option, as the documents were left in a public place, before being taken away by Mr Huiqing Zhang.
[38] Mr Shi made a conscious decision not to take the documents, but to leave them in the street. After Mr Shi had walked away, there was no obligation for Mr Huiqing Zhang to leave the documents lying in the street. The fact that he picked up the abandoned documents and took them away with him does not invalidate service.
[39] A similar situation arose in Tseitline v Mikhelson.15 In that case service was held to have been validly effected. Ms Manuson submitted that Tseitline is distinguishable because (amongst other things) the defendant in that case was subsequently given the means to obtain the papers which the process server had attempted to serve on him.
[40] In this case, Mr Shi was aware that the documents were being served on him by Ms Du’s lawyer, whom he had met before. He was engaged in ongoing legal proceedings in China in which Mr Huiqing Zhang had been instructed by Ms Du. Mr Shi therefore knew who to contact if he had a change of heart and decided that he wanted copies of the documents after all. Nevertheless, it is my view that “best practice” would have been for a further set of the documents to have been posted or emailed to Mr Shi (as occurred in Tseitline) or left in his letterbox. This would have maximised the prospect of him actually physically receiving the documents. The fact that this did not occur does not, however, invalidate service.
[41] In order to effect valid service (in circumstances where Mr Shi declined to take the documents) Mr Huiqing Zhang was required to inform Mr Shi of the nature of the documents, and to put them down and bring them to his attention. On Mr Huiqing Zhang’s evidence all of these requirements were met. Mr Shi has failed to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that they were not.
15 Tseitline v Mikhelson and others [2015] EWHC 3065 (Comm).
The defective notice of proceeding
[42] The notice of proceeding that Mr Huiqing Zhang attempted to serve on Mr Shi failed to include the required notice informing the defendant of:
(a)the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of claims against persons who are not resident in New Zealand; and
(b)the grounds alleged by the plaintiff in relying on that jurisdiction; and
(c)the defendant’s right to enter an appearance and objection to the jurisdiction of the Court under r 5.49.
[43] This was a significant oversight. The omission was not a minor one. Both the parties reside in China. It is a serious matter for a New Zealand court to assert jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. It is important that the procedural requirements relating to service on such defendants be followed to the letter. Although Mr Shi did not take the service documents with him he is, in effect, deemed to have received copies of them. Mr Shi is therefore deemed to have received copies of a notice of proceeding that was seriously defective.
Conclusion on whether the Judgment was regularly obtained
[44] In conclusion, it is my view that service was validly effected, but that the Judgment was nevertheless irregularly obtained due to the fact that the notice of proceeding did not comply with the requirements of the High Court Rules.
Should the Judgment be set aside?
[45] As I have set out at [21] above, where a judgment has been irregularly obtained, the Courts will almost always find that there has been a miscarriage of justice requiring the judgment to be set aside. That is not an inflexible rule, however. In some cases, the irregularity may be so minor that it could not have caused prejudice. If the Court can safely conclude that there is no risk of a miscarriage of justice, it might properly decline to set aside the judgment.
Significance of the defective notice of proceeding
[46] Mr Zhang submitted, in his supplementary submissions, that because Mr Shi did not take the notice of proceeding with him and never read it, it would have made no difference whether the correct form for the notice of proceeding was used. Accordingly, although there was a technical defect in the service documents, in practical terms the defect is irrelevant. There is no risk of a miscarriage of justice.
[47] Although that argument is superficially attractive, in my view it does not withstand closer scrutiny. On Mr Zhang’s analysis, it would not have mattered what was in the envelope. Mr Huiqing Zhang could have inadvertently picked up the wrong envelope when he left his office and attempted to serve some entirely unrelated documents on Mr Shi. On Mr Zhang’s argument, that that would still constitute valid service, because Mr Shi did not take the documents. I do not accept that that can be the case.
[48] As I have previously noted, it is a serious matter for a New Zealand court to assert jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. The jurisdiction of the court in an action in personam is based on service of the documents by which the proceeding is commenced; the Court only has jurisdiction if the documents by which the proceeding is commenced are properly served, either within in New Zealand or overseas.16 As Kós J observed in Discovery Geo Corporation v STP Energy Pte Ltd:17
First, jurisdiction at heart is dependent on valid service on the defendant … Where service offshore is involved, some rectitude is required. It involves as has often been said, an exercise of sovereignty within the country in which service is effected. … Of course, in some circumstances, involving true urgency, formal service by means of substituted service might be permissible.
… However, no application for substituted service was made in this case.
[49] In this case Mr Shi is deemed to have been served with copies of documents that were seriously defective. I assume that Mr Shi and/or his lawyers subsequently obtained copies of the originating documents at some stage, for the purposes of the application to set aside. Due to the defective notice of proceeding, however, Mr Shi would not have been informed of the grounds on which the plaintiff claims that the
16 Laws of New Zealand Conflict of Laws Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments (online ed) at [6].
17 Discovery Geo Corporation v STP Energy Pte Ltd [2012] NZHC 3549 at [39].
New Zealand court has jurisdiction. Such information (which is still not known) may well have provided the defendant with further grounds to challenge the default judgment.
Other relevant matters
[50] The Court’s discretion as to whether to set aside a judgment obtained by default is a wide one. A further matter that, in my view, is potentially relevant to the exercise of that discretion relates to the subsequent sealing of the Judgment.
[51] Where a statement of claim or counterclaim is served on a party outside New Zealand without leave, and that party does not appear, judgment by default may not be sealed without the leave of the Court.18 Leave may not be granted unless the Court is satisfied of all of the following matters:19
(a)that the party applying for leave to seal the judgment was entitled to serve the document out of New Zealand without leave;
(b)that the document was duly served by a method prescribed by the internal law of the country where service was to be effected, being a method prescribed in respect of service of documents in domestic actions on persons who are within the country; and
(c)that service was effected in sufficient time to enable the person served to appear.
[52] That provision was not complied with in this case, as the plaintiff sealed judgment without addressing the above matters and obtaining leave of the Court. Counsel explained that he was not aware of this rule at the time that he sealed judgment.
[53] The logical time for the above matters to have been addressed would have been at the formal proof hearing (to avoid the need for a two-stage process). They were not
18 High Court Rules 2016, r 15.11.
19 High Court Rules 2016, r 15.11(2)(a)-(c).
addressed at that time, however, or subsequently. Even now, there is insufficient information before the Court to satisfy me of the matters set out in [51](a) and (b) above. Specifically:
(a)because the notice of proceeding was defective, there is no information as to the basis (in terms of the categories in r 6.27) on which the plaintiff (who is based in China) claims it was entitled to serve the statement of claim on the defendant (also based in China) without leave of this Court; and
(b)there is no evidence that the method of service outlined at [11] to [16] above is a method of service that would be recognised by the domestic law of China.
Result
[54] The Judgment was irregularly obtained, due to the notice of proceeding being defective. It was subsequently sealed without the required leave of the Court.
[55] I have concluded that this is not one of those rare cases where the irregularity in service was so minor that the Court should decline to set aside the judgment. The application is accordingly granted. I order that the formal proof judgment of 8 March 2017 and the costs judgment of 18 April 2018 be set aside.
[56] If costs cannot be resolved between counsel, then any costs memorandum on behalf of Mr Shi is to be filed by 11 October 2019. Any response on behalf of Ms Du is to be filed by 25 October 2019.
Katz J
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