Doak v Rollander

Link copied
Case Copied 5 min read

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

CIV 2015-485-1022 [2016] NZHC 2319

UNDER Part 18 of the High Court Rules 2008

IN THE MATTER

of the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908

BETWEEN

WILLIAM NEVILLE DOAK First Plaintiff

AND

CHILDRENʼS HEALTH CAMPS - THE NEW ZEALAND FOUNDATION FOR CHILD AND FAMILY HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT KNOWN AS STAND CHILDRENʼS SERVICES

Second Plaintiff

AND

BRETT DAVIS ROLLANDER, KIRSTY- ANNE ROLLANDER AND VAREENA STEVENS AND JILL BURKE, RICHARD BURKE AND MONICA YOUNG

First Defendants

AND

PATRICIA KAY HUFF Second Defendant

AND

STEPHEN JOHN MACKLIN AND ADELE MARGARET MACKLIN Third Defendants

AND

ROBERT HAROLD WYLIE WAKELIN, JOANNE ISABELL WAKELIN AND BURROWES TRUSTEE SERVICES (2013) LIMITED

Fourth Defendants

AND

NEIL TREVOR TURNER, JEAN ELIZABETH TURNER AND KAPITI TRUST COMPANY LIMITED

Fifth Defendants

AND

CHRISTOPHER JOHN LAMAIN AND CAROL ANN LAMAIN

Sixth Defendants

DOAK & ORS v ROLLANDER & ORS [2016] NZHC 2319 [29 September 2016]

ANDCAROL LILLIAN WEBSTER, STUART GORDAN WEBSTER AND HERCUS KING TRUSTEES LIMITED

Seventh Defendants

Hearing: On Papers

Counsel:

P S J Withnall for Plaintiffs
M Riordan and N Jessen for First, Third, Sixth and Seventh
Defendants

Judgment:

29 September 2016

JUDGMENT OF SIMON FRANCE J (Costs/stay of costs award)

[1]      Following upon the judgment of 29 July 2016, the unsuccessful defendants seek orders that:

(a)       costs lie where they fall; or alternatively there be reduced costs;

(b)any award of costs be stayed until the determination of an appeal brought by the seventh defendant.

[2]      The substantive proceeding concerned the interpretation of a provision in a restrictive covenant.  The second plaintiff wishes to purchase land in a subdivision from the first plaintiff.   It sought a declaration that its intended use (what was previously known as a children’s health camp) would not breach  a term of the restrictive covenant prohibiting commercial activity.   A declaration to that effect issued.

[3]      The  proceeding  was  actively  defended  by  four  of  the  seven  named defendants.    One of them,  the seventh  defendant,  has  filed appeal  proceedings. However all four defendants who would be liable to pay costs if an award is made seek a stay pending determination of the appeal.

Costs lie where they fall

[4]      The respondents emphasise that the proceedings were for a declaration, and were for the plaintiffs’ benefit.  It is submitted the second plaintiff could have just completed the proposed purchase and seen if any objection was taken to its use. Instead  it  chose to  make the obtaining of such a declaration  a condition  of its purchase.

[5]      Emphasis is placed on the costs discretion afforded by s 13 of the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908 which it is said is a departure from the normal rule that costs follow the event.   On that matter the  second  plaintiff refers to  a passage from Waimauku Estate Ltd v Jack and Anor which holds that the normal costs principles

contained in the Rules apply.1

[6]      The form  of  proceeding is  not  pivotal  here.    It  is  clear that  the  second plaintiff’s proposed use was strongly opposed by some…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Doak v Rollander and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2016] NZHC 2319
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Doak v Rollander is a case that came before the High Court of New Zealand. The primary dispute in this case revolves around the interpretation of a restrictive covenant in a subdivision, specifically whether the second plaintiff's intended use of the land would constitute a breach of the covenant prohibiting commercial activity. The second plaintiff, Children's Health Camps, sought a declaration that their intended use, which was previously known as a children’s health camp, would not violate the terms of the restrictive covenant. This case was actively defended by four of the seven named defendants, with one of them filing an appeal. The defendants sought orders that costs lie where they fall or, alternatively, that any award of costs be reduced or stayed until the determination of an appeal brought by one of the defendants.

The central legal issues before the court were the appropriate allocation of costs between the parties and whether any such costs should be reduced or stayed pending the outcome of an appeal. The court had to consider whether the costs should follow the event in the normal way, whether there were grounds to reduce the costs, and if an appeal by one of the defendants justified a stay of the costs award. The court was also required to address the discretionary nature of costs in declaratory judgment proceedings under the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908.

The court's reasoning focused on the nature of the proceeding, which was for a declaration and primarily for the benefit of the second plaintiff. The court emphasised that the proceeding was adversarial, as opposed to purely assisting the court, and that there was no public dimension to it. The court held that costs should follow the event in the normal way, rejecting the argument that costs should lie where they fall. Regarding the request for reduced costs, the court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to full costs, rejecting the defendants' arguments that certain costs should be excluded or limited. The court also declined to stay the costs award, noting that the fact of an appeal alone does not justify a stay, especially since not all liable defendants were appealing. The court concluded that the first, third, sixth and seventh defendants are liable for costs on a 2B scale, together with reasonable disbursements. The normal rule of joint and several liability applies, while the Council is to carry its own costs but is not otherwise liable to pay costs.