| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND |
| CA767/2011 [2012] NZCA 309 |
| BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS |
| AND SHANON JOHN GEORGE HALL |
| Hearing: 3 July 2012 |
| Court: Ellen France, Randerson and Stevens JJ |
| Counsel: M J Lillico for Appellant |
| Judgment: 17 July 2012 at 2.30 p.m. |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The appeal is dismissed.
___________________________________________________________________
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Randerson J)
Introduction
This appeal raises an issue about the meaning of the term “legally represented” for the purposes of s 30(1) of the Sentencing Act 2002. In particular, when a defendant is represented in court by a duty lawyer, does that amount to legal representation for the purposes of the section?
The appeal was brought by the Solicitor-General under s 144 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 (the SPA) against a decision of MacKenzie J on an appeal from the District Court.[1] Leave to appeal to this Court was later granted by MacKenzie J.[2]
[1] Hall v R DC Nelson CRI-2011-042-2195, 5 September 2011.
[2] Hall v R HC Nelson CRI-2011-442-35, 10 November 2011.
The respondent Mr Hall was sentenced in the District Court in Nelson to two months imprisonment after pleading guilty to a charge of failing to report for community work. When he appealed to the High Court, MacKenzie J allowed the appeal and substituted a sentence of home detention for one month. He did so on the basis that it was not safe to assume that Mr Hall’s decision to enter a guilty plea, based only on advice from the duty lawyer, was a fully informed decision.
In consequence, MacKenzie J held that Mr Hall could not be said to have been legally represented by the duty lawyer for the purposes of s 30 of the Sentencing Act. That section provides:
30No sentence of imprisonment to be imposed without opportunity for legal representation
(1) No court may impose a sentence of imprisonment on an offender who has not been legally represented at the stage of the proceedings at which the offender was at risk of conviction, except as provided in subsection (2).
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the court is satisfied that the offender—
(a)was informed of his or her rights relating to legal representation, including, where appropriate, the right to apply for legal aid under the Legal Services Act 2000; and
(b)fully understood those rights; and
(c)had the opportunity to exercise those rights; and
(d)refused or failed to exercise those rights, or engaged counsel but subsequently dismissed him or her.
(3) If, on any appeal against sentence, a court finds that a sentence was imposed in contravention of subsection (1), the court must either—
(a)quash the sentence imposed and impose in substitution for it any other lawful sentence that the court thinks ought to have been imposed; or
(b)quash the conviction and direct a new hearing or trial, or make any other…
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- Case
- [2012] NZCA 309
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Background
Background to the litigation
The case began with an appeal to the High Court from a District Court sentencing decision, where MacKenzie J substituted a sentence of home detention for Hall. The Department of Corrections, as the original informant, then appealed to the Court of Appeal under section 144 of the Summary Proceedings Act. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal as the Department of Corrections did not seek to overturn the substituted sentence imposed in the High Court.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Who is the correct appellant in the case?
2. Does this Court have jurisdiction in respect of the appeal?
3. Should this Court express a view on the meaning of "legal representation" for the purposes of s 30(1) of the Sentencing Act?
Held
1. The correct appellant in the case is the Department of Corrections, not the Solicitor-General or "The Queen". The court accepted that the Solicitor-General had a legitimate interest in the subject matter of the appeal and amended the intituling accordingly.
2. This Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Department of Corrections does not seek to overturn the sentence imposed by the High Court, and therefore, the appeal does not involve an adverse consequence that could be appealed under s 144(1) of the Summary Proceedings Act.
3. The Court chooses not to express a view on the meaning of "legal representation" for the purposes of s 30(1) of the Sentencing Act, but makes brief observations that the question of legal representation is essentially a question of fact and that the role of a duty lawyer is not to be underestimated.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court began by addressing the issue of who is the correct appellant in the case. The Court concluded that the Department of Corrections is the correct appellant, despite the initial confusion in the intituling of the case. The Court found no prejudice to the respondent and acknowledged the Solicitor-General's legitimate interest in the appeal.
The second issue considered was whether the Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Court examined s 144(1) of the Summary Proceedings Act and determined that the powers of the Court of Appeal on an appeal under s 144 are limited to those of the High Court under s 121 of the Act. The Court found that since the Department of Corrections did not seek to challenge or overturn the substituted sentence imposed in the High Court, there was no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
Lastly, the Court addressed the issue of whether it should express a view on the meaning of "legal representation" for the purposes of s 30(1) of the Sentencing Act. The Court declined to do so, but made brief observations that the question of legal representation is a question of fact and that the role of a duty lawyer should not be underestimated. The Court also noted that the decision of the Court in Long remains good law and that the continuing application of that decision may be revisited on another occasion if a proper evidential foundation is presented.