Deliu v King Charles Iii
[2024] NZHC 1664
•24 June 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2023-404-2888
[2024] NZHC 1664
UNDER the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016, Part 30 of the High Court Rules, New
Zealand Bill of Rights 1990 and the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908
IN THE MATTER
of proceedings moving of an application for judicial review, writs, bill of rights claims and a petition for declaratory relief.
BETWEEN
DOCTOR FRANCISC CATALIN DELIU
Applicant
AND
KING CHARLES THE THIRD
First Respondent
DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERAL
Second RespondentATTORNEY GENERAL
Third Respondent
Hearing: 5 May 2024 Appearances:
Applicant by video link
D J Perkins for Respondent
Judgment
24 June 2024
JUDGMENT OF WHATA J
This judgment was delivered by me on 24 June 2024 at 4.00pm,
pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date: ………………………….
DELIU v KING CHARLES THE THIRD [2024] NZHC 1664 [24 June 2024]
[1] Mr Deliu applies to have Counsel for the Crown debarred from this proceeding. He says that Crown Counsel and in particular Mr Neild, has misled the Court both administratively and substantively. This, he says, has led to procedural unfairness and undue delay.
The claim
[2] Mr Deliu is presently facing two charges of assault and two charges of perverting the course of justice. These charges were laid in 2017 and 2018 respectively. Mr Deliu is now resident overseas and has no intention of returning. He has made requests to the Crown to:
(a)be extradited.
(b)have the charges withdrawn.
(c)be tried by AVL.
(d)have the charges stayed.
[3] The Crown refused the requests relating to extradition, withdrawal, and AVL. It did not respond at all to the request for stay. Mr Deliu filed these proceedings seeking to review those refusals and lack of response on various grounds, including; breach of ss 25(b) and 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights, errors of law and fact, failure to have regard to relevant considerations and irrationality.
The process
[4] As the claim for debarment relates specifically to the steps taken in this proceeding it is necessary to set out what has occurred to date in some detail. I note that Mr Deliu’s documents are dated one day behind New Zealand time.
[5] On 29 November 2023, the applicant Mr Deliu filed his first statement of claim with an amended claim No 1 filed the same day. An amended Claim No 2 and case management memorandum was then filed on 18 December 2023. A further amended
Claim No 3 was filed on 12 January 2024. Claim No 4 was filed on 16 January 2024, and Amended Claim No 5 was then filed on 21 January 2024.
[6] On 22 January 2024, Mr Neild, unaware of Amended Claim No 5, sought an extension of time for filing the statement of defence. In light of the various amended statements of claim the Crown sought an extension to 12 February 2024 and noted that if any further statements of claim were filed it may need to seek a further extension. On 23 January 2024, O’Gorman J granted the extension as sought and reserved leave for the Crown to seek a further extension if necessary.
[7] In a case management memorandum dated 25 January 2024, Mr Deliu sought timetabling allocations for both the underlying proceeding and his interlocutory application. On 12 February 2024, Mr Neild filed a memorandum updating the Court on the timing of the respondent’s statement of defence. In this memorandum Mr Neild states that the final amended statement of claim dated 21 January 2024 was served by the applicant in between the Crown’s earlier memorandum and their receipt of O’Gorman J’s minute. Mr Neild proposed they address the timing of the statement of defence at the first case management conference scheduled for 21 February 2024 because the final statement of claim raised significant new material.
[8] On 15 February 2024, counsel for the Auckland District Court filed a memorandum seeking leave to appear remotely at the case management conference.
[9] On 19 February 2024, Mr Neild filed on behalf of the Crown a memorandum setting out its position ahead of the case management conference. In this memorandum he explains that the Crown seeks either a stay of the proceeding pending the appeal of a decision of Brewer J in Deliu v Attorney General,1 or timetabling directions towards a hearing to determine whether a security for costs order should be made.
[10] The memorandum from Mr Deliu dated 18 February 2024 replies to the previous memorandum from Crown counsel. In this memorandum the applicant asserts that Mr Neild was lying when he claimed issues in the current proceeding have
1 Deliu v Attorney-General [2023] NZHC 512.
already been adjudicated and that he has already defaulted on his word of honour by failing to file the statement of defence by 12 February 2024. Mr Deliu also claims that any application for security will fail citing a previous case he was involved in where it was found that ordering security would have the effect of terminating the proceeding.
[11] Mr Deliu also filed an interlocutory application for temporary injunctive relief dated 19 February 2024. He applied for a positive or mandatory injunction compelling the Attorney General to consider his request made on 11 January 2024 to stay the criminal proceedings.
[12] In a memorandum dated 20 February 2024, Mr Deliu submitted proposed timetabling and reiterated his application to the Attorney General to stay the criminal proceedings. He proposed timetabling for a two-hour hearing for “both interlocutories”. In the final paragraph of this memorandum, he also states that he will be moving to debar Mr Neild but will wait until after his application for the injunction is heard because he does not want any further delays.
[13] A telephone case management conference was convened before Woolford J on 21 February 2024.
[14] In a memorandum dated 23 February 2024 Mr Neild responded to the Mr Deliu’s timetabling proposal including his proposal that his interlocutory application be heard at the same time as the Crown’s application for security of costs. In terms of the interlocutory application for the Attorney General to consider Mr Deliu’s request, Mr Neild stated this request had been received and a decision would be made by 22 March 2024 so Mr Deliu’s application for the current proceedings to be stayed was no longer necessary. He therefore proposed timetabling for the Crown’s application for security of costs without timetabling for Mr Deliu’s interlocutory application.
[15] In a memorandum dated 22 February 2024, Mr Deliu acknowledges the Attorney General has now agreed to hear his claim but seeks for the costs of his
interlocutory application to be met by the Crown. This memorandum also reiterates his intention to debar Mr Neild.
[16] In a memorandum dated 26 February 2024, Mr Neild acknowledged receipt of Mr Deliu’s memorandum confirming that he had withdrawn his interlocutory application. He then sought for the security for costs application to be timetabled without any other interlocutory matters and a direction that they not file a statement of defence until the security for costs application has been determined.
[17] On 27 February 2024, Mr Deliu filed an interlocutory application to remove Mr Neild or to debar him from acting as counsel in the proceeding. In an affidavit in support of this application Mr Deliu set out the reasons why he believes Mr Neild has “violated one or more ethical obligations” and misled him as well as the Court.
[18] On 28 February 2024, Mr Deliu also filed an ex parte application for formal proof hearing attaching the fifth statement of claim dated 21 January 2024.
[19] On 5 March 2024, the respondent filed its memorandum responding to each of Mr Deliu’s applications for debarment, costs, and formal proof. Counsel indicated their opposition to the debarment application and proposed that each of these applications be decided on the papers while timetabling directions are made for the respondents to apply for security for costs and a direction is made deferring the filing of a statement of defence until the Court determine the security for costs application.
[20] Mr Deliu immediately filed a memorandum in response claiming this is an improper way to litigate. While he did not oppose the applications for formal proof and costs being heard on the papers, he objected to the application for debarment being decided on the papers. Mr Deliu filed a further memorandum dated 14 March 2024 pointing out that the Crown had not filed submissions by 15 March 2024 in accordance with their proposed timetabling for a hearing on security for costs.
[21] On 18 March 2024, Woolford J issued two minutes. First declining Mr Deliu’s request for the interlocutory matters to be heard on 21 March 2024 and second to adjourn the proceeding to a second call in the judicial review list on 17 April 2024. In
this minute he lays out the complicated background to the current matter and records the outstanding matters to be:
(a)The Crown's notification of 19 February 2024 that it intended to make an application for security for costs and its request for timetable orders.
(b)Mr Deliu's memorandum dated 22 February 2024 seeking costs against counsel personally and/or the Attorney-General.
(c)The Crown's application dated 26 February 2024 to defer the filing of the statement of defence.
(d)Mr Deliu's application dated 27 February 2024 to debar Crown Law and Mr Neild from acting in the proceeding.
(e)Mr Deliu's application dated 28 February 2024 for formal proof hearing.
[22] On 18 March 2024, the respondents filed their interlocutory application for security of costs. On 29 March 2024, Mr Deliu filed a notice of opposition in response to the interlocutory application made by the respondent. On 31 March 2024, Mr Deliu also made an application to recuse Jagose J from the proceeding because the Judge’s sister is Una Jagose the Solicitor General.
[23] On 17 April 2024, Venning J issued a minute noting the three applications before the Court. The first in time being Mr Deliu’s application to remove Mr Neild as counsel. The second being the respondent’s application for security for costs and the third being the application to recuse Jagose J. Justice Venning allocated a one- hour hearing on 5 June 2024 for the application to remove Mr Neild as counsel. He set down the timetabling directions and allocated a time for the security for costs hearing as well. In relation to the application to recuse Jagose J he noted that if the matter is scheduled before him then it will be for the Judge to deal with that application.
Claims against Mr Neild
[24] Given the allegations that counsel has misled the Court are serious matters, I directed that Mr Deliu identify the verbatim misrepresentations. He identified the following:2
A.On 22 January 2024, Mr Neild advised in a memorandum to this Honourable Court that “the respondent seeks an extension to file the statement of defence, to three weeks from today: ie to 12 February 2024”, Tab 8 at ¶ 3. This never happened. I relied on this when I, on 21 January 2024, did not oppose an extension. Had I known that no defence would be filed, I would have moved for formal proof under High Court Rules 2016 r 15.9.
B.On 12 February 2024, Mr Neild advised that his client “proposes to address the timing of the statement of defence at the first case management conference, which is scheduled for 21 February 2024. A memorandum in advance of that conference, addressing this and other Schedule 5 matters, will be filed by the respondent shortly”, Tab 12 at
¶ 4. This did not occur, refer Tab 13. Again, I relied on his word of honor when I consented on 11 February 2024. Had I not, I would have altered my position.
C.On 19 February 2024, Mr Neild moved for “a stay of the proceeding pending Mr Deliu’s appeal of Brewer J’s decision in Deliu v Attorney- General”, Tab 13 at ¶ 1.1, on the basis that “[t]his new proceeding relies on arguments rejected by Brewer J”, at ¶ 7, which I “appealed”, at ¶ 8, such that “it is open to the Court to stay this proceeding pending the outcome of the appeal of Brewer J’s decision. If Brewer J’s decision is overturned and the Court of Appeal finds that the Crown acted unlawfully in maintaining the charges, that may be determinative of this proceeding. Alternatively, if Brewer J’s decision is upheld, the Court of Appeal’s reasoning is likely to be relevant to the High Court in determining this proceeding”, at ¶ 15, and accordingly sought a “direction”, at ¶ 16, that “the proceeding be stayed pending the outcome of the Court of Appeal hearing of the appeal against Brewer J’s decision”, at 16.1. Not only was there no basis for this motion but it was irregular, i.e., without any authority cited in support, contrary to r 7.19, without any evidential basis in support contrary to r 7.20, without any reference to what part of the other case somehow could dispose of the instant case, without any comparison of the pleadings or appeal notice in either of the cases and too close to the case management conference, r 7.24.
D.In that same document, Mr Neild “propose[d]”, ibid at ¶ 17, “the Crown to file an application for security for costs by 15 March 2024”, id at ¶ 17.1. This did not happen.
E.On 23 February 2024, Mr Neild affirmed “the Crown to file an application for security for costs by 15 March 2024”, Tab 19 at ¶ 4.1. This did not happen.
2 Mr Deliu’s synopsis dated 4 June 2024.
F.“At the 21 February 2024 hearing before the Honourable Justice Woolford, Mr Neild then referred to a “Harvey J” judgment under appeal that somehow also needed to await a decision from the Court of Appeal before this case could be progressed”, Tab 22 at ¶ 13D. This was yet a new theory that I was given absolutely no advanced notice and so was an inappropriate ambush and, again, it was improperly made orally, from the Bar, in breach of ethics, Rr 13.5, 13.5.1, 13.5.2,
13.5.3 and/or 13.5.4 of the Lawyers & Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, not in writing with no reference to any underlying legal or factual basis for it and, as there are many Harvey J Deliu decisions, actually did confuse me and de minimis risked misleading the Honourable Justice Woolford.
G.On 5 March 2024, Mr Neild reaffirmed that “the respondents to file an application for security for costs by 15 March 2024”, Tab 24 at ¶
6.1. This did not happen.
H.In that same document, Mr Neild submitted “[t]he Court of Appeal’s decisions are likely to be relevant to the High Court’s determination of this proceeding”, ibid at ¶ 19. Again, no reference is made to why, how or in what manner the two appeals had anything to do with the issues in the pleading in the instant case.
I.On 18 March 2024, Mr Neild asserted that “[t]his proceeding lacks merit”, Tab 32 at ¶ 5. Ipso facto this cannot be so as my cause of action against the Attorney-General for ignoring my January 2024 request for stay, Tab 7 at 33, succeeded, refer Tab 13 at ¶ 2 “Mr Deliu’s request has now been received by Crown Law. It will be considered and a decision made by Friday 22 March 2024” and the express concession at Tab 25 at ¶ 11 that “…Mr Deliu obtained the thing he wanted (consideration of his stay request)….”
[25] He also identified the following matters as further supporting his claim of Counsel misconduct:3
A.Mr Neild is the subject of current, and prima facie meritorious, law society complaint and Harley costs application. In any event, the appearance of justice requires he be excused, at least pending their final resolution on the merits.
B.The Crown Law Office did not file a notice of opposition to the application to debar, even though that is required by r 7.24. I did file a proper opposition to the application for security for costs. § 27(3) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 refers: “Every person has the right to bring civil proceedings against, and to defend civil proceedings brought by, the Crown, and to have those proceedings heard, according to law, in the same way as civil proceedings between individuals.”
C.The Crown Law Office did not file a r 7.19 application to extend time for filing a defence. All of my applications for injunctive relief,
3 Mr Deliu’s synopsis dated 4 June 2024.
debarment and formal proof were made in the proper manner. My costs application was made by memorandum, but that is accepted custom. The Crown should be held to the same standards as any other litigant under the Rules.
D.No reason is ever really given for the Crown delays, but especially not why it took almost 4 months for a security for costs application to be filed and served and why it altered its original position that a defence would be filed on 12 February 2024. An inference can be drawn that the only reason that the application for security for costs was finally filed on 18 March 2024, almost four months after initial service of the proceedings, is because I raised this default in my 14 March 2024 Memorandum, at Tab 26 and/or filed my full evidence and submissions on 15 and 16 March 2024 respectively, at Tabs 27-29. The vanguard of my pleading is delay in criminal charges that date back 2,671 days (over an alleged scratch and bruise) and 2,229 (over allegedly my telling my clients who were criminal suspects not to speak to the Police in circumstances where they ultimately both pleaded guilty to criminal fraud and then made a deal with the Crown to turn state’s evidence and accuse me of witness intimidation), so longer than the 2,194 days from Germany's invasion of Poland to Japan's surrender, which are preventing me from practicing law and moving on with my life. Justice delayed is justice denied…4
[26] Mr Deliu also refers to the “model litigant” as a reference point for assessment of Mr Neild’s conduct. He states that the Crown has “model litigant obligations” and cites the Attorney General’s Values for Crown Civil Litigation. He notes the following as material duties:5
5. The Crown will:
5.1Take and defend litigation in accordance with the rule of law, ensuring the Government is able to pursue its objectives and responsibilities lawfully and effectively.
5.2Deal with litigation promptly and efficiently and without causing unnecessary delays or expense and seek to have cases resolved as early as is appropriate and on such terms as are appropriate.
5.3Apply a fair and objective approach in the handling of litigation, promoting the just and fair application of the law to all.
5.4Consider the possibilities for, and initiate where appropriate, alternative means of avoiding or resolving litigation, including by cooperation or other agreed resolution.
5.5Responsibly spend public funds in relation to litigation.
4 Citing Ngunguru Coastal Investments Ltd v Māori Land Court [2011] NZAR 354 at [23]–[24].
5 Crown Law “Attorney-General's Values for Crown Civil Litigation” (31 July 2013).
5.6Not take inappropriate or unfair advantage of an impecunious or unrepresented opponent.
5.7Not contest matters which it accepts as correct.
5.8Not take unmeritorious points for tactical reasons.
5.9Not pursue appeals unless it considers that it has reasonable prospects of success or the appeal is otherwise justified in the public interest.
[27] Mr Deliu therefore submits that Mr Neild has breached his ethical duties to the Court and fell well below the standards expected of a model litigant by his inappropriate filings, statements to the Court and failures to act as indicated in a timely manner and indeed at all. Mr Deliu contends that the way in which Mr Neild has represented the overlap between the present proceedings and others Mr Deliu is involved in is misleading. He also claims that Mr Neild actively misled the Court when stated he would file a statement of defence and then failed to file said statement of defence. Furthermore, Mr Deliu considers the application for security for costs to be a “procedurally or ethically” inappropriate manner to litigate because it delays his access to justice.
Assessment
[28]As stated by the Court of Appeal in Accent Management:6
[32] The Court has jurisdiction to debar counsel or solicitors from acting where that is necessary in order for justice to be done or to be seen to be done. Removal will usually be ordered where counsel will not be able to comply with his or her duties to the Court: where there is a conflict of interest, or where there is a real risk that a client will not be represented with objectivity. The threshold for removal is a high one, requiring something extraordinary. The Court should guard against allowing removal applications to be used as a tactical weapon to disadvantage the opposing party.
(footnotes omitted)
[29]The high threshold for removal is further emphasised in Cant v R:7
The principles in this area are clear. The Court may debar counsel from acting in a proceeding where it is necessary in order for justice to be done or seen to be done. The threshold for removal of counsel is high requiring something
6 Accent Management Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2013] NZCA 155, [2013] 3 NZLR 374.
7 Cant v R [2013] NZCA 321 at [61].
extraordinary to warrant that course. In Clear Communications Ltd v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Fisher J opined that the jurisdiction to remove counsel will only be exercised in cases of “truly egregious misconduct likely to infect future proceedings”.
(footnotes omitted)
[30] I will address each of Mr Deliu’s key claims noted at [24], before deciding whether Mr Neild’s conduct qualifies as extraordinary or truly egregious misconduct warranting debarment.
[31] Dealing first with items A and B, Mr Neild’s representations that he would file a statement of defence by particular dates together with the failure to file one as directed by O’Gorman J or at all. I do not consider this conduct demands any form of censure. As Mr Perkins accurately put it, Mr Neild was dealing with a rolling maul of amended statements of claim, including three amended statements of claim within two weeks. Indeed, Mr Neild’s initial representation as to timing like O’Gorman J’s direction, related to Amended Claim No 4 and immediately became redundant on the filing of Amended Claim No 5. Similarly, I also see nothing in the subsequent decision not to file a statement of defence pending resolution of an application for security. That was simply a matter of litigation strategy still available to the respondents at the time given that the period for filing a statement of defence in relation to Claim No 5 had not expired.
[32] As to the stay application (items C, F, and H), Mr Deliu is on slightly better ground because this could have been foreshadowed much earlier, but still the conduct complained about is well short of “ something extraordinary”. Mr Neild sought a stay of the proceeding pending Mr Deliu’s appeal of Brewer J’s decision in Deliu v Attorney-General,8 and in argument also referred to Harvey J’s decision of the same name.9 The basis for a stay was set out in the submissions of Mr Neild. The simple point asserted was that the application relies on arguments rejected by Brewer J who had observed that:10
In short, the Courts will not interfere with the existence of the prosecutorial discretion to bring and continue charges, other than grounds of evidential
8 Above n 1.
9 Deliu v Attorney-General [2023] NZHC 1159.
10 Above n 1, at [6].
insufficiency, without clear evidence of wrongdoing which requires as a condign response that the charges be stayed or struck out. That is a high threshold to [show] and Mr Deliu’s claims do not come close to doing so.
[33] While the decisions of Brewer J and Harvey J are not concerned with the exact allegations currently before the Court, the Crown’s position was not so hopeless as to amount to misrepresentation of fact or law. Both decisions concern related judicial review applications made by Mr Deliu. It is at least arguable that this Court might benefit from the Court of Appeal’s view on the point of principle advanced by Brewer J for the purpose of resolving the present claims. In any event, I consider that Mr Neild’s conduct in this respect falls well short of misrepresentation or similar conduct qualifying for debarment.
[34] Mr Deliu’s claim that the application for security is hopeless is not a matter properly resolvable in this context. Indeed, to do so would pre-empt the proper consideration of this matter. I would simply observe that, as Mr Deliu is resident overseas and has made it plain that he has no intention of returning to New Zealand, an application for security as to costs does not appear outrageous on its face.11 I also do not think the fact that Mr Neild did not file the application for security by a specified date (items D, E and G) qualified as truly egregious conduct.
[35] Mr Deliu’s complaint about Mr Neild’s claim that the proceedings lacked merit (item I) can hardly provide a basis for debarment. The Courts would be empty of lawyers were that so.
[36] Turning to Mr Deliu’s formal complaint against Mr Neild, Mr Deliu conceded that a complaint by itself about opposing counsel could not provide a proper basis for debarment. But he says, when viewed in connection with his misleading and wasteful conduct, this factor is another reason for removing him from the proceedings. But as I do not accept his other criticisms of Mr Neild are extraordinary or truly egregious conduct, his complaint adds nothing to the assessment.
[37] Stepping back from the individual complaints, and assessing Mr Deliu’s concerns in the round, claims of unethical behaviour or substandard conduct by
11 Aquaculture Corp v McFarlane Laboratories (1984) Ltd (1987) 1 PRNZ 467 at 470–471.
counsel are very serious matters.12 It is not enough to simply identify steps taken that ideally should have been taken. Even model litigants may err without risk of debarment. If that were not so, very few counsel would survive scrutiny. In any event, I do not accept that Mr Neild’s actions or alleged missteps individually or collectively qualify as extraordinary or truly egregious misconduct that requires debarment.
[38] In terms of the Attorney General’s Values, they were published by Crown Law in response to a recommendation to develop a model litigant guideline similar to Australian policies.13 The Values and model litigant guidelines generally embody a commitment to uphold the rule of law and seek to promote the efficient and fair administration of justice. As a Full Court of the High Court observed in Solicitor General v Miss Alice the “theme overall is that the Crown as Executive must be an exemplar of high standards of conduct in litigation before the Courts.”14 But importantly, the Crown may take steps open to a private individual and is not subject to different procedural obligations than those that apply to a normal litigant.15
[39] Returning to the present case, I am not satisfied that Mr Neild has fallen below the standards expected by the Attorney General’s Values or model litigant obligations more generally. As has often been said elsewhere, in law context is everything.16 There has been much activity in this proceeding over a short period. Illustrative of this:
(a)Since proceedings were commenced on 29 November 2023, five amended statements of claim have been filed.
12 See Accent Management above n 6; Cant v R above n 7; and Clear Communications Ltd v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand (1999) 14 PRNZ 477 (HC) at 483.
13 Miriam Dean QC and David Cochrane A Review of the Role and Functions of the Solicitor- General and the Crown Law Offıce (Crown Law, 24 February 2012) at 15–16.
14 Solicitor General v Miss Alice [2007] 2 NZLR 783 at [48]. For the requirement of all counsel to be seen to be promoting the efficient and effective administration of justice and the power of the Court to control its own processes, see Black v Taylor [1993] 3 NZLR 403 (CA) at 408ff.
15 For detailed discussion on the Crown as a model litigant see Anthea Williams “Is the Crown Expected to be a Model Litigant in New Zealand?” (2017) 28 PLR 61.
16 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 AC 532 at 548 per Lord Steyn.
(b)In the period 18 December 2024 to 14 March 2024, 13 memoranda were filed, nearly evenly split between Mr Deliu and the Crown, as well as a memorandum filed by the Auckland District Court.
(c)In the period 19 February 2024 to 31 March 2024, Mr Deliu filed an application for temporary injunctive relief, an application to remove Crown counsel, an application for formal proof, and an application for recusal. Meanwhile the Crown also made an application for security for costs.
[40] While as Mr Deliu says, Mr Neild has played his part in this rolling maul, his conduct must be understood in light of this intense level of activity over a relatively short period. At most it might be said he has acted prematurely in committing to certain dates or ambitiously in terms of the application for stay. None of this in my view requires intervention of the type sought by Mr Deliu.
[41]In the result, I am satisfied the application for debarment must be dismissed.
[42] Turning to costs, they must in my view follow the event. The application to debar was unjustified in the circumstances. There shall be an order for costs on a 2B basis in favour of the Crown accordingly.
[43] For completeness I received a further memorandum from Mr Deliu after hearing referring to another hearing involving Mr Neild.17 He identifies various matters which he says reveal still further shortcomings in Mr Neild’s behaviour. I simply record that I have taken those matters into account and my position remains the same.
Whata J
Solicitors:
Crown Law, Wellington Copy to: Dr F C Deliu
17 Mr Deliu’s Motion and attached Affidavit dated 19 June 2024.
0
3
1