De Mey v The Queen

Case [2005] NZSC 42


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

SC 31/2005

[2005] NZSC 42

RAMON DIRK JOHANNES DE MEY

v

THE QUEEN

Court:            Blanchard J and Tipping J Counsel:  Applicant in Person

A M Powell for the Respondent

Judgment:      29 June 2005

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

REASONS

[1] An application by Mr De Mey for leave to appeal against the refusal of the Court of Appeal to re-open his appeal was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds : [2005] NZSC 27. The applicant now seeks leave to appeal against the dismissal by the Court of Appeal of his appeal against a conviction for common assault. His application is long out of time but the Crown accepts that the delay causes no prejudice.

[2]      It is plain, however, that the proposed appeal does not satisfy the criteria in s 13 of the Supreme Court Act 2003.  It relates entirely to the findings of fact which

DE MEY V R SC SC 31/2005 [29 June 2005]

the jury must have made and as such raises no question of general or public importance.  Nor is there an appearance that a substantial miscarriage of justice may have occurred.   The Court of Appeal has reviewed the evidence concerning the degree of force used by the applicant and has determined that the jury could properly find that the applicant was not acting in self defence.

Solicitors:

Crown Law Office, Wellington

Details
AGLC
De Mey v The Queen [2005] NZSC 42
Case
[2005] NZSC 42
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of New Zealand, Ramon Dirk Johannes De Mey brought an application for leave to appeal against the dismissal of his appeal against a conviction for common assault. The case was presided over by Justices Blanchard and Tipping. De Mey represented himself in the case, while the Crown was represented by A M Powell. The court's decision was rendered on 29 June 2005.

The primary legal issue the court had to decide was whether the application for leave to appeal met the criteria outlined in section 13 of the Supreme Court Act 2003. The application, which was filed beyond the statutory time limit, pertained to the findings of fact made by the jury. The court was tasked with determining whether the appeal raised a question of general or public importance, or if there was an indication of a substantial miscarriage of justice.

The court found that the proposed appeal did not satisfy the criteria in section 13 of the Supreme Court Act 2003. It was entirely focused on the factual findings made by the jury and did not raise a question of general or public importance. Moreover, the Court of Appeal had already reviewed the evidence concerning the degree of force used by the applicant and had determined that the jury could properly find that the applicant was not acting in self-defense. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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