De Marco v Official Assignee
[2022] NZHC 1481
•23 June 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2021-485-130 CIV-2021-485-525
[2022] NZHC 1481
BETWEEN EUGENE JOHN DE MARCO
Plaintiff
AND
THE OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE
Defendant
Hearing: 25 May 2022 Appearances:
Plaintiff in person
G Neil and R Hindriksen for Defendant
Judgment:
23 June 2022
JUDGMENT OF WOOLFORD J
(Ordering security for costs)
This judgment was delivered by me on Thursday, 23 June 2022 at 2:00 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors: Meredith Connell (Office of the Crown Solicitor), Auckland Copy to: Plaintiff
DE MARCO v THE OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE [2022] NZHC 1481 [23 June 2022]
[1] On 14 July 2021, Associate Judge Johnston adjudicated Mr DeMarco bankrupt.1 Mr DeMarco had various appeals on foot at the time. The Official Assignee resolved not to pursue these appeals on his behalf.
[2] In these proceedings, Mr DeMarco applies for review of these decisions.2 The Official Assignee now applies for an order that Mr DeMarco pay security for costs on the reviews before they can be heard.
Background
Anderson v DeMarco
[3] On 22 December 2017, Mr DeMarco entered an unconditional agreement to sell a property in Wellington. The purchasers paid a deposit of $120,000. It later transpired Mr DeMarco had obtained an adverse report on the state of the property and failed to disclose it. The purchasers refused to settle, and when Mr DeMarco did not return their deposit, brought a claim in misrepresentation. Cooke J agreed and awarded the purchasers interim damages of $132,123 (later increased by $38,313.46) and costs.3
[4]Mr DeMarco was adjudicated bankrupt on the basis of this judgment debt.
[5] Mr DeMarco appealed the substantive decision, but this was deemed abandoned when he took no further steps. He also appealed the decision to adjudicate him bankrupt. He applied for dispensation of security for costs due to public interest and impecuniosity. On the latter front he provided information to the effect that his partner had no income and that he was awaiting the outcome of a legal aid application.
[6] The Registrar declined to dispense with security for costs on the bases that Mr DeMarco had not confirmed whether a family trust existed that might help fund his litigation and that, contrary to Mr DeMarco’s claim, the evidence suggested he was not being considered for legal aid.
1 Re DeMarco, ex parte Anderson [2021] NZHC 1757 [adjudication decision].
2 Insolvency Act 2006, s 226.
3 Anderson v DeMarco [2020] NZHC 2979, (2020) 21 NZCPR 758; and Anderson v DeMarco
[2020] NZHC 3490.
[7] Mr DeMarco then applied for review of the Registrar’s decision. Courtney J declined the application.4 She held there was no public interest in the appeal. The Registrar’s assessment of Mr DeMarco’s impecuniosity was correct. And the prospects of success of the appeal were “very limited”.5
The Vintage Aviator Ltd/Wulff v DeMarco
[8]Mr DeMarco also has outstanding judgment debts in other proceedings.
[9] Mr DeMarco was an employee of The Vintage Aviator Ltd (TVAL), which restores and manufactures vintage aircraft. TVAL’s shareholders are Sir Peter Jackson and Fran Walsh. He was also the sole shareholder and director of The Old Stick & Rudder Co Ltd (TOSR). TOSR was liable for a loan to Sir Peter Jackson and Ms Walsh’s trust, the Film Property Trust (FPT), and was significantly in default.
[10] In summary, Mr DeMarco arranged to sell three TVAL aircraft at inflated prices in order to keep the difference and use it to repay the loan to the FPT. In doing so, he made false representations to the purchaser (the New Zealand Warbirds Association) and TVAL.
[11] Mr DeMarco also arranged to sell to Mr Oliver Wulff an aircraft and a share in TOSR. Mr DeMarco and Mr Wulff entered into an agreement by which the aircraft would remain the property of TOSR and Mr Wulff obtained a legally meaningless “assignment of ownership” of the aircraft. Mr DeMarco later offered the aircraft as collateral for a further loan, also to pay the loan to the FPT. He did not inform the bank of any interest Mr Wulff may have had in the aircraft.
[12] For these actions Mr DeMarco was convicted of four charges of theft by a person in a special relationship and two charges of obtaining by deception. On 5 December 2019, Clark J sentenced him to two years, five months’ imprisonment.6
4 DeMarco v Anderson [2022] NZCA 57.
5 At [14].
6 R v DeMarco [2019] NZHC 3209.
[13] On Mr DeMarco’s release, TVAL, the trustees of the FPT and Mr Wulff continued civil claims against him in relation to the same facts. Those parties successfully obtained both an order of Associate Judge Johnston striking out elements of Mr DeMarco’s statement of defence that were factually inconsistent with his convictions7 and an unless order relating to discovery.8 When Mr DeMarco failed to comply with the unless order, he was debarred from defending the substantive proceeding.9
[14]In the substantive proceeding, Grice J awarded TVAL and the trustees of FPT
$957,020.05 against Mr DeMarco and TOSR, as well as an equitable charge for
$720,000 over an aircraft.10 Mr Wulff was awarded ownership of the relevant aircraft and shares in TOSR.11 Both TVAL and Mr Wulff were awarded costs against Mr DeMarco.12
This proceeding
[15] Mr DeMarco appealed Anderson v DeMarco, the original liability and damages judgment.13 This appeal was deemed abandoned on 10 June 2021, but Mr DeMarco’s counsel filed an application for an extension of time on 8 July 2021.
[16] Mr DeMarco also appealed the decisions of Associate Judge Johnston striking out part of his statement of defence and making an unless order,14 and later debarring him from defending the substantive proceeding.15 He has not appealed against the substantive judgments in the TVAL and Wulff proceedings.
[17] Following Mr DeMarco’s adjudication as bankrupt, the Official Assignee resolved not to pursue these appeals. Mr DeMarco then applied under s 226 of the Insolvency Act 2006 (Act) for review of the Official Assignee’s decisions. That section relevantly provides:
7 Pursuant to s 47 of the Evidence Act 2006.
8 The Vintage Aviator Ltd v DeMarco [2021] NZHC 847.
9 Vintage Aviator Ltd v DeMarco [2021] NZHC 1476.
10 The Vintage Aviator Ltd v DeMarco [2021] NZHC 3096.
11 Wulff v DeMarco [2021] NZHC 3110.
12 Vintage Aviator Ltd v DeMarco [2022] NZHC 334; and Wulff v DeMarco [2021] NZHC 3353.
13 Anderson v DeMarco [2020] NZHC 2979, above n 3.
14 The Vintage Aviator Ltd v DeMarco, above n 8.
15 Vintage Aviator Ltd v DeMarco, above n 9.
226 Appeal from Assignee’s decision
(1) A person (including the bankrupt or a creditor) whose interests, monetary or otherwise, are detrimentally affected by an act or decision to which this section applies may apply to the court to reverse or modify the act or decision.
…
(4) The court may confirm, reverse, or modify the act or decision.
[18] The Official Assignee now makes an interlocutory application under r 5.45 of the High Court Rules 2016 for an order for security for costs on Mr DeMarco’s application to review its decisions.
Law
[19] The approach to an application for an order for security for costs is summarised by the decision of Kós J in Highgate on Broadway Ltd v Devine. The Court must determine:16
(a)whether there is any reason to believe the plaintiff will be unable to meet an award of costs against him;
(b)whether it is appropriate to make the order; and if so
(c)the quantum of security to be ordered.
[20] The plaintiff’s inability to meet an award of costs is a “threshold question”. It is a question of fact without a burden of proof or presumption one way or the other. What is needed is “credible (that is, believable) evidence from which it may reasonably be inferred that the plaintiff will be unable to pay any such order.”17 It concerns the plaintiff’s financial ability, not willingness, to meet an adverse award of costs.18
[21] In determining whether an order is appropriate, the Court may consider a number of factors.
16 Highgate on Broadway Ltd v Devine [2012] NZHC 2288, [2013] NZAR 1017 at [6].
17 Sharda Holdings Ltd v Gasoline Alley Services Ltd HC Auckland CIV-2008-004-539, 13 November 2009 at [6].
18 Highgate on Broadway Ltd v Devine, above n 16, at [8].
[22] In favour of making an order, whether: the plaintiff is a “nominal” plaintiff; there is evidence of the plaintiff disposing of assets to avoid meeting a costs order; the plaintiff’s claim is unmeritorious; the plaintiff has access to third party funding; or denial of an order would be oppressive to the defendant.19
[23] Against making an order, whether: the defendant may have caused the plaintiff’s impecuniosity; the order would deny the plaintiff the capacity to advance a meritorious claim; or the defendant has delayed in applying for security.20
[24] Overall: the conduct of both parties; the public interest; and how best to balance the respective interests of the parties.21
Mr DeMarco’s submissions
[25] As well as addressing the factors in Highgate on Broadway, Mr DeMarco submits the Court has no jurisdiction to make the orders sought.
[26] First, Mr DeMarco submits an order for security for costs would be discrimination, in violation of the judicial oath of office, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, natural justice, international human rights law, and the common law principle of equality before the law. This is because as a lay litigant he is unable to make an equivalent costs claim against the Official Assignee.
[27] To the extent the right of lay litigants to claim costs is taken away by statute, Mr DeMarco submits statute cannot derogate from the common law.
[28] Mr DeMarco also submits the Official Assignee’s application should be struck out on the basis the Official Assignee failed to file its submissions within the time limit directed by Brewer J.
[29] Brewer J directed, in a minute of 7 April 2022, that Mr DeMarco file a notice of opposition to the application for an order for security for costs within 10 working
19 At [22].
20 At [23].
21 At [24].
days of the minute, and that the Official Assignee file submissions within 10 working days of Mr DeMarco filing a notice of opposition.22 Mr DeMarco filed his notice of opposition on 26 April 2022, precisely 10 working days later. The Official Assignee’s submissions were therefore due to be filed on 10 May 2022. In fact, they were filed on 19 May 2022. Mr Neil explained that the delay was occasioned by a communication failure in his office. I offered Mr DeMarco the opportunity to file further submissions within two weeks if he felt disadvantaged. He declined the offer.
[30] Most fundamentally, Mr DeMarco submits he has never consented to being adjudicated bankrupt, nor for the High Court to hear the proceeding. If he has given implied consent, he now withdraws that consent. Mr DeMarco intends to submit the matter to a Common Law Court.
Highgate on Broadway factors
[31] Mr DeMarco does not claim he is able to meet an adverse costs award. In fact, he submits the opposite: a Court order that he pay security for costs will have the effect of ending the application and stifling his right to be heard. He refers to Highgate on Broadway Ltd in which Kós J said:23
Access to justice is an essential human right. The cost of exercising that right is the payment of costs in the event of failure. The right of a successful defendant to costs in that event is arguably subordinate to the plaintiff's right to be heard. Strong social policy considerations favour the use of Courts as an accessible forum for the resolution of disputes and grievances of almost all kinds. Only where a clear impression can be formed that the plaintiff's claim is altogether without merit — so that in the alternative it would be amenable to being struck out — would it be right for security to be ordered where to do so would bring the plaintiff's claim to dead halt.
[32] Mr DeMarco submits his claims are not “altogether without merit”. In fact, his substantive claims, and therefore his applications for review of the Official Assignee’s decisions, have a high probability of success. This is because the decisions on appeal contain errors of fact, were arbitrary and appear to be biased.
22 DeMarco v Official Assignee HC Auckland CIV-2021-485-525, 7 April 2022, at [5(c)].
23 Highgate on Broadway Ltd v Devine, above n 16, at [23(b)].
[33] He submits that the Registrar’s decision declining to dispense with security for costs, and therefore Courtney J’s decision declining to review the decision of the Registrar,24 were wrong in fact. Contrary to the Registrar’s claim, Mr DeMarco answered questions relating to family trusts. Also contrary to the Registrar and Courtney J’s findings, the Legal Services Commissioner has confirmed its decision on legal aid is pending.
[34] Mr DeMarco also submits Associate Judge Johnston’s determination that Mr DeMarco’s likelihood of success in other proceedings was moot, was arbitrary, as was his determination that Mr DeMarco was unable to pay his debts.25 Mr DeMarco submits if he had control of his assets, he would be able to pay his debts.
[35] He claims that elements of Associate Judge Johnston and Courtney J’s decisions also evidence bias, via both the determination that Mr DeMarco’s likelihood of success in other proceedings was moot and the use of language such as:26
… it seems to be a further step in a very long drawn out effort to deprive the judgment creditors of the fruits of their judgment.
[36] Mr DeMarco notes the test for judicial bias is one of apprehension of bias, not actual bias, and that an apprehension of bias will invalidate a decision.27
[37] More fundamentally, Mr DeMarco appears to argue many decisions against him in relation to his bankruptcy have been arbitrary as he has never consented to bankruptcy or contracted with the Official Assignee.
[38] In relation to the merits of his appeals, Mr DeMarco submits his affidavit must be rebutted point by point by the Official Assignee or be taken as true.
24 DeMarco v Anderson, above n 4.
25 Re DeMarco, ex parte Anderson, above n 1, at [36].
26 DeMarco v Anderson, above n 4, at [15].
27 Citing Newfoundland Telephone Co v Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities)
[1992] 1 SCR 623; and Szilard v Szasz [1955] SCR 3.
Official Assignee’s submissions
[39] First, the Official Assignee clarifies there is jurisdiction to make a costs order against a bankrupt, including on applications brought under s 226 of the Act.28
[40] On the threshold question in Highgate on Broadway, the Official Assignee submits that Mr DeMarco asserted impecuniosity when applying for dispensation of security for costs in the Court of Appeal.29 He also claimed family members were unable to help him, demonstrating a lack of access to third party funding. He has never asserted to the contrary, including in his affidavit of 26 April 2022. In any event, all of Mr DeMarco’s property vested in the Official Assignee upon being adjudicated bankrupt.30
[41] The Official Assignee also notes an order for security for costs may have the effect of ending the proceedings, but this is not determinative.31
[42] On whether to make an order, the Official Assignee first submits the proceedings have no merit. Mr DeMarco has failed to identify any error in the decisions he challenges. He has no standing to apply under s 226 of the Act in any event, as his interests are not affected by the increase in the amount payable to creditors.32
[43] On the other factors mentioned by Kós J in Highgate: there is no evidence the Official Assignee is involved in causing Mr DeMarco’s impecuniosity. It is the result of the judgments against him described above. By contrast, there is some evidence Mr DeMarco is disposing of assets. The Official Assignee refers to a judgment of the Court of Appeal on Mr DeMarco’s application to suspend his bankruptcy. The Court of Appeal said:33
28 Citing Gibson v Official Assignee of New Zealand [2015] NZHC 3200.
29 Re DeMarco, ex parte Anderson, above n 1.
30 Insolvency Act, s 101.
31 Nikau Holdings Ltd v Bank of New Zealand (1992) 5 PRNZ 430 (HC).
32 Citing Gay v Bruns CA193/98, 17 June 1999; Glynbrook 2001 Ltd v Official Assignee [2012] NZCA 289; Gollan v Official Assignee [2012] NZHC 1869; and Burgess v Official Assignee [2019] NZHC 1324.
33 DeMarco v Anderson [2021] NZCA 476.
[15] We agree with the Official Assignee that suspending adjudication is likely to be highly prejudicial to the public interest.
[16] The Official Assignee has identified a number of assets and property that need to be investigated and if necessary secured. Those properties and assets include real estate in New York and Florida, a Ferrari motor car in New York and a plane in New Zealand, the ownership of which may be in the process of being transferred to a company in the United Kingdom.
[17] It is in the public interest that the restrictions attached to the adjudication remain in full force so as to enable the Official Assignee to discharge his duties and mitigate against any harm being caused to the business community and the broader public through the Official Assignee being hampered in the discharge of his responsibilities.
[44] On this point, Mr DeMarco has suggested in earlier affidavits that the Official Assignee’s alleged costs of administering the estate are excessive and made with the intention of draining the estate.
[45] The Official Assignee also submits there is also no evidence of improper delay or that Mr DeMarco is legally aided. In fact, there is evidence against a grant of legal aid: the fact Mr DeMarco’s counsel has been granted leave to withdraw.
[46] The Official Assignee submits Mr DeMarco’s conduct favours the making of an order. He has failed to comply with unless orders, resulting in his debarring from participating fully in proceedings. He has also allowed appeals to lapse and hearing dates to be vacated by failing to comply with timetabling orders.
[47] Finally, the Official Assignee goes further and submits Mr DeMarco’s conduct in the proceedings has been vexatious. It suggests Mr DeMarco is using unmeritorious litigation against the Official Assignee as a means of emptying his bankrupt estate and denying the victims of his fraud their money.
Discussion
[48]I first consider Mr DeMarco’s preliminary points.
[49] Mr DeMarco submits an award of costs, and therefore security for costs, against him would be discriminatory as he may not claim costs. The rule that self- represented lay litigants may not claim costs but may be liable to pay costs has recently
been affirmed by the Supreme Court.34 The Court noted there was a case for reform, but concluded that was not its role:
[88] Against that background, we conclude that, if there is to be reform to the law as it stood before Joint Action Funding, this should be effected otherwise than by the courts. This could be done by the legislature although we think that such reform is probably within the competence of the Rules Committee. In either case, reform would occur only following appropriate consultation.
[50] I note the Rules Committee has begun the process of reform. It is not for this Court to usurp the role of the Rules Committee, nor to contradict the Supreme Court.
[51] As for the submission that statute may not derogate from the common law, this is the purpose of statute.
[52] The Official Assignee’s delay in filing submissions does not justify striking out the application. However, it is a factor to be considered at the second stage of the test in Highgate on Broadway.
[53] Consent of the respondent is not necessary to the bankruptcy process. Nor is it necessary in an application for security for costs.
[54]I now turn to the test in Highgate on Broadway.
Is Mr DeMarco able to meet an award of costs?
[55] There appears to be no dispute on this matter. Mr DeMarco submits the Registrar of the Court of Appeal erred by not recognising his impecuniosity. He also submits an order that he pay security for costs will have the effect of ending his applications. I accept the threshold test is made out.
Are security for costs appropriate?
[56] I first consider the merits of the applications. As an order would put an end to Mr DeMarco’s applications and so stifle his right to access to justice, I must not make an order unless satisfied the claim is altogether without merit.
34 McGuire v Secretary for Justice [2018] NZSC 116, [2019] 1 NZLR 335.
[57] Mr DeMarco first submits the Registrar, and Courtney J, erred in relation to his assets and the grant of legal aid. He has annexed three documents to his affidavit of 26 April 2022 as evidence of this.
[58] Annexure “A” is a form in which Mr DeMarco answered questions relating to family trusts. In fact, annexure “A” is an email purporting to attach the form in question. The form itself is not annexed to the affidavit.
[59] The remaining documents are letters from the Legal Services Commissioner to his former counsel, Mr Tennet, dated 9 December 2021 and 8 April 2022. In both letters the Legal Services Commissioner asks for more information from Mr Tennet, and in the first says:
… previous applications have been refused on the grounds that Mr De Marco is not financially eligible. The current application shows exactly the same financial circumstances as previously.
[60] It goes without saying Mr Tennet no longer represents Mr DeMarco. It is not apparent, on this evidence, that the Registrar and Courtney J erred. Regardless, the correctness of the Court of Appeal decision is not in issue in this proceeding. What is relevant is the merits of the decisions Mr DeMarco seeks to challenge.
[61] Mr DeMarco’s case is that those decisions were arbitrary and appear biased. I can see no evidence of arbitrary decision making in the judgments. As above, Mr DeMarco’s consent was not required for his adjudication.
[62] Mr DeMarco correctly submits that the appearance of bias is enough to overturn a decision. If it appears the Judge in question has effectively determined Mr DeMarco’s case prior to considering it, his or her decision will be fundamentally flawed.
[63] But the decisions contain no evidence of bias. The decisions relate to disputes between Mr DeMarco and others. The Judges were required to determine which of the parties were correct. As it happens, the Judges agreed with the plaintiffs and made determinations unfavourable to Mr DeMarco. That Mr DeMarco lost his cases is not evidence of any bias against him.
[64] I consider if Mr DeMarco is to advance his appeals on these grounds, they have no prospect of success.
[65] Earlier affidavits of Mr DeMarco contain more detailed arguments on the merits of his applications. Much of these relate to his adjudication, however, which he does not challenge.35 Others relate to the finding of liability for misrepresentation in Anderson v DeMarco.36 But it appears Mr DeMarco is resiling from these arguments in favour of arguments based on consent and a misunderstanding of the common law.
[66] The Official Assignee submits Mr DeMarco has not challenged its decisions. This is correct, although Mr DeMarco’s claim that the applications have merit effectively amounts to such a challenge.
[67] The Official Assignee also submits Mr DeMarco has no standing to apply under s 226 as he has not shown a reasonable likelihood that, if successful, his bankrupt estate will return a surplus.37 It is possible Mr DeMarco has standing as his adjudication was based on the liability decision he seeks to challenge. Without further submissions I will not reach any firm conclusion on this point. Given my view of the merits of the applications, it is immaterial.
[68] I am satisfied the Official Assignee has not caused Mr DeMarco’s impecuniosity. Mr DeMarco suggests the Official Assignee is attempting to drain his bankrupt estate of assets. This has no connection to his ability to pay security for costs. Regardless, the Official Assignee’s costs are understandable in the context of multiple applications by Mr DeMarco requiring legal and other expenses.
[69] I also agree that Mr DeMarco has not been granted legal aid in the relevant proceedings. Mr DeMarco’s own evidence suggests he does not have legal aid and is unlikely to be granted it.
35 Mr DeMarco’s main submission is that prior to his bankruptcy he owned two aircraft that were worth well over the value of his debts, that those aircraft are currently in the hands of creditors that are failing to maintain them or to provide discovery on the maintenance of the aircraft, and that the Official Assignee is bowing to the wishes of creditors by ending the litigation.
36 Anderson v DeMarco [2020] NZHC 2979, above n 3, at [103].
37 Burgess v Official Assignee, above n 32, at [18].
[70] Most importantly, I agree with the submission that Mr DeMarco’s conduct favours making the order. Mr DeMarco increasingly makes clear that he will argue he does not consent to his own bankruptcy and that, in that context, the Court has no jurisdiction to make orders relating to him. The Official Assignee submits Mr DeMarco is abusing process in order to avoid paying his creditors, the victims of his fraud. This may also be a misguided but good faith attempt to seek what he perceives to be justice. Regardless, such arguments have no merit. Although an order that Mr DeMarco pay security for costs will have the effect of ending his applications, the threshold set by Kós J is met.
How much security should be paid?
[71] The Official Assignee submits the quantum of security for costs to be paid should be $12,428.00. The Official Assignee arrives at this figure by estimating 2B scale costs for the proceedings including an appearance at a mentions hearing on 7 April 2022, the preparation of two sets of written submissions (in relation to each proceeding), the preparation of the bundle for the hearing, an appearance at a one day hearing and sealing orders in both proceedings.
[72] The Official Assignee also seeks the proceeding be stayed until Mr DeMarco pays security for costs.
[73] The determination of the amount of security for costs to be paid is not a mathematical exercise and not necessarily to be based on the likely award of costs. It is a discretionary exercise based on what the Court thinks fit in all the circumstances.38
[74] The amount of security suggested by the Official Assignee, however, is sensible and below the Official Assignee’s likely actual costs.
[75] The Court will generally order a stay of proceedings until security is paid, unless special circumstances exist.39 No such circumstances are present in this case.
38 A S McLachlan Ltd v MEL Network Ltd (2002) 16 PRNZ 747 (CA) at [27].
39 Andrew Beck and others McGechan on Procedure (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at [HR5.45.11].
Costs on this application
[76]The Official Assignee also applies for the following costs on this application:
Step
Description
Days
Sum at
$2390/day
22
Filing interlocutory application for security for costs
0.6
$1,434.00
24
Preparation of written submissions
1.5
$3,585.00
25
Preparation by applicant of bundle for hearing
0.6
$1,434.00
26
Appearance at hearing
0.25
$597.50
29
Sealing order or judgment
0.2
$478.00
Total
3.15
$7,528.50
[77] The Official Assignee also seeks $1,000.00 in disbursements for the filing fee on its interlocutory application.
[78] Neither party makes submissions on costs. I am satisfied there is no reason against awarding costs to the Official Assignee. Mr DeMarco’s impecuniosity does not prevent an award of costs.40
Result
[79] I order Mr DeMarco to pay $12,428.00 as security for costs. That sum is to be paid into Court or to be secured to the satisfaction of the Registrar.
[80] Mr DeMarco’s applications under s 226 of the Insolvency Act 2006 (CIV-2021- 485-525 and CIV-2021-485-130) are stayed pending the payment of security for costs.
[81] The Official Assignee’s application for $7,528.50 in costs and $1,000.00 in disbursements is granted.
Woolford J
40 Foni v Foliaki [2018] NZHC 3126.
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